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Rating the relevance of QUORUM-selected ASRS incident narratives
to a "controlled flight into terrain" accident
MICHAEL W. MCGREEVY AND IRVING C. STATLER
NASA Ames Research Center
Summary
An exploratory study was conducted to identify
commercial aviation incidents that are relevant to a
"controlled flight into terrain" (CFIT) accident using a
NASA-developed text processing method. The
QUORUM method was used to rate 67820 incident
narratives, virtually all of the narratives in the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database,
according to their relevance to two official reports on
the crash of American Airlines Flight 965 near Cali,
Colombia in December 1995. For comparison with
QUORUM's ratings, three experienced ASRS analysts
read the reports of the crash and independently rated
the relevance of the 100 narratives that were most
highly rated by QUORUM, as well as 100 narratives
randomly selected from the database.
QUORUM successfully retrieved a large proportion of
incidents that are relevant to the Cali accident. Eighty-
four of 100 QUORUM-selected narratives were rated
as relevant to the Cali accident by one or more of the
analysts. Each analyst rated approximately two-thirds
of the QUORUM-selected narratives as relevant. Over
two-thirds of the incidents retrieved by QUORUM
were rated as relevant to the context, events,
problems, or human factors of the Cali accident. Over
half of the incidents were rated as relevant to the
causes of the accident. In addition, the QUORUM
collection of incidents was found to be significantly
more relevant than the random collection.
The 84 incidents that were rated as relevant to the Cali
accident involved a variety of factors, including over-
reliance on automation, confusion and changes during
descent/approach, terrain avoidance, and operations in
foreign airspace.
These results show that a QUORUM-derived query
model based on accident reports can be used
successfully to retrieve relevant incident reports.
Introduction
The relevance of commercial aviation incidents to
accidents is not firmly established by hard data, but
most analysts believe that incidents and accidents are
importantly related. Aviation accidents, which are
relatively rare, involve major injury to persons,
significant damage to property, or both. Incidents are
more common, but do not result in significant damage
or injury. Many aviation experts (e.g., Miller, 1998a;
Miller, 1998b) have long felt that accidents generally
involve chains of causation among otherwise
relatively minor factors that, taken together, lead to
serious consequences. These minor factors, occurring
in isolation, might otherwise result in an incident. By
identifying accident factors that also occur in
numerous incidents, it may be possible to break
critical links in the chain of causation.
The Cali accident
On the night of December 20, 1995, American
Airlines Flight 965, a Boeing 757 carrying 163
passengers and crew on a regularly scheduled flight
from Miami, Florida to Call, Colombia, crashed into
the side of a mountain, just short of its summit
(NTSB, 1996a; NTSB 1996b; McKenna, 1996a;
McKenna, 1996b; Kaiser, 1996). Only 4 passengers
survived the crash. This crash is classified as a CFIT
(controlled flight into terrain) accident. According to
Duke (1996), "CFIT remains the leading killer of
airliner occupants, far exceeding windshear or midair
collisions." For that reason, preventing CFIT accidents
is a high priority (Shifrin, 1998; McKenna, 1998a;
McKenna, 1998c; Anon., 1998; Roberts, 1996; Scott,
1996).
Because the accident happened in Colombia, it was
investigated by Aeronautica Civil of the Government of
Colombia. In accordance with international protocol,
assistance was provided by the U.S. National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), American Airlines, the
Allied Pilots Association, Boeing Commercial Airplane
Group, and Rolls Royce, Inc. In September, 1996,
Aeronautica Civil issued its report (Aeronautica Civil,
1996). In response to the accident and the Colombian
report, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
issued recommendations in the form of a letter to the
Federal Aviation Administration, dated October 16, 1996
(NTSB, 1996c).
Thesetwoofficial government accident report
documents cite a number of factors that contributed to
the Cali accident. These factors include, but are not
limited to:
• execution of a GPWS (ground proximity warning
system) escape maneuver without retracting speed
brakes and without angle of attack information
other than the stick shaker,
• loss of situational awareness by the flight crew,
• failure to recognize loss of situational awareness,
• additional workload imposed by a runway change
during an automation-aided approach,
• the effect of time pressure on execution of
procedures,
• over-reliance on the FMS (flight management
system),
• the loss of waypoint data when a direct clearance
was entered into the FMS,
• the potential for confusion when non-standard
names are used for standard terminal arrival
routes,
• the potential for confusion of two proximal
navigation beacons having the same identifier,
• use of the wrong navigational beacon,
• an unintended aircraft maneuver,
• inadvertent course deviation,
• miscommunication between flight crew and
controller (especially given the language and
cultural differences),
• over-reliance on ATC (air traffic control),
• problems with crew decision-making,
• the lack of commonality between instrument
approach charts and FMS displays,
• the lack of detailed terrain information on approach
charts,
• the lack of terrain information on FMS displays,
• the lack of radar coverage when accustomed to
having it,
• possible problems associated with commercial
aviation operations in Latin America.
ASRS incidents
While commercial aviation accidents are relatively
infrequent and typically involve seemingly unique
combinations of circumstances, commercial aviation
incidents are more common and can sometimes be seen to
fall into patterns. Since the causes of incidents are thought
to be related to the causes of accidents, considerable
effort has g,_ne into collecting incident reports for
analysis oflaeir safety implications. Many aviation safety
databases are currently in operation, each with its own
purposes and characteristics. (For examples of U.S.
government databases, see FAA, 1998). The Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database is of particular
interest because it contains a large number of narratives
written by those who directly observed, and usually
participated in, the incidents themselves.
According Io the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA,
1998), "The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is
a voluntary confidential and anonymous incident
reporting s) stem. It is a cooperative program established
under FAA Advisory Circular No. 00-46D, funded by the
FAA and administered by NASA. Information collected
by the ASRS is used to identify hazards and safety
discrepancies in the National Aviation Airspace System.
It is also used to formulate policy and to strengthen the
foundation of aviation human factors safety research."
The ASRS has been a major clearinghouse of commercial
aviation incident reports for over 20 years (Reynard,
Billings, Ct,eaney, and Hardy, 1986; ASRS, 1998). The
ASRS has received and processed over 300,000 incident
reports, including over 30,000 in 1997 alone. Nearly
70,000 reports are fully documented in the ASRS
database. Reports are typically submitted by flight crews,
but there are also many submissions by air traffic
controllers, cabin crews, ground crews, and others. Each
report in the database includes a narrative section, as well
as specializ-_xi data fields to aid in classification and
statistical aJaalyses. Many narrative sections include only
the original narrative received from the incident reporter,
but some contain additional material. This can include
supplemental information obtained from the incident
reporter thr3ugh "callback conversations," as well as
original narratives from others reporting the same
incident. Figure 1 shows a typical incident report.
QUORUM text processing
QUORUM is a collection of NASA-developed methods
and softwaJe for analyzing, modeling, and relevance-
ranking tex_ such as the narratives in the ASRS database.
QUORUM models text as a list of word pairs, each
accompankd by a measure of their contextual relatedness,
the proximi:y-weighted co-occurrence metric. Taken
together, th_se pair-wise word relations constitute a
weighted nt_twork model of the text. QUORUM
relevance-r inks text by comparing QUORUM models.
In a recent :_tudy (McGreevy, 1997), QUORUM was used
to relevance-rank sentences from a collection of news
stories describing the crash of TWA Flight 800, as well as
narrativesandsentencesfromvariouscollectionsof
ASRSnarratives.Thecriteriaofrelevanceincluded
typicalitywithinacollection,typicalitywithrespectto
textoutsidethecollection,associationwithoneormore
topics,andsimilaritytoexamplenarratives.Forexample,
QUORUMwasusedtoranksentencesfromASRS
narrativesaccordingtotheirrelevancetothenews tories,
andtorankthenarrativesinacollectionaccordingto
theirsimilaritytoparticularnarrativesofinterest.In
additiontomodelingforrelevance-ranking,QUORUM
modelinghasbeenusedforfine-grainedanalysisofa
collectionofmode-relatedASRSnarratives(McGreevy,
1996).Earlierwork,inwhichtheQUORUMmethodwas
initiallydeveloped,involvedmodelingofscientifictext
describingsatellite-basedvolcanology(McGreevy,1995).
Inpreviousstudies,QUORUMwasappliedtocollections
containinguptohundredsofASRSnarratives.Inthe
presents udy,QUORUMwasappliedtoallofthe
narrativesintheASRSdatabasethatwereavailableatthe
startofthestudy,acollectionof67820narratives.In
earlierstudies,QUORUMrelevance-rankedhundredsof
ASRSnarrativesbasedonafewothernarrativesoron
approximatelyI00briefnewsaccountsof anaviation
disaster.Inthepresentstudy,QUORUMwasusedtorank
allofthenarrativesoftheASRSdatabaseaccordingto
theirelevancetotwoofficialgovernmentaccident
reports.Finally,thisisthefirstQUORUMstudyinwhich
ASRSanalystshaveratedtheresults.
Design of the study
This was an informal, exploratory study, designed to
obtain the first relevance ratings of QUORUM-
selected narratives by qualified ASRS analysts. The
study was primarily intended to see if a useful
proportion of relevant incidents might be retrieved by
using an accident report as the source of the query
model. The study was further intended to provide
some insight into the nature of the operational topics
contained in the relevant incidents, and whether those
topics might have a bearing on the prevention of
future accidents.
From the point of view of improving QUORUM's
performance, the study was intended to provide
insight into the similarities and differences between
QUORUM's ratings of relevance and those of
analysts. The use of six different assertions of
relevance was intended to provide information
regarding the kinds of relevance found among
QUORUM-selected reports. This is of particular
interest to those seeking incidents having relevance to
the causes of the Call accident.
In addition to the informal, exploratory questions
above, the study also involved the experimental
question of whether QUORUM performs significantly
better than chance. Thus, as a control, 100 randomly
selected narratives were also rated by the analysts.
This provides one estimate of the distribution in the
ASRS database of narratives that are relevant to the
Cali accident. Without the control, it would be
difficult to interpret QUORUM's performance. The
tested hypothesis was: The mean relevance rating of
incidents in the collection of QUORuM-selected
incidents is significantly higher than the estimated
mean relevance rating of the 67820 incidents from the
ASRS database.
Method of the study
Two official government documents that describe and
analyze the Cali accident were used to rank 67820
incident narratives from the Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS) database according to their relevance to
the Cali accident. The 100 narratives having the highest
relevance-ranking values were selected for inclusion in
the study. An additional 100 incident narratives were
selected at random from among the 67820 narratives.
None of the narratives in the random collection were also
among the 100 narratives of the relevance-ranked
collection. Three professional incident analysts from the
ASRS read the Cali documents, and read and rated each
of the 200 incident narratives according to their relevance
to the Cali accident. The analysts had no indication of
QUORUM's ratings, nor did they know that half the
incidents had been selected randomly.
Analysts
Each of the analysts has had extensive experience in
commercial aviation operations. The analysts include:
• a retired air carrier pilot with 50 years of aviation
experience including 8 in the U. S. Air Force, 33 with
a major U. S. air carrier, and 9 as an ASRS analyst;
• a retired air traffic controller with 33 years experience
at tower, TRACON, and center facilities and 6
months experience as an analyst at the ASRS, and;
• a retired corporate pilot with 22 years of flying
experience and 9 years experience as an analyst and
research scientist at ASRS.
Procedure
Modeling the Cali documents-- QUORUM was
used to model the Call documents and to generate a
query model based on those documents. The method
is described in detail in appendix 1. QUORUM
methods are described in even greater detail in
McGreevy(1997),McGreevy(1996),andMcGreevy
(1995).Inmodelingtext,QUORUMgenerateslistsof
wordpairsthatareoftenfoundincloseproximityin
thetext.Foreachwordpair,it calculatesaproximity-
weightedco-occurrencem tric.Thismetricindicates
thetendencyofthetwowordstobefoundinthesame
context.A wordpairandthecorrespondingrelational
metricvalue(RMV)iscalledaQUORUMrelation.
TheinitialmodeloftheCalidocumentsconsistedof
5000QUORUMrelations,whilethequerymodel
consistedof2436QUORUMrelations(table1).So-
called"stopwords"(e.g.,the,is,was,and,or,though)
werenotincludedin themodel.Becausealltextinthe
ASRSnarratives(andtheirmodels)isinuppercase
format,theCalidocumentswerecapitalizedpriorto
modeling.All ofthetextintheCalidocumentswas
used,includingnotonlythebodyofthetext,butalso
suchtextasthetableofcontents,headers,tables,lists,
andreferences.
TheinitialmodeloftheCalidocumentscouldbeused
directlyasaquerymodel,butthishastwomajor
drawbacks.First,thevocabularyoftheCali
documentsdoesnotmatchtheabbreviationsofthe
ASRSnarratives.Second,useofthedocumentmodel
tendstoretrieveincidentshatarerelevantinahighly
genericway.Inparticular,theincidentsendto
involvetheapproachphase,butwithoutemphasison
theaspectsoftheCaliaccidentthatmakeit unusual.
Toeliminatethevocabularymismatchproblem,the
prominentCallvocabularywasmappedtotheASRS
databaseabbreviationspriortomodeling.For
example,thewordpair"firstofficer"wasmappedto
"FO"andtheword"approach"wasmappedto
"APCH".Thesemappingswouldbeunnecessaryif a
collectionofASRSincidentreportswereusedto
generatethequerymodelbecausethevocabulary
wouldbeidentical.
Toeliminateheproblemofretrievingeneric
incidents,theinitialmodeloftheCalidocumentswas
transformed.Therelationalmetricvalueofeachword
pairintheinitialdocumentmodelwasdividedbythe
relationalmetricvalueofthatwordpairinall67820
narrativesfromtheASRSdatabase.Thistendsto
disfavorwordpairs uchasAPCHRWY(approach
andrunway)sincetheyaresocommoni theASRS
database.Notice,however,thatsuchgenericword
pairsarenoteliminated,justdevalued.Theweighting
favorswordpairsthatoftensharethesamecontextsin
theCalidocuments,butonlyrarelydosointheASRS
database.Forexample,thewordpairTERRAIN
CALIisexceedinglyrareintheASRSdatabase,but
prominentintheCali documents, so it gains
prominence.
If a pair of words is never present, proximal, or
sufficiently proximal, then it falls out of the query
model. For example, the word pair "Civil
Aeronautica" is very prominent in the Cali documents,
but never occurs in the ASRS database, so it falls out
of the query model. The point at which occurring
word pairs fall out of the model depends on the
resolution ot the document models. A single
occurrence c f a word pair is included in the initial
model of the Cali documents if the two words are
separated by no more than 12 other words. This is
more than sr fficient resolution for modeling the text.
The method of favoring certain co-occurrences is, by
itself, somewhat brittle since even marginally
important word pairs from the Cali documents can
appear to be very important in the query if they are
very rare, but present, in the ASRS database. To adjust
for this, the relational metric value associated with
each word pair is also multiplied by the frequencies of
those words in the Cali documents. Thus, word pairs
in the query model are favored if each of the words is
important in the Cali documents, if the word pairs are
often found :n the same contexts in the Cali
documents, -'tnd if they are rarely found together in the
ASRS database.
There remains an effect of "out-of-domain"
vocabulary, which was not addressed in this study.
This is a problem in which words such as "accident,"
which are ccmmon in the Cali documents, are given
excessive irr ponance due to their rarity in the ASRS
database. This problem could have been addressed,
but it would have required manual tuning of the
models. While one of the strengths of QUORUM is
that its models are fully accessible and finely tunable,
it was decided that, for the sake of this exercise, it
would be be:ter only to use methods that can be
applied with little or no human intervention. Fine-
tuning is adciressed in more detail in the discussion
section.
Modeling the ASRS incident narratives--
QUORUM was used to model each of the 67820
ASRS incid_'nt narratives, producing 67820 models. In
modeling ea:h of the narratives, QUORUM generated
lists of word pairs that are often found in close
proximity in the text. For each word pair, a proximity-
weighted co occurrence metric was computed. This
metric indicates the tendency of the two words to be
found in the same context. For this study, each model
was limited to 100 word pairs and their associated
relational metric values, that is, 100 QUORUM
relations.Thus,the67820narrativesweremodeledas
6,782,000QUORUMrelations.Figure2showsan
exampleofoneofthenarratives,andtable2showsa
QUORUMmodelofthatnarrative.
Asusual,thevocabularyof theASRSnarrativeswas
standardizedslightlyforconsistency.Such
standardizationisappropriate,houghnotstrictly
necessary,forallQUORUM-basedprocessingofthe
ASRSdatabase.It isonlydoneduringthemodeling
phase,anddoesnothaveanyeffectonthereportsin
thedatabase.Examplesofthisstandardizationinclude
mappingreferencesto"FIt" (firstofficer)to"FO",
andmappingavarietyofreferencestovariousmakes
andmodelsofaircrafttosinglerepresentations.For
example,"Boeing757","B-757","B757",anda
varietyofotherformsweremappedto"B757".In
addition,somewordpairsthatfunctionasunitswere
linked,suchasFLT_CREW,SPD_BRAKE,and
ACR_X.
It ispossibleforaparticularpairofwordstobe
presentwithinthesamenarrative,andyettheirdegree
ofco-occurrencecouldbetoosmallforthewordpair
tobeincludedin themodel.Sinceachnarrative,
whetherlongorshort,waslimitedto100QUORUM
relationsforthisstudy,theminimumresolutionofthe
modelvariesfromnarrativetonarrative.Giventhe
averagenumberofwordsinanarrativeof219anda
contextwindowof_+20words,theminimumrelational
metricvalueistypicallyaround19.Thismeansthata
singleoccurrenceofawordpairinanarrativewill
appearinthemodelif thetwowordsareimmediately
adjacenttoeachother.Thisisprobablyexcessive
resolution.Giventhemaximumwordcountof 1479
andacontextwindowof_+20words,theminimum
relationalmetricvalueistypicallyaround47.This
meansthatwowordswouldhavetoappearinclose
proximity(thoughnotnecessarilyimmediately
adjacent)3ormoretimesbeforebeingincludedinthe
model.If greaterresolutionisrequired,longer
narrativescouldbemodeledusingmorerelations,in
ordertobringtheminimumrelationalmetricvalueto
alowervaluesuchas19.
Retrieving incident narratives--- In order to find the
ASRS incident narratives that are most relevant to the
Cali accident, the Cali query model was compared
with each of the 67820 narrative models to produce a
relevance-ranking value for each narrative. The
method is described in appendix I. The narratives
with the 100 highest relevance-ranking values were
selected for use in the study.
To compare a query model and a narrative model,
their intersection is found, producing an intersection
model. The intersection model represents features of
the narrative that are relevant to the Cali accident. The
intersection model contains word pairs that appear in
both the query model and the narrative model. For
example, table 2 shows a narrative model in which
word pairs that are also in the Cali query model are
highlighted in bold italics. So, for example, since there
is a relation in the query model that contains the words
APCH (approach) and CHART, as well as a relation
in the narrative model containing the same words, the
word pair APCH CHART (or CHART APCH, since
order doesn't matter in this situation) is included
among the word pairs in the intersection model.
The relational metric value (RMV) associated with
each word pair of the intersection model is the product
of the RMV in the query model and the RMV in the
narrative model. For example, the word pair APCH
CHART has an RMV of 277 in the query model (table
1) and 67 in the narrative model (table 2) to produce
an RMV of 18559 in the intersection model (table 3).
Table 3 also shows the other relations of the
intersection model for narrative 310130.
In addition to an intersection model, table 3 also
shows an example of how the relevance-ranking value
(RRV) of a narrative is derived from its intersection
model. Three factors are taken into consideration. The
first factor is the sum of the weights (RMVs) of the
intersection relations. This is a measure of the
prominence in the Cali document and the prominence
in the narrative. If this factor is high, then one or
several elements of the incident are prominent in the
Call accident. The second factor is the fraction of the
narrative model that intersects with the query model.
This reflects the extent to which the commonalities of
the incident and the Cali accident are central to the
incident. Since this was found to favor short
narratives, a third factor (the length factor) favors
longer reports by multiplying by the number of words
in the narrative, divided by the largest likely number
of words.
The product of these three factors, the relevance-
ranking value (RRV), was calculated for each of the
67820 narratives. The 100 narratives having the
largest RRVs were collected for use in this study.
There is a simpler, but more abstract way to describe
the calculation of the relevance-ranking value (RRV).
That is, if the query model and the narrative models
are considered to be vectors, then an RRV consists of
the inner product of the query vector and a narrative
vector, multiplied by the fraction-of-intersection factor
and the length factor.
Anunused,butpossiblybeneficialscalefactoristhe
fractionofthequerymodelthatintersectshe
narrativemodel.Thiscouldsupplementthecombined
weightsoftheintersectionrelationsbyfurther
reflectingtheextenttowhichthecommonalitiesofthe
incidentandtheCallaccidentarecentraltothe
accident.
Forthesakeofcomparison,another100incident
narrativeswererandomlyselectedfromthedatabase.
Thisisusefulbecauseit isnotknownhowmany
incidentsintheASRSdatabasearerelevanttotheCali
accident.If thedatabasewerededicatedtoCali-like
incidents(whichit isnot)thenevenarandom
collectionofnarrativeswouldcontainalargefraction
ofrelevantreports.Ontheotherhand,it mightbethat
onlyafewreportsarerelevanttoCali.Withoutsome
ideaofthenumberofrelevantreportsinthedatabase,
it wouldbedifficultointerpretQUORUM'sabilityto
findthemostrelevantreports.Theproportionof
relevantnarrativesamongtherandomlyselected
narrativesisanestimateof theproportionofrelevant
narrativesin thedatabase.Bycomparingtheanalysts'
ratingsoftherandomcollectionwiththeirratingsof
theQUORUM-selectedcollection,it ispossibletosee
if QUORUMperformedanybetterthanchance.
Theorderofthe200incidentnarrativeswas
randomized,andthenarrativeswereprintedand
bound.Withgenerousinter-linespacingtoease
reading,thecollectionfilled141pages.Onecopywas
providedtoeachanalyst.
Rating by ASRS analysts-- The three analysts each
read the Cali documents as their schedules permitted.
They then participated in a one hour brainstorming
meeting to discuss among themselves the diversity of
issues raised by the documents. The analysts then read
the 200 narratives and rated their relevance, as their
schedules permitted. Their instructions are shown in
appendix 2, figure 1. A sample page from the bound
book of narratives is shown in appendix 2, figure 2.
For each narrative, the analysts responded to six
assertions of relevance:
A) In some ways, the context of this incident is similar to
the context of the Cali accident.
B) Some of the events of this incident are similar to some
of the events of the Cali accident.
C) Some of the problems of this incident are similar to
some of the problems of the Cali accident.
D) Some of the human factors of this incident are similar
to some of the human factors of the Cali accident.
E) Some of the causes of this incident are similar to some
of the cause s of the Cali accident.
F) In some _vays, this incident is relevant to the Cali
accident.
The purpose of the multiple statements was to assert
relevance in a number of familiar and operationally
useful ways. Specifically, the first five statements
assert various aspects of relevance without using the
word "relevance," and the last statement asserts
relevance directly without specifying what aspect of
relevance is involved.
The assertions refer to six factors of relevance:
context, events, problems, human factors, causes, and
one or more unspecified factors. That is, they refer to
six kinds of relevance, the last of which is unspecified.
The degree of orthogonality of these factors (the
extent of their conceptual independence) is not at
issue. Further, it is not required that any particular
incident have multiple factors of relevance in order to
be considered relevant. Since QUORUM makes no
claim to detect any particular kind of relevance, any
kind of relevance is acceptable. Accordingly, if the
incident is relevant in any way, it is considered to be
relevant.
This breakdown of kinds of relevance, however, does
allow the specific nature of the relevance to be
reviewed. This is especially useful because causal
relevance is of particular interest to investigators of
accidents and incidents. If QUORUM found incidents
having only contextual relevance but no other kinds of
relevance, it would have limited practical value. The
use of mult;ple assertions of relevance allows a review
of this aspe_:t of QUORUM's performance.
For each su_tement, the analysts selected from among
seven responses:
1) strongly disagree
2) disagree
3) somewhl,t disagree
4) undecided
5) somewhat agree
6) agree
7) strongly agree
The essential purpose of the responses was to see
whether the analysts rated the narratives as relevant or
irrelevant. 7?hus, a rating of 5, 6, or 7 indicates a rating
of "relevan,," while a rating of 1, 2, or 3 indicates a
rating of "ir._elevant. ''
Finding the extent to which the analysts agreed with
the assertions of relevance was a secondary goal. By
having these levels of agreement, it is possible to gain
insightintothestrengthof analysts'opinionsthat
incidentsare relevantandwhichnarrativesare
consideredtobethemostrelevant.
Theanalystsusedprintedresponseformstorecord
theirratings.A samplepagefromtheresponseform
bookletisshowninappendix2,figure3.
Asanexampleoftheresultingdata,theratingsof
incidentnarrative310130areshownintable4.
Resultsof the study
TheresultsofthisstudyindicatethatQUORUM
successfullyretrievedalargeproportionofincidentshat
werejudgedtoberelevanttotheCaliaccident.Thatis,
QUORUMrelevance-ranked67820incidentnarratives
fromtheASRSdatabase,andthetop100ofthesewere
judgedtocontainalargeproportionofrelevantincidents.
Specifically,eighty-fourincidentswereratedbyoneor
moreoftheanalystsasrelevanttotheCaliaccident.Each
oftheanalystsratednearlytwo-thirdsoftheQUORUM's
top100incidentsasrelevanttotheCaliaccident.
Theresultsin thefollowingsectionsarepresentedfroma
varietyofviewpoints.First,theratingsbyeachanalyst
areshown,comparingtheproportionofrelevantincidents
intheQUORUMcollectiontothatin therandom
collection.Next,theratingsofeachofthesixassertions
ofrelevanceareshown,indicatingtheproportionof
incidentsratedasrelevanttothecontext,events,
problems,humanfactors,causes,andunspecifiedfactors
oftheCaliaccident.Followingthis,thedegreeof
relevanceoftheQUORUMcollectioniscomparedwith
thatoftherandomcollection.Thisisbasedonthenumber
ofassertionsofrelevancetowhichtheanalystsagreed,
foreachincident.
Next,thestrengthofanalysts'opinionsi presented,based
onthesevenlevelsofagreementtheanalystsusedin
ratingeachnarrative.Thesedataarealsousedtosorthe
collectionsofincidentsonrelevance.
Severalggregationsofthedataarealsoshown,including
acomparisonfthemeanrelevanceratingsofthe
QUORUMcollectionandtherandomcollection,a
measureoftheconsistencyofratingsamongthesix
assertionsofrelevance,andcorrelationsamongthe
ratingsoftheanalystsandbetweentheratingsofthe
analystsandQUORUM.
ThesevariousviewpointsindicatethatQUORUM
successfullyretrievedalargeproportionofincidentshat
arerelevanttotheCaliaccident.Thisshowsthata
QUORuM-derivedquerymodelbasedonaccident
reportscanbeusedwithhighprecisiontoretrieve
relevantincidentreports.Theresultsalsoindicatethat
QUORUMperformedsignificantlybetterthanchance.
Inaddition,theresultsindicatethatheratingsamongthe
analysts,andbetweenQUORUMandtheanalysts,were
consistent,thoughnotidentical.Theissueofdifferences
ofopinionamongtheanalysts,andbetweentheanalysts
andQUORUM,isaddressedinthediscussionsection
Thediscussionsectionalsoincludesanoutlineofthe
operationaltopicscontainedintherelevantincidents
selectedbyQUORUM.Thesetopicsclearlyhavea
bearingonthepreventionoffutureaccidents.
(Note:Referencestoanalystsbynumber,suchas"analyst
1",areunrelatedtotheorderthattheanalystsarelistedin
themethodsection,"Analysts.")
Incidents rated relevant by each analyst
The results indicate that each of the analysts rated a
large proportion of the QUORuM-selected incident
narratives as relevant to the Cali accident. Each
analyst found that approximately two-thirds of the
QUORUM-selected narratives are relevant, compared
with approximately one quarter of the randomly
selected incidents (figure 3). Specifically, figure 3
shows that analyst 1 found 63 of 100 QUORUM-
selected narratives to be relevant, compared with only
24 of 100 randomly selected narratives. Similarly,
analyst 2 found 71 of 100 QUORuM-selected
narratives to be relevant, compared with only 23 of
100 randomly selected narratives. Further, analyst 3
found 70 of 100 QUORuM-selected narratives to be
relevant, compared with only 19 of 100 randomly
selected narratives.
Incidents rated relevant to each factor
Figure 4 shows that the analysts rated a large
proportion of the incident narratives in the QUORUM
collection as relevant to the context, events, problems,
human factors, causes, and unspecified factors of the
Cali accident. Seventy of I00 QUORUM-selected
narratives were rated as relevant to the context of the
Call accident by one or more of the three analysts.
Similarly, seventy of 100 narratives were rated as
relevant to events of the accident, seventy-four of 100
narratives were rated as relevant to problems of the
Cali accident, and 67 of 100 narratives were rated as
relevant to human factors of the accident. While
QUORUM is not designed to detect any particular
kind of relevance, it is interesting to note that 54 of the
100 QUORUM-selected narratives were rated as
causally relevant. Causal relevance is a stringent
criterion, yet over half the narratives QUORUM rated
as relevant were rated by the analysts as causally
relevant.Theanalystsrated61narrativesa relevant
tounspecifiedfactorsof the Cali accident.
By comparison, figure 5 shows that few narratives in
the random collection were rated as relevant to the
context, events, problems, human factors, causes, or
unspecified factors of the Cali accident. The analysts
rated 10 of 100 randomly selected narratives as
relevant to the context of the Cali accident, and 19 of
100 as relevant to events of the accident. They rated
23 of 100 narratives as relevant to problems of the
Cali accident, and 26 of 100 narratives as relevant to
human factors of the accident. The analysts rated 14 of
100 narratives as relevant to causes of the Cali
accident, and 5 of 100 as relevant to unspecified
factors.
In figures 4 and 5, a narrative is counted as relevant if
at least one of the analysts agreed to the corresponding
assertion of relevance. For example, the pie chart in
figure 4 labeled "Events" shows 75 relevant narratives
because for each of 75 narratives, at least one of the
analysts agreed with the statement: "Some of the
events of this incident are similar to some of the
events of the Call accident." This approach to scoring
is intended to reflect the expectation that each of the
analysts bases his judgments of relevance on
experiences, expertise, and insights that do not
necessarily intersect with those of the other analysts.
In addition, there is evidence that when analysts
disagree among themselves about the presence of
relevant factors, the analyst denying that presence
overlooked relevant factors. This issue is explored in
the discussion section in "Disagreements among
analysts."
Consensus among analysts
The analysts did not always agree on which incidents
are relevant. As shown in figure 6, all three analysts
rated 48 of 100 QUORUM-selected incidents as
relevant, compared with only 9 of the randomly
selected incidents. At least two of three analysts rated
72 of 100 QUORUM-selected narratives as relevant,
compared with only 16 of 100 randomly selected
narratives. At least one of three analysts rated 84 of
100 QUORUM-selected narratives as relevant,
compared with 41 of 100 randomly selected
narratives.
Whether rating QUORUM-selected incidents or
randomly selected ones, the analysts agreed among
themselves regarding the relevance of about two-
thirds of the incidents. The pie chart on the left in
figure 6 shows that 48 of 100 QUORUM-selected
incidents were rated as relevant by all three analysts,
and 16 of 1COwere not rated as relevant by any of the
three analysts, for a total of 64 unanimous ratings. In
comparison, 36 of the QUORUM-selected incidents
were rated as relevant by one or two of the analysts
but not by the other analyst(s). Similarly, the pie chart
on the right in figure 6 shows that 9 of 100 randomly
selected incidents were rated as relevant by all three
analysts, and 59 of 100 were not rated as relevant by
any of the ff_ree analysts, for a total of 68 unanimous
ratings. In comparison, 32 of 100 randomly selected
incidents were rated as relevant by one or two of the
analysts and not by the other analyst(s).
Disagreements among the analysts, and some
incidents about which they disagree, are reviewed in
more detail :n the discussion section in
"Disagreements among analysts."
Degree of relevance of the collections
If a collection contains a large proportion of incident
narratives that are highly relevant, then that collection
is itself highly relevant. One measure of the degree of
relevance of a particular narrative is the number of
assertions of relevance to which one or more analysts
agree. For example, if an analyst agrees with one
assertion of relevance, it would indicate that the
narrative is relevant, while agreement with two
assertions o__relevance would indicate that the
narrative ha:, a higher degree of relevance. Agreement
with six assertions of relevance would indicate a very
high degree of relevance. Thus, to gain insight into the
degree of relevance of a collection of incidents, it is
useful to see the number of narratives that are relevant
to a particular number of assertions of relevance.
Accordingl), figure 7 shows the number of incident
narratives r_ted as relevant to the Cali accident in
response to N of six assertions of relevance, for values
of N ranging from 6 to 1.
The two pie charts of figure 7 show that the analysts
rated many ,gf the QUORuM-selected incidents as
highly relevant, while few of the randomly selected
incidents were rated as highly relevant. Thus, the
QUORUM ,::ollection has a high degree of relevance,
while the raadom collection has a low degree of
relevance, a_ indicated by the following observations.
In rating 45 of the 100 QUORUM-selected incidents,
each of the t,ix assertions of relevance was agreed to
by one or more of the analysts. That is, 45 of the 100
QUORUM-selected incidents were judged to be
relevant to tt_e context, events, problems, human
factors, causes, and unspecified factors of the Cali
accident. In comparison, only 3 of the 100 randomly
selected incidents were judged to have all six
relevance factors. Twelve of the 100 QUORUM-
selectedincidentswerejudgedtohavexactlyfiveof
therelevancefactors,oatotaloffifty-sevenof100
QUORUM-selectedincidentswerejudgedtohaveat
least5oftherelevancefactors.Incomparison,only5
ofthe100randomlyselectedincidentsweresimilarly
judged.Nineofthe100QUORUM-selectedincidents
werejudgedtohavexactly4oftherelevancefactors,
soatotalof66of 100QUORUM-selectedincidents
werejudgedtohaveatleast4oftherelevancefactors.
Incomparison,only8ofthe100randomlyselected
incidentsweresimilarlyjudged.Sixofthe100
QUORuM-selectedincidentswerejudgedtohave
exactly3oftherelevancefactors,soatotalof72of
the100QUORuM-selectedincidentswerejudgedto
haveatleast3oftherelevancefactors.Incomparison,
only16ofthe100randomlyselectedincidentswere
similarlyjudged.Fiveofthe100QUORUM-selected
incidentswerejudgedtohaveexactly2ofthe
relevancefactors,oatotalof77ofthe100
QUORuM-selectedincidentswerejudgedtohaveat
least2oftherelevancefactors.Incomparison,only
24ofthe100randomlyselectedincidentswere
similarlyjudged.
Finally,sevenofthe100QUORUM-selected
incidentswerejudgedtohaveexactlyoneofthe
relevancefactors,soatotalof84ofthe100
QUORuM-selectedincidentswerejudgedtohaveat
leastoneoftherelevancefactors.Incomparison,only
41ofthe100randomlyselectedincidentswere
similarlyjudged.Thus,84ofthe100QUORUM-
selectedincidentswerejudgedtoberelevanttothe
context,events,problems,humanfactors,causes,
and/orunspecifiedfactorsoftheCaliaccident.
Taken together, these results indicate that the
QUORUM collection has a high degree of relevance,
while the random collection has a low degree of
relevance.
Strength of analysts' opinions
In responding to each of the six assertions of relevance,
the analysts varied in their level of agreement or
disagreement. This was captured by the 7-level response
scale shown in the section, "Rating by ASRS analysts."
So, for example, if the analysts agreed with the assertion
that "Some of the human factors of this incident are
similar to some of the human factors of the Cali
accident," they could "somewhat agree," "agree," or
"strongly agree." If they disagreed with that assertion,
they could "somewhat disagree," "disagree," or "strongly
disagree." They were also free to declare that they were
"undecided."
In rating the random collection of 100 incidents, each
analyst provided, in effect, his estimate of the number of
incidents likely to be found at each level of agreement in
any random sample of 100 incidents. In rating the
QUORUM collection of 100 incidents, each analyst
specified how many incidents at each level were actually
retrieved by QUORUM. For example, regarding the level
of agreement "strongly agree," the three pie charts on the
right in figure 8 show that one is unlikely to find any
incidents among a random collection of 100 incidents
about which the analysts would "strongly agree" with an
assertion of relevance. In contrast, the three pie charts on
the left in figure 8 show that the analysts "strongly
agreed" that 4 to 15 incidents in the QUORUM collection
are relevant to the Cali accident. Here are the details.
Analyst 1 did not "strongly agree" that any of the
incidents in the random collection are relevant to the Call
accident, but "strongly agreed" that 4 of the QUORUM
collection are relevant. Similarly, analyst 2 did not
"strongly agree" that any of the random incidents are
relevant, but "strongly agreed" that 12 of the QUORUM
collection are relevant. Finally, analyst 3 "strongly
agreed" that 1 incident from the random collection is
relevant, but "strongly agreed" that 15 of the QUORUM
collection are relevant. Thus, QUORUM performed much
better than chance.
Similarly, regarding the level of agreement "agree," the
three pie charts on the right in figure 8 show that one is
unlikely to find more than a few incidents, among a
random collection of 100 incidents, about which the
analysts would "agree" with an assertion of relevance. In
contrast, the three pie charts on the left in figure 8 show
that the analysts "agree" that 20 to 31 of the incidents in
the QUORUM collection are relevant to the Cali accident.
Here are the details. Analyst 1 "agreed" that I of the
incidents in the random collection is relevant to the Cali
accident, but "agreed" that 24 of the QUORUM collection
are relevant. Similarly, analyst 2 "agreed" that 1 of the
random incidents is relevant, but "agreed" that 31 of the
QUORUM collection are relevant. Finally, analyst 3
"agreed" that 4 incidents from the random collection are
relevant, but "agreed" that 20 of the QUORUM collection
are relevant. Again, QUORUM performed much better
than chance.
Each of the remaining levels can be interpreted in a
similar fashion. This analysis leads to the conclusion that
the analysts more strongly agreed that the QUORUM-
selected incidents, rather than the randomly selected ones,
are relevant to the Cali accident. Further, the analysts
more strongly disagreed that the randomly selected
incidents are relevant.
Appendix3 presents the data in a different way. It uses
the strength-of-opinion data to sort the incidents
according to relevance. In appendix 3, table 1, all 100
QUORUM-selected incident narratives are shown sorted
in order of their ratings by the analysts. In appendix 3,
table 2, all 100 randomly selected incident narratives are
shown sorted in order of their ratings by the analysts.
While there are several useful ways to sort these tables on
relevance, the method that was used sorts on the number
of scores at each level of agreement. Thus, if all three
analysts strongly agreed with any of the assertions of
relevance for a particular incident, then that incident is
considered to be more relevant than one for which only
two analysts strongly agreed with assertions of relevance.
Further, if a single analyst strongly agrees that an incident
is relevant, that incident is ranked as more relevant than
one in which all three analysts merely agreed, but none
agreed strongly. A review of the narratives themselves
suggests that this sorting method produces a list that is
reasonably well-sorted on degree of relevance.
In figure 8 and in appendix 3, each analyst's highest rating
across the six assertions of relevance is used to
characterize each narrative because an agreement with
any assertion of relevance is an acknowledgment that the
narrative has some kind of relevance. For example, if an
analyst "strongly agrees" with the assertion that the
human factors of an incident are relevant to the Cali
accident, but disagrees that there are other similarities, it
remains true that the analyst "strongly agrees" that the
narrative has relevance to the Cali accident.
The significance of QUORUM's performance
A simple test was conducted to investigate the
significance of the difference between the estimated mean
relevance rating of the 67820 incident narratives from the
ASRS database, and the mean relevance rating of the
collection of QUORUM-selected incident narratives. The
mean rating of the collection of randomly selected
incidents was used as an estimate of the mean relevance
rating of the ASRS database. The hypothesis being tested
was that the mean relevance rating of incidents in the
collection of QUORUM-selected incidents is significantly
higher than the estimated mean relevance rating of the
67820 incidents from the ASRS database. If true, this
would indicate that QUORUM had performed
significantly better than chance.
One rating was used to represent each incident narrative:
the highest rating across response statements and analysts.
This rating indicates whether any of the analysts judged
the incident to be relevant in any of the six ways (context,
events, problems, human factors, causes, or unspecified
relevance).
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The mean radng of the QUORUM collection, averaged
across narratives, is 5.40. The mean rating of the random
collection, averaged across narratives, is 3.61.
Based on the ratings, the test statistic t (Kanji, 1993, pg.
27) is equal to 13.275. Comparing this value with
Student's t distribution with 99 degrees of freedom
(Snedecor and Cochran, 1989, pg. 466), the probability of
achieving a value of this magnitude is less than 0.001.
That is, there is less than 1 chance in I000 that the mean
rating of QUORUM's collection could have been
achieved by random sampling.
Thus, the mean rating of incidents in the collection of
QUORUM-selected incidents is significantly higher than
the estimated mean rating of the 67820 incidents from the
ASRS database. Such performance is very unlikely to
have been achieved by chance.
Consistency among the assertions of relevance
Cronbach's alpha, a measure of the internal consistency of
a collection of response statements (Spector, 1992), was
used to mea._ure the consistency among the six assertions
of relevance. Cronbach's alpha measures how well the
statements reflect a common, underlying construct. A
value of 0.7 or greater is considered to be an indication of
internal consistency.
Based on the analysts' ratings of the 200 narratives,
Cronbach's alpha is 0.962, indicating that responses to the
six assertions of relevance are highly intercorrelated, and
that the resp_mses to the individual statements reflect
responses to a common, underlying construct.
Cronbach's alpha does not guarantee that the meaning of
the common, underlying construct is the same as the
intended meaning. That meaning is carried by the
wording of the assertions, and must be interpreted by the
analysts.
The purpose of the multiple statements was to assert
relevance in a number of familiar and operationally
useful ways Specifically, the first five statements
assert various aspects of relevance without using the
word "relevance," and the last statement asserts
relevance directly without specifying what aspect of
relevance is involved. The wording of the assertions
centers on two concepts. The first concept is similarity
between features of an incident and features of an
accident. TI:.e second concept is the relevance of an
incident to _n accident. Cronbach's alpha indicates that
the statemer_ts based on these concepts elicited
consistent r_:sponses from the analysts. The high value
of Cronbact's alpha indicates that, as intended, the
various que: tions did address a single underlying
concept,which,inthiscase,couldbecalledeither
featuresimilarityorrelevance.
Whiletheintendedmeaningoftheassertionsisclear,the
analysts'ratingshowthattheassertionsmeasurewhat
wasintended.A readingoftheincidentsratedhighestby
theanalysts(e.g.,the10incidentsinappendix4)
indicatesthatheyarehighlyrelevant to the Cali accident.
Those rated lowest generally have little or no relevance.
This is further evidence that the six assertions of
relevance do, in fact, measure analyst's opinions of
relevance.
Correlations
The broad pattern of agreement among the analysts, and
between the analysts and QUORUM, can be seen by
looking at the correlations among the ratings. Since any
kind of relevance is of interest, the maximum rating
across assertions of relevance is used to calculate the
correlations reported here. Further, the correlations are
based on the ratings of all 200 narratives. Given the 198
degrees of freedom, these observed values of r, the
correlation coefficient, are all statistically significant at
the 1% level (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989, pg. 473).
X Y r
analyst 2 analyst 3 0.706
analyst 1 analyst 2 0.616
analyst 1 analyst 3 0.573
QUORUM analyst 3 0.590
QUORUM analyst 2 0.560
QUORUM analyst 1 0.489
Among the analysts, the ratings of analysts 2 and 3 are
most correlated, while the ratings of analysts 1 and 3 are
least correlated. QUORUM's ratings are most correlated
with those of analyst 3, while QUORUM's ratings are
least correlated with those of analyst 1. It is interesting to
note that QUORUM's ratings are more correlated with the
ratings of analyst 3 (r=0.590) than the ratings of analyst 1
are correlated with the ratings of analyst 3 (1"=-0.573). This
suggests that QUORUM's ratings are worthy of
comparison with those of human raters.
Discussion
The results indicate that the analysts rated many of the
QUORuM-selected incidents as relevant, and few of
the randomly selected incidents as relevant; that
QUORUM performs significantly better than chance;
and that QUORUM can retrieve a large proportion of
relevant incident reports based on analysis of accident
reports.
Still, the analysts did not always agree regarding the
relevance of particular incident narratives. Whether
rating QUORUM-selected incidents or randomly
selected ones, the analysts agreed among themselves
regarding the relevance of about two-thirds of the
incidents. This issue is discussed in the section,
"Disagreements among analysts."
From the viewpoint of commercial aviation
operations, it is useful to examine the nature of the
incidents retrieved by QUORUM. Even though many
of the incidents were rated as relevant, which of the
important Cali-related factors do they contain? Are
they all "controlled flight toward terrain" (CFTr)
incidents, or are other factors involved? The section
"Prominent factors among the relevant narratives"
examines these questions.
Finally, QUORUM was occasionally misled by the
presence of words such as "accident," "FAA,"
"safety," and "civil." This highlights a particular
concern when using accident reports to find incidents,
as discussed in the section, "Improving QUORUM's
performance."
Disagreements among analysts
It was not expected that the three analysts would
always agree in their opinions. This is particularly true
because the analysts in this study came from three
different roles within the domain of commercial
aviation. One analyst was a pilot for a major
commercial airline, another was a corporate pilot,
while the third was an air traffic controller. While they
all shared the same aviation environment, their
particular roles were complementary. Thus, while
these professionals share a certain amount of expertise
and experience, much of their domain knowledge and
insight is unique to each of them. As a result, one
would not expect the three analysts to have identical
interpretations of the Cali accident. Neither would one
expect that the analysts would have identical
appreciation of the relevant factors of every incident.
Given this expected diversity of insight and opinion,
care must be taken when combining analysts' ratings.
In figures 4 and 5, for example, a narrative is counted
as relevant if at least one of the analysts agreed with
each of the assertions of relevance. This approach to
scoring is intended to reflect the expectation that each
of the analysts bases his judgments of relevance on
experiences, expertise, and insights that do not
necessarily intersect with those of the other analysts.
This approach to scoring also reflects the fact that
there is evidence, examples of which are shown
below, that when analysts disagree among themselves
about the presence of relevant factors, the analyst
denying that presence seems to have overlooked
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relevantfactorsor perhaps made an error in marking
the rating form. (It is important to note in this context
that the tasks involved in this study are quite different
from the tasks usually performed by ASRS analysts.
In no way does this study have anything to say about
their performance of ASRS tasks. It was not designed
to investigate such issues.)
The rating of incident narrative 310228 is an example
in which analysts had diametrically opposite opinions.
In rating that incident, analysts 2 and 3 either agree or
strongly agree that the narrative is relevant to the
context, events, problems, human factors, causes, or
unspecified factors of the Cali accident, yet analyst 1
disagrees or somewhat disagrees that any of the
factors are relevant. A review of the narrative of
incident 310228 (appendix 5, figure 1) suggests that
analysts 2 and 3 are correct, while analyst 1 has
apparently overlooked relevant factors. Just as at Cali,
the incident involved a VOR/DME approach, there
was miscommunication between the crew and the
controller, the crew was confused about the approach,
the flight was off course, and name confusion was a
central factor. In fact, just as the Cali accident
involved same-letter identifier confusion about a
navigation fix (Rozo's R vs. Romeo's R), this incident
involved sound-alike name confusion about a
navigation fix (Beeje vs. Meach). One must conclude
that analyst 1 is mistaken in denying the presence of
any relevant factors.
In another example, in rating the incident narrative
140711, analysts 1 and 3 either agree or somewhat
agree that the narrative is relevant to the context,
events, problems, human factors, causes, or
unspecified factors of the Cali accident, yet analyst 2
strongly disagrees that any of the factors are relevant.
A review of the narrative of incident 140711
(appendix 5, figure 2) suggests that analysts 1 and 3
are correct, while analyst 2 seems to have overlooked
relevant factors. The incident took place in Colombian
airspace and involved one of the ATC facilities,
Barranquilla Center, that was involved in the Cali
accident. So, the context, at least, is nearly identical,
not just similar. Just as in the Cali incident, the flight
was cleared direct to the Tulua VOR. So, one of the
events of the incident is identical, not just similar, to
the Cali accident. A problem of the incident involved
the quality, or perceived quality, of Colombian air
traffic control, and this problem is highly relevant to
the Cali accident. The performance of the air traffic
controller is a human factors issue in both the incident
and the Cali accident. In this incident, the direct
clearance to the Tulua VOR, the performance of the
Colombian controller, and the quality of Colombian
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ATC are, in some ways, similar to the causes of the
Cali accider t. Given all of these similar factors, it is
easy to see why analysts 1 and 3 rated the incident as
relevant, and hard to see why analyst 2 did not.
In yet another example, in rating incident narrative
153355, analyst 1 agrees or somewhat agrees that the
incident is relevant to the Cali accident. Analyst 2
somewhat agrees or is undecided. Analyst 3, however,
somewhat disagrees, disagrees, or strongly disagrees
that the incident is relevant. A review of the incident
(appendix 5, figure 3) indicates that it occurred during
approach, it involved difficulty with the FMS and
over-reliance on the FMS, and, even more relevant to
the Cali accident, the crew was unsure of their
position and the flight was off course. It appears that
in rating this incident, analyst 3 overlooked relevant
factors.
As a final example, incident 355364 (appendix 5, figure
4) was rated as irrelevant by analysts 1 and 3, while
analyst 2 only somewhat agreed with one of the six
assertions of relevance. In this case, only analyst 2 is
correct. First, the incident and the Cali accident both
occurred in the context of the approach phase of flight.
More important, the incident involved two events that
also occurred in the Cali accident. First, the crew received
a GPWS (ground proximity warning system) warning.
Second, the crew performed an escape maneuver. Only
analyst 2 agreed with the statement, "Some of the events
of this incident are similar to some of the events of the
Call accidet_t." Analyst 1 flatly disagreed with this
statement, and analyst 3 somewhat disagreed. Clearly, the
GPWS wanling and the escape maneuver were events that
are similar Io those in the Cali accident. So analyst 1 and
3 must have overlooked these events or perhaps
misunderstood what is meant by "events." Or perhaps
analysts 1 and 3 were expressing an opinion that nothing
can be learr ed from this narrative that would have an
influence o1_preventing future accidents like the one at
Cali. If so, they failed to follow instructions. Besides,
previous experiences with false GPWS warnings can be a
factor in act.'idents involving controlled flight into terrain
(Majikas, 1995). None of the analysts agreed with the
statement, "In some ways, the context of this incident is
similar to tt,e context of the Call accident." Apparently,
the fact that this incident and the Cali accident happened
during the _pproach phase was insufficiently important
for the analysts to consider the contexts to be similar.
These exartples are typical of the cases in which the
analysts disagreed among themselves regarding the
relevance of particular narratives. Review of the ratings of
these and o:her similar cases indicates that when relevant
factorsarepresentinanincidentnarrative,theyarerarely
overlookedbyallthreeanalysts.
Prominentfactorsamongtherelevantnarratives
Onemightassumethatallincidentsrelatedtoa
"controlledflightintoterrain"(CFIT)accidentwouldbe
"controlledflighttowardterrain"(CFTT)incidents.A
reviewoftheCaliaccident,however,suggeststhatmany
otherfactorscanplayarole,aslistedintheintroduction
ofthispaper(seesection,"TheCaliaccident,"onpg.1).
Areviewofthe84QUORUM-selectedincidentshathe
analystsratedasrelevanttotheCaliaccidentshowsthat
theincidentscontainavarietyofsimilarfactors,
includingover-relianceonautomation,confusionduring
descent/approach,ndoperationsinforeignairspace,as
wellasCFTI"andGPWS(groundproximitywarning
system)alarms.
The following outline shows the topical categories and
subcategories of the 84 incident narratives that were rated
relevant by QUORUM and one or more of the analysts.
This outline is derived from the factors of the Cali
accident listed on page 2 of this paper. The number in
parentheses at the end of each line is the number of
incidents in that category or subcategory. The numbers
sum to 91 because five of the incidents appear in two
places, and another one appears in three places. Because
of these and other cases of categorical overlap, the
numbers in the headings should not be over-interpreted.
(As used here, the term "automation" refers to the FMS
(flight management system) or other components of the
automated flight systems that are used to operate the
aircraft.)
1. Over-reliance on automation, and other problems with
use of automation (37)
1.1. Over-reliance on automation (36)
1.1.1. Automation turns aircraft off course (5)
1.1.2. Loss of data when other data are entered (5)
1.1.3. Distracted by automation (7)
1.1.4. Name confusion using automation (4)
1.1.5. Automation data entry error or data error (6)
1.1.6. Other problems getting automation to work as
desired (4)
1.1.7. Miscellaneous over-reliance on automation (5)
1.2. Other automation-related problems (1)
2. Confusion, changes, and other problems during
descent/approach (29)
2.1. Last minute approach/runway change leads to
significant confusion (3)
2.2. Other confusion during descent/approach (11)
2.2.1. Name confusion (5)
2.2.2. Confusion regarding charts (4)
2.2.3. Confusion due to use of wrong data (2)
2.3. Forgot speed brakes (2)
2.4. Other problems with changes late in
descent/approach (4)
2.5. Miscellaneous problems during descent/approach
(9)
3. Terrain avoidance (19)
3.1. GPWS alarms (I 5)
3.1.1. Complacency, loss of situational awareness, slow
reaction (5)
3.1.2. Miscellaneous GPWS alarms (10)
3.2. Other terrain-related incidents (4)
4. Problems with operations in foreign airspace (6)
4.1. Problems with operations in Latin America (4)
4.2. Problems with operations in other foreign locations
(2)
Appendix 6 shows excerpts of all 84 relevant narratives,
organized according to the outline above. The outline and
excerpts demonstrate that QUORUM-selected incidents
contain a wide variety of the factors that are relevant to
the Cali accident, with emphasis on some of the most
important factors. Thus, many of the links of the chain of
factors found in the Cali accident are found scattered
among the incidents. Some incidents contain several of
these factors, while others contain only one of them.
Appendix 7 shows excerpts of all 16 of the narratives that
were rated relevant by QUORUM but irrelevant by all
three analysts. Review of these excerpts indicates that 5
of these incidents are clearly irrelevant, 6 are vaguely
relevant, and 5 are relevant.
Taken together, appendices 6 and 7 contain excerpts of all
100 of the incidents that QUORUM rated as being the
most relevant to the Cali accident of the 67820 incidents
from the ASRS database.
Improving QUORUM's performance
QUORUM models can be refined by deleting relations
that do not contain word pairs of interest. This is
discussed in great detail in McGreevy (1997). While
automatically generated query models can be very
effective, as demonstrated by the results of this study,
they can be improved by weeding out relations that are
not of interest. Specifically, the number of QUORUM-
selected incidents that are not relevant can be reduced by
eliminating from the query model word pairs that are not
operationally oriented, such as BELIEVES SAFETY.
A typical sentence containing "believes" and "safety"
from the accident reports is:
"Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the
FAA should require that all approach and
navigation charts graphically present terrain
information."
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Because ntenceslikethisarecommoninthedocuments
usedtogeneratehequerymodel,wordpairslike
BELIEVESAFETYappeartobeimportant.Theyare,in
fact,important,butonlyfromthepointofviewof
accidentinvestigationa dsafetyrecommendations,not
fromthepointofviewoftheoperationalf ctorsofthe
accident.(Incontrast,thewordpair"TERRAIN
CHARTS"fromthesamesentenceisoperationally
orientedandwouldberetained.)Therarityoftheword
pairBELIEVESAFETYintheASRSdatabase
magnifiestheapparentimportanceofthiswordpair.This
canleadtoretrievalofnarrativesthatarenotreally
relevant.Thesolutionis todeletethisandothersimilar
wordpairsfromthequerymodelbecausetheycomefrom
thevocabularyofaccidentreportsandsafety
recommendations,notfromthevocabularyofoperational
problems.
Afurtherimprovementcanbeobtainedbyremoving
words,wordgroups,andabbreviationsthatoftenappear
inaccidentreports,butarenotusefulin identifying
operationalproblemsamongincidentnarratives.
Examplesinclude:
• InternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO)
• NationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB)
• FederalAviationAdministration(FAA)
• UnitedStates(U.S.)
• investigation
• accident
• crash
• timeofimpact
Thedeletionswouldbeappliedtotheaccidentdocuments
beforethequerymodelisgenerated.(Toavoid istorting
thedistancesmeasuredamongotherwords,thedeleted
wordswouldbereplacedwithgenericnon-wordstoactas
place-holders.)
Anotherclassofwordsandwordgroupstobedeleted
includesthosethatarespecifictoaparticularaccident
investigation.Amongthemostprominentoftheseterms
in theCalidocumentare:
• AeronauticaCivil
• American Airlines
• AA
• Flight 965
• AA965
Words and word groups that are particular to the
operational setting of the accident would not be deleted.
These include, for example:
• Tulua
• Barranquilla Center
• Colombia
• Latin America
Other ASRS incidents containing these words or word
groups might be relevant to the operational problems
associated with the Cali accident.
A more radical idea, and perhaps a risky one, is to
eliminate words that reflect an outsider's view of
operations, :dnce the core of ASRS narratives reflect an
insider's vocabulary. Among these words are:
• flight t:rew(s)
• pilot(s _
Members ot flight crews more often refer to the captain or
first officer. Review of irrelevant incidents retrieved by
QUORUM (see appendix 7, sections 6 and 7) suggests
that elimination of these words would reduce QUORUM's
false positive rate.
In summary, QUORUM models can be easily refined by
removing relations that are not of interest, but such
refinement sometimes requires manually picking through
the model relations. This effort is not necessary, as
indicated b) QUORUM's success in this study using an
automatically generated query model. Still, it might be
worthwhile in some applications to remove words, word
groups, abbreviations, and word pairs that are oriented
toward accident investigation and safety
recommendations rather than operational details. Once
the offending material is collected, it can be reused in
subsequent malyses, allowing fully automated modeling
and relevance-ranking.
Related work
Using QUORUM for relevance-ranking puts it squarely
in the techn:cal domain of "information retrieval" (Frakes
and Baeza-'_'ates, 1992). In that domain, nearly all work
in relevance-ranking is based on the occurrence or
frequency oi' words in documents (e.g., Salton, 1991), and
very little ol it is based on the co-occurrence of words.
What co-occurrence work there is (e.g., Smadja, 1991)
typically ad:lresses analysis of word groupings such as
"home run" rather than conceptual proximities and
variably prcximal co-occurrences, and little of it directly
involves inf)rmation retrieval.
Osgood (1959) pioneered the modeling of text based on
conceptual tbut not variably proximal) co-occurrences,
but the metl_od was not applied to information retrieval.
Recently, Hawking and Thistlewaite (1996) have been
developing :o-occurrence methods for information
retrieval, but their methods are significantly different
from QUOEUM methods. For example, while
QUORUM':_ query models are based on proximity-
weighted cc.-occurrences among prominently occurring
words in a body of text such as the Cali accident reports,
Hawking and Thistlewaite base their query models on
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unstructuredandspontaneousgenerationfpossibly
occurringandpossiblyclusteredwords.
Aproximitymethodforinformationretrievaldeveloped
byCaidandOing(1997)isbasedonthepremisethatif
twodifferentwordsarefrequentlyfoundveryclose
togetherintext,theyarelikelytobeinsimilarcategories,
andthushavesimilarmeaningsorusages.CaidandOing
combineadocument'sword-categoriesintoasingle
abstractategoryinordertosummarizethecontentsof
thedocument.Queryingconsistsoffindingabstract
documentcategoriesthataresimilartoaparticular
abstractdocumentcategory.Incontrast,theQUORUM
methodisbasedonthepremisethattheassociative
structureofatextreflectstheassociativestructureofthe
domaindescribedin thetext,asindicatedbytheconcerns
oftheauthor(orauthors).Concernsthataremore
frequentlyfoundincloserproximityinthetextarethose
whicharemorestronglyassociatedbytheauthor.An
explicitnetworkoftheseassociationsconstitutesamodel
ofthetextandamodeloftheconcernsoftheauthor.
Queryingconsistsoffindingnetworksofconcerns(e.g.,
modelsofASRSnarratives)thataresimilartoaparticular
networkofconcerns(e.g.,amodeloftheCali
documents).
WorkrelatedtoQUORUMrelevance-rankingisreviewed
inMcGreevy(1997).WorkrelatedtoQUORUM
modeling,uponwhichQUORUMrelevance-rankingis
based,isreviewedingreatdetailinMcGreevy(1995).
Conclusion
QUORUM successfully retrieved a large proportion of
incidents that are relevant to the Cali accident. Eighty-
four of I00 QUORUM-selected narratives were rated as
relevant to the Cali accident by one or more of the
analysts. Each analyst rated approximately two-thirds of
the QUORuM-selected narratives as relevant. Over two-
thirds of the incidents retrieved by QUORUM were rated
as relevant to the context, events, problems, or human
factors of the Cali accident. Over half of the incidents
were rated as relevant to the causes of the accident.
Further, the QUORUM collection of incidents was
significantly more relevant than the random collection.
These results show that a QUORuM-derived query
model based on accident reports can be used successfully
to retrieve relevant incident reports.
The ratings among the analysts, and between QUORUM
and the analysts, were consistent, though not identical.
Whether rating QUORUM-selected incidents or randomly
selected ones, the analysts agreed among themselves
regarding the relevance of about two-thirds of the
incidents. This is attributed to the diversity of experience
among the analysts, and to occasions in which one or two
of the analysts recognize relevant factors that are
overlooked by the other(s). As it turns out, QUORUM's
ratings are more correlated with the ratings of analyst 3
than the ratings of analyst 1 are correlated with the ratings
of analyst 3, suggesting that QUORUM's ratings are
worthy of comparison with those of human raters.
The QUORUM-selected incidents contain a variety of
factors that are similar to those of the Cali accident,
including over-reliance on automation, confusion during
descent/approach, and operations in foreign airspace, as
well as cFTr and GPWS (ground proximity warning
system) alarms. These topics clearly have a bearing on the
prevention of future accidents.
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Figures and Tables

ACCESSION NUMBER : 204756
DATE OF OC_CE : 9203
REPORTED BY : FLC; ; ;
PERSONS FUNCTIONS : FLC,FO; FLC,PIC.CAPT; ARTCC,RDR;
FLIGHT CONDITIONS : VMC
REFERENCE FACILITY ID : ONM
FACILITY STATE : NM
FACILITY TYPE : ARTCC;
FACILITY IDENTIFIER : ZAB;
AIRCRAFT TYPE : MLG;
ANOMALY DESCRIPTIONS : IN-FLT ENCOUNTER/OTHER; ACFT EQUIPMENT
PROBLEM/LESS SEVERE; ALT DE'V/EXCURSION FROM ASSIGNED; NON
ADHERENCE LEGAL RQMT/CLNC ;
ANOMALY DETECTOR : COCKPIT/FIX_;
ANOMALY RESOLUTION : FLC OVERCAME EQUIP PROBLEM; FLC
ACFT TO ORIGINAL CLNC OR INTENDED COURSE;
ANOMALY CONSEQUENCES : NONE;
SITUATION REPORT SUBJECTS : PROC OR POLICY/COM3PANY; AN ACFT TYPE;
ACFT EQUIPMENT;
NARRATIVE : AUTOPLT ON IN 'PERF' MODE, CRUISE
CONDITIONS. ACFT STARTED A SLIGHT DSCNT TO ABOUT 300 FT BELOW
ASSIGNED ALT, WHEREUPON CAPT SELECTED 'VERT SPD' MODE AND A 500
FPM CLB. BUT ACFT STARTED TO CLB AT 2000 FPM AND WENT RIGHT
THROUGH SELECTED ALT OF FL350 TO ABOUT 450 FT HIGH, WHEREUPON CAPT
DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND RETURNED TO FL350. NO CONFLICT. I'M STILL
NOT SURE IF THIS WAS DUE TO MOUNTAIN 9_[AVE ACTIVITY OR AUTOPLT
MALFUNCTION OR BOTH. CAPT ASSUMED MOUNTAIN WAVE AND INSTRUCTED ME
TO RPT IT TO CTR. THIS PARTICUI2L_ AUTOPLT, WHEN USED IN THE 'PERF
CRZ' MODE (WHICH IS SOP) CONSISTENTLY DEVIATES FROM SELECTED ALT
BY + OR - i00 TO 200 FT. THIS MAKES IT AT TIMES DIFFICULT TO
DETERMINE IF AUTOPLT IS FUNCTIONING 'NORMALLY' OR MALFUNCTIONING
UNTIL IT IS TOO LATE. STILL, IF WE HAD BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN
DISCONNECTING AUTOPLT SOONER AND FLYING PROPER ALT, WE MIGHT HAVE
DIMINISHED THE ALT EXCURSION.
SYNOPSIS : CLR AIR TURB ASSOCIATED WITH MOUNTAIN
WAVE ACTMTY CREATES AN ALTDEV ALT EXCURSION.
REFERENCE FACILITY ID : ONM
FACILITY STATE : NM
MEL ALTITUDE : 34700,35450
Figure 1. Example incident report from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database. This report
describes a situation involving an altitude deviation and the autopilot.
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Table 1. Excerpt of QUORUM query model derived from the Carl accident r_,port documents, containing 2436 co-
occurring word pairs. The top 100 relations are shown here, along with a sampling of less important relations m the
model. Word pairs with larger relational metric values (RMVs) are the more important query relations. The query model
was compared with each of the 67820 incident models in the database (e.g., Table 2), and for each incident, a single
relevance-ranking value was calculated (for example, see Table 3).
wor¢l 1 word 2 RMV CALl CLRED 3643
CALl TERRAIN 35389 PLTS PRESENT 3637
FMS PLTS 25488 FLT_CREW RECOGNIZE 3566
FLT_CREW AWARENESS 22072 ACCIDENT B757 3564
CALl VOR 18281 NOT ICAO 3510
FMS FLT_CREW 17511 CTLR CIVIL 3402
FMS FAA 17155 PLTS SITUATIONAL 3373
ACCIDENT TERRAIN 13275 APCH INVESTIGATION 3347
TERRAIN CHARTS 13131 PLTS PROX 3299
P-MS BOARD 12754 ACCIDENT TRAINING 3188
FAA CIVIL 12533 SPD_BRAKES CREW 3166
FMS TRAINING 11469 ACCIDENT CI_R 3072
TERRAIN FAA 11355 TRAINING CIVIL 3063
ACCIDENT OPS 10890 F-'MS STATES 3034
PLTS TERRAIN 10210 FLT_CREN PRESENT 3011
FLT_CREW TERRAIN 10032 ACCIDENT RTE 2989
TERRAIN AWARENES S 10018 CALl HIGH 2979
APCH ACCIDENT 9999 PLT SPD_BRAKES 2967
CALl DIRECT 9314 TERRAIN TRAINING 2966
APCH DISPLAYS 8616 APCH ROMEO 2941
FLT_CREW CRITICAL 8417 FLT_CREW BELIEVES 2883
ACCIDENT CAPT 8327 FLT_CRE_ ACTIONS 2845
SAFETY BELIEVES 7400 FLT CREN SITUATIONAL 2822
CAPT AMERICAN 7230 FMS INVESTIGATION 2801
TERRAIN USED 6969 ACCIDEb "P NAV 274 !
FLT_CREW VOR 6678 CHARTS REQUIRE 2723
TERRAIN SIT 6674 FMS NDB 2704
PLTS CRM 6525 NOT AMERICAN 2613
TERRAIN SPD_BRAKES 6439 SAFETY BOARD 2587
APCH FLT_CREWS 6301 FAA EVALUATE 2534
APCH CIVIL 6100 SPD_BRA KES PITCH 2534
PLTS ACCIDENT 6074 OPS B757 2513
NAV REQUIRE 6002 SPD_BRA KES B757 2498
FMS COMMAND 5990 APCH FLT_CREW 2493
TERRAIN PRESENT 5984 FLT_CRET¢ DECISION 2464
FMS PLT 5934 PLTS LATIN 2459
CAPT AA 5760 TERRAIN PATH 2446
BELIEVES BOARD 5332 FLT_CREW GPWS 2441
FMS CHART 5258 TERRAIN DATA 2437
APCH FMS 5150 PLTS AWARENESS 2389
ACCIDENT FO 5038 FMS CONFUSING 2384
CHARTS BELIEVES 5007 FMS CONFUSION 2378
FMS FIXES 4719 CIVIL INTL 2327
TERRAIN CFIT 4550 FLT_CRE W MANEUVER 2325
FLT_CREW FLT_PATH 4492
VOR TULUA 4491 AWAREI% ESS SIT 1002
FLT_CREW ESCAPE 4489 ...
TERRAIN NAV 4407 POS WAYPOINTS 278
CALl COLOMBIA 4032 APCH CHART 277
ACCIDENT MIA 3992 .,.
NOT AA 3909 MANEU'v ER PITCH 100
TERRAIN REQUIRE 3839 NDB ENTERING 100
SPD_BRAKES PERF 3822 ...
ACCIDENT ICAO 3781 SPD_BRA KE LEVER 10
FMS ENVIRONMENT 3717 TERRAII_ WARNINGS 10
FMS II 3689 ..,
CALl ATC 3647 WX CLOUDS 1
2O
310130
WE WERE INITIALLY GIVEN A VECTOR DIRECT TO ARSOT AND PROGRESSIVE DSCNTS TO 5000
FT. WE QUESTIONED THE CTLR REPEATEDLY ABOUT WHICH APCH WE COULD EXPECT. ATIS
WAS GIVING ILS RWY 35 APCHS WITH A CIRCLE TO LAND ON RWY 11. THE WIND WAS 160
DEGS AT 14 KTS, AND WE WERE NOT VERY HAPPY WITH THAT PROSPECT. WE HAD SCATTERED
TO BROKEN CLOUDS AT ABOUT 1300-1500 FT. I WAS HAVING A VERY DIFFICULT TIME
UNDERSTANDING THE CTLR, AND THE FO AND SO WERE NOT DOING MUCH BETTER. THE ILS
FOR RWY 11 WAS NOTAMED OTS. AT THE LAST MIN, AFTER WE WERE VECTORED DIRECT
TOWARD THE OUTER LOCATOR 'OC', WE WERE CLRED FOR A 'STRAIGHT IN LNDG ON RWY 11'
AND TOLD TO RPT OVER 'OC.' I HAD #1 VOR DME ON EZE AND THE FO INITIALLY SET UP
HIS RADIO ON THE LOC 110.1, BUT THERE WAS NO LOC OR ANYTHING ON THAT FREQ. THE
FO KEPT ASKING ME TO GET THE TYPE OF APCH AND ALT FROM THE CTLR. THE CTLR SAID
TO FLY THE ALTS OF THE APCH. WE HAD BRIEFED BOTH THE ILS TO RWY 35 WITH A
CIRCLE TO LAND AND THE LOC-VOR-DME RWY 11 APCH, BUT NOT A STRAIGHT IN APCH. THE
ONLY STRAIGHT IN APCH WAS AN ADF LOCATOR APCH, WITH DME. OUR MINIMUM SECTOR ALT
WAS 3000 FT AND WE WERE AT 5000 FT. WHEN WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO FLY THE ALTS ON
THE APCH, FO (PF) SET THE ALT WINDOW TO 2150 FT WHICH WAS THE ALT FOR 10 DME ON
THE 11-1 PAGE FOR A VOR APCH. MEANWHILE I WAS TRYING TO FIND AN APPROPRIATE
APCH PAGE. WE SETILED ON 11-2 CHART SINCE THE CTLR HAD CALLED THE APCH A
'STRAIGHT-IN APCH.' THE SO WAS HELPING THE FO WITH HIS CHART AND RADIO SETUP,
AND WE WERE DSNDING. I SAID 'I AM CONFUSED.' I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY WE WERE
DSNDING AND THE FO HAD ALL FLAGS WITH HIS RADIO ON THE ILS FREQ. I COULDN'T
FIGURE OUT WHICH APCH HE WAS USING, AND I HAD TROUBLE READING HIS CHART FROM
ACROSS THE COCKPIT. THEN THE SO MENTIONED THAT WE HAD A 3000 FT MSA. WE WERE AT
2650 FT, AND I TOLD THE FO TO FLY AT 3150 FT WHICH WAS THE ALT FOR THIS POINT
ON THE ADF LOCATOR APCH. HE CLBED BACK UP. WE GOT THE 2500 FT LIGHTS ON THE
GPWS. I HAD SOME GND CONTACT INTERMITTENTLY, BUT I COULD NOT SEE THE RWY. THEN
THE FO SWITCHED HIS RADIO OVER TO THE VOR FREQ 116.5 EZE AND CONTINUED THE 11-1
APCH USING THE 11-2 PAGE. I THINK THE MAJOR PROBS WITH THIS APCH WERE: NO EARLY
KNOWLEDGE OF WHICH RWY OR APCH WE WOULD USE. THE APCH WE WERE FINALLY GIVEN, OR
FLEW ANYWAY, DID NOT CONFORM TO ANY OF THE PLATES. WE DID NOT MAINTAIN OUR MSA
BTWN ARSOT AND 10 DME EZE. WE WERE CONFUSED ABOUT WHAT GND EQUIP WAS AVAILABLE
TO US. I ACCEPTED THE CLRNC FOR A STRAIGHT-IN APCH, NOT KNOWING WHICH APCH. THE
SOP WAS NOT FOLLOWED IN THAT THE PF (FO) RESET THE ALT WINDOW. I SHOULD HAVE
GOTTEN CLARIFICATION OR REFUSED THE APCH UNTIL WE WERE SURE OF WHAT WE WERE
DOING, INSTEAD WE FOUND NO ALT SHOWN FOR WHAT WE WERE DOING.
Figure 2. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 310130, one of the 10 narratives rated as most relevant to the Carl
accident. The QUORUM model of this narrative is shown in Table 2. A QUORUM model of the comrnonalities of this
narrative and the Carl documents is shown in Table 3. The analysts' ratings of this narrative are shown in Table 4.
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Table 2. A QUORUM model of the narrative of incident number 310130 (figure 2). Relations shown in bold italics are the
word pairs that are also found in the query model (table 1) that was ded,/ed from the Carl documents. The sum of the
relational metric values (RMVs) of the bold italicized relations is 1328. Tbe sum of the other relations is 3185. So, the
percentage of this model that is also found in the query model is 100"(1;728/(1328+3185)) = 29.4261%. As shown in Table
3, when the weights of the relations in this incident model are combined with the weights of the relations in the query
mode/, the relation APCH CHART is seen to be the most important Call-oriented relation in this narrative. The relations
APCH NOT and APCH CTLR are the next most important Call-oriented relations in this narrative. These three relations
are underlined below. In general, relations of the form NOT X or X NOT suggest problems involving X. In this case, the
relation APCH NOT suggests problems during the approach phase of flighL The relations APCH CHART and APCH
CTLR suggest that the problems involved the approach chart and the approach controller. These indications are
confirmed by reading the incident narrative in Figure 2. Similar difficulties were encountered just prior to the Carl accident.
word I word2 RMV NOT BUT 36
APCH STRAIGHT 186 LAND CIRCLE 36
APCH NOT 135 CTLR SAID 36
APCH ALT 120 APCH MAJOR 36
APCH RWY 117 APCH KNOWING 36
APCH CTLR 105 APCH LOC 35
APCH DME 94 APCH FREQ 35
APCH PAGE 92 VOR EZE 34
APCH FO 88 NOT DME 34
APCH VOR 73 APCH WINDOW 34
RWY ILS 71 NOT SOP 33
APCH ADF 71 NOT KNOWING 33
APCH LOCATOR 70 FO CTLR 33
APCH CHART 67 APCH MINIMUM 33
FO RADIO 65 VOR PAGE 32
RWY NOT 61 VOR OVER 32
FO ALT 61 FO DSNDING 32
RWY LAND 59 APCH TRYING 32
RWY CIRCLE 59 APCH THINK 32
NOT STRAIGHT 58 APCH SOP 32
FO NOT 51 APCH FINALLY 32
ALT WINDOW 51 ALT CI_R 32
DME VOR 50 WINDOW PF 31
APCH BUT 49 RW'Y APCHS 31
LOC BUT 48 NOT PLATES 31
R W'Y VOR 47 NOT FOLLOWED 31
APCH USING 44 NOT CONFORM 31
APCH KNOWLEDGE 44 FO WINDOW 31
APCH ILS 44 APCH RADIO 31
APCH EARLY 44 APCH MEANWHILE 31
STRAIGHT DME 43 LOC ANYTHING 30
APCH USE 43 FO BUT 30
APCH PF 42 APCH SECTOR 30
APCH ALTS 42 APCH LAND 30
ALT PF 42 APCH GIVEN 30
ALT DME 42 ALT DOING 30
RWY STRAIGHT 41 STRAIGHT BUT 29
FO FREQ 41 RADIO DSNDING 29
APCH CALLED 40 NOT MAINTAIN 29
APCH SETTLED 39 FO RWY 29
LOCATOR ADF 38 APCH CIRCLE 29
FO PF 38 ALT ALTS 29
FO LOC 38 SAID DSNDING 28
APCH PROBS 38 RWY LOC 28
RADIO FREQ 37 RADIO LOC 28
FO SET 37 ILS CIRCLE 28
DME EZE 37 DSNDING UNDERSTAND 28
APCH APPROPRIATE 37 DSNDING CONFUSED 28
STRAIGHT LOCATOR 36 DSNDING AM 28
RWY DME 36 CTLR ALTS 28
RWY BUT 36
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Table 3. Derivation of the intersection model and the relevance ranking value (RRV) for the narrative of ASRS incident
number 310130 (figure 2). The intersection model represents features of the narrative that are relevant to the Carl
accident. The intersection model is based on word pairs that appear in both the Carl query model (Table 1) and the
incident model (Table 2). For example, the word pair APCH CHART appears in both the query model and the incident
model Accordingly, the relational metric value (RMV) of APCH CHART in the query model (277, in column 3) is
multiplied by the RMV in the incident model (67, in column 4) to produce the RMV of APCH CHART in the intersection
model (18559, in column 5). The notes below the table show how the QUORUM relevance ranking value for this narrative
is derived from this table, and how the QUORUM relevance rating is derived from the RRV.
probe term-in- RMV in RMV in product of
term cqntext (Tali query_ incident model RMVs
APCH CHART 277 67 18559
APCH NOT 33 135 4455
APCH CTLR 27 105 2835
APCH DME 21 94 1974
APCH VOR 22 73 1606
APCH RWY 13 117 1521
APCH USE 26 43 1118
APCH FO 12 88 1056
APCH USING 22 44 968
RW'Y VOR 18 47 846
APCH RADIO 14 31 434
RWY DME 12 36 432
FO CTLR 8 33 264
APCH ALTS 6 42 252
APCH LAND 7 30 210
NOT DME 6 34 204
APCH BUT 4 49 196
DME VOR 3 50 150
RWY NOT 2 61 122
APCH ALT 1 120 120
FO RWY 2 29 58
To calculate the RRV:
RRV = S * F * W i / Wma x = 37380 * 0.294261 * 555 / 2000 = 3052
where
S
F
Wi
Wmax
= sum of products of RMVs (sum of last column) = 37380
= fraction of incident model that is matched by Cali model ; from table 2, F=29.4261%
= number of words in incident narrative 310130 = 555
= a number larger than the number of words in the longest narrative in the database = 2000
To convert QUORUM's relevance ranking value (RRV) to QUORUM's rating:
rating = truncate(-0.75 + logl0(RRV * (108 / max_RRV )))
if(rating>7)rating=7
if(rating< l)rating= 1
This calculation maps the RRVs into the same seven-level rating scale used by the analysts.
From Appendix 3, Table 1, max_RRV = 31696, so, given RRV of 3052, rating = 6
Thus, in Appendix 3, Tablel, the QUORUM relevance ranking value (RRV) associated with ASRS incident
number 310130 is 3052 and the QUORUM rating is 6.
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Table 4. Analysts' ratings of narrative 310130. The narrative is shown i,_ figure 2. The analysts responded to each of the
six assertions of relevance by selecting among the seven responses.
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context event_ problems human factors causes relevance
310130 analyst 1 6 6 7 6 5 6
analyst 2 6 6 6 7 6 6
analyst 3 7 7 7 '7 7 7
Assertions of relevance
A) In some ways, the context of this incident is similar to the cot text of the Cali accident.
B) Some of the events of this incident are similar to some of the events of the Cali accident.
C) Some of the problems of this incident are similar to some of the problems of the Cali accident.
D) Some of the human factors of this incident are similar to some of the human factors of the Cali accident.
E) Some of the causes of this incident are similar to some of the causes of the Cali accident.
F) In some ways, this incident is relevant to the Cali accident.
Responses
1: strongly disagree
2: disagree
3: somewhat disagree
4: undecided
5: somewhat agree
6: agree
7: strongly agree
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Number of relevant incidents identified by each analyst.
QUORUM-selected incidents
Analyst 1
Randomly selected incidents
Analyst 1
undecided (2)
Analyst 2 Analyst 2
undecided (5)
,"undecided (11 )
Analyst 3 Analyst 3
Figure 3. Number of relevant incidents, among 100 QUORUM-selected incidents and 100 randomly selected
incidents, identified by each analyst.
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Number of QUORUM-selected incidents that are relevant to
the context, events, problems, human factors, causes,
or unspecified factors of the Cali accident
Context Human factors
undecided (2)
undecided (3)
Events Causes
undecided (1)
undecided (3)
Problems Unspecified factors
undecided _
undec ded (5)
Figure 4. Number of QUORUM-selected incidents that are relevant to the context, events, problems, human factors,
causes, or unspecified factors of the Carl accident. In this figure, an incident is counted as relevant if one or more of the
analysts rated the incident as relevant.
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Number of randomly selected incidents that are relevant
the context, events, problems, human factors, causes,
or unspecified factors of the Cali accident
to
Context
irrelevant
(87)
(10)
(3)
Human factors
undecided (8)
Events Causes
undecided (1)
(14)
undecided (4)
irrelevant
(80)
Problems Unspecified factors
undecided (1)
.._ _ m _k_" - re Ievdantid(5) (5 )
\ irrelevant /
Figure 5. Number of randomly selected incidents that are relevant to the context, events, problems, human factors,
causes, or unspecified factors of the Call accident./n this figure, an incident is counted as relevant if one or more of the
analysts rated the incident as relevant.
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Consensus among analysts:
Number of incidents rated as relevant to the
by N of 3 analysts
Cali accident
QUORUM-selected incidents Randomly selected incidents
1 of 3 (12) 3 of 3 analysts
(48 incidents)
(9)
2 of 3 (7)
Figure 6. Consensus among analysts regarding the number of incidents relevant to the Call accident, companng results
for QUORUM-selected incidents and those selected randomly. These pie charts show the number of QUORUM-selected
incidents and randomly selected incidents that were rated as relevant by 3 of 3 analysts, 2 of 3 analysts, I of 3 analysts,
and 0 of 3 analysts. All three analysts rated 48 of 100 QUORUM-selected incidents as relevant, compared with only 9 of
the randomly selected incidents. At/east two of three analysts rated 72 of 100 QUORUM-selected narratives as relevant,
compared with only 16 of 100 randomly selected narratives. Of the 100 ,_UORUM-selected narratives, 84 were rated as
relevant by at/east one analyst. Of the 100 randomly selected narratives, 41 were rated as relevant by at/east one
analyst.
Degree of relevance:
Number of incidents rated as relevant to the Cali accident
in response to N of 6 assertions of relevance
QUORUM-selected incidents Randomly selected incidents
0 of 6 (16)
1 of 6 6 of 6 assertions
2 of 6 (45 incidents)
3 of 6 (6).'
4 of 6 (9)... (12)
_4 f 6 (3)
of 6 (2)
of 6 (3)
3 of 6 (6)
_ '" 2 of 6 (8)
1 of 6 (17)
Figure 7. Degree of relevance: Number of incidents rated as relevant tc the Carl accident in response to N of 6 assertions
of relevance. Agreement with more than one assertion of relevance indicates a greater degree of relevance. These two
pie charts show that the analysts found many of the QUORUM-selectec_ incidents to be highly relevant, while few of the
randomly selected incidents were highly relevant. For example, in ratinc!sof 45 of the QUORUM-selected incidents, each
of the 6 statements of relevance was agreeable to one or more of the a_a/ysts, while only 3 of the randomly selected
incidents were rated as relevant for all six statements. Eighty-four of the 100 QUORUM-selected incidents were judged to
have at/east one relevant factor, while only 41 of the randomly selected incidents had at least one relevant factor.
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Strength of analysts' opinions
that incidents are relevant to the Cali accident
QUORUM-selected incidents Randomly selected incidents
Analyst 1
strongly disagree (1)_2.__._-_-strongly agree (4)
disagree _///,_
,,L,._.K///'_ agree (24)
somewhat dis_
undecided (2)/. _somewhat agree (35)
Analyst 1
(_ agree (1)
strongly disagree somewl_at agree (23)
disagree (30_ (27)at disagree
Analyst 2
strongly disagree (13) _strongly agree (12)
disagree (2)_J
somewhat A,,_"_Y.(/_///_ \
disagree (9_ /
undecided (5 agree (31)
somewhat agree (28)
Analyst 2
__ agree (1)
at agree (22)
strongly disagree (51)_
k_-_,'_,',_'undecided (11)
__j_somewhat disagree
disagree (7)_ (8)
Analyst 3 Analyst 3
strongly disagree (6_strongly agree (15)
aisagre_
somewhat .\\\\_<_ \
disagree (16_agree (20)
somewhat agree (35)
strongly disag__
gly agree (1)
agree (4)
at agree (14)
disagree (15)
_Ldisagree (23)
Figure 8. Strength of analysts' opinions that incidents are relevant to the Carl accident, comparing results for QUORUM-
selected incidents and randomly selected incidents. Each pie chart shows the number of incidents whose highest rating
across assertions of relevance was one of the following: 7: strongly agree, 6: agree, 5: somewhat agree, 4: undecided, 3:
somewhat disagree, 2: disagree, or 1: strongly disagree. Overall, the analysts more strongly agreed that the QUORUM-
selected incidents, rather than the randomly selected ones, are relevant to the Carl accident. Further, they more strongly
disagreed that the randomly selected incidents are relevant.
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Appendix 1.
Methods of modeling and ranking

Appendix 1. This appendix describes a method of modeling bodies of text (including one or more documents, parts of
documents, paragraphs, sentences, or word groups), generating query models, comparing models, and ranking
collections of models according to their similarity to a query model, thereby obtaining the similarity-based ranking of
documents in a collection. The degree of similarity is interpreted as the degree of relevance to the query. Steps marked
with an asterisk (*) were not used in the Carl project.
Generate proximity-weighted co-occurrence model
I. Identify the terms in a body of text. Each term can be one or more marks or characters, such as: a single
punctuation mark; a sequence of marks and/or characters; a word; a linked set of marks, characters, or words; a
tagged set of marks, characters, or words; or any combination of these. Ignore any terms that are on the stoplist,
that is, terms that are not of interest in the analysis. If desired, special sections (e.g., titles, headers, tables,
captions, tables of contents, indices, or other sections) may be differentiated from the body of text or
incorporated into it.
2. If desired, map specific classes of terms to other terms, as in mapping certain domain terms to non-word place
holders. For example, "callback conversation," a phrase sometimes inserted into incident narratives by the
ASRS, can be mapped to "nonword nonword."
3. If desired, standardize the vocabulary, such as by converting multiple disparate forms of terms to a single
representation, linking terms, tagging terms, changing case, or any combination of these. Once the vocabulary is
standardized, return to step 1. Terms especially appropriate for linking are those which should not, do not, or
only rarely stand alone as individual terms.
4. Map terms as needed to ease computer-based parsing and use of regular expressions.
5. Generate a list of terms and their frequencies of occurrence in the body of text.
6. Select a number of the most frequently occurring terms to serve as probe terms. If desired, exclude terms on the
stoplist.
7. If desired, use only the probe terms having particular tags or other distinguishing characteristics.*
8. If desired, expand the list of probe terms by including synonyms of those already on the list, and scaling their
frequencies accordingly.*
9. At each occurrence of each probe term in the body of text, do steps 9.1 through 9.4.
9.1. Identify the terms in proximity to the probe term, to some distance from the probe term, as being among the terms-
in-context of the probe term. The terms-in-context are considered to be in the context of each occurrence of the
probe term. Instances of the probe term that are in the context of an occurrence of the probe term are considered
to be terms-in-context of that occurrence. If desired, ignore terms-in-context that are on the stoplist.
9.2. Consider each unique pair, consisting of a probe term and a term-in-context, as a relation having a value.
9.3. For the current context, assign a value to each relation based on the proximity of each instance of the term-in-
context to the probe term. This is a proximity value.
9.4. For each unique relation found in this context, accumulate the sum of the proximity values. Each sum, accumulated
across all contexts, is the relational metric value (RMV) of the relation within this particular body of text.
10. List the unique relations, each with its relational metric value.
11. Rank order the relations based on the magnitudes of the relational metric values.
12. If desired, remove relations that are not of interest (e.g., "BUT NOT"). Remove relations containing stoplisted
terms, if this was not done in step 9.1.
13. Use all of the remaining relations, or select a number of the relations having the largest relational metric values.
14. Use this list of relations to represent the body of text from which the relations were derived.
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15. If desired, such a list of relations can be synthesized from scratch to represent the model of an idealized,
hypothesized, or sought-after body of text.*
Generate models of a collection of text
1. Identify a collection of bodies of text as a database of text.
2. Derive a proximity-weighted co-occurrence model, as described in the previous section, of each body of text in the
database of text to produce a database of models. Each body of text in the database of text corresponds to one
model in the database of models.
Generate ouery model
1. Select one or more bodies of text from any source, including but not limited to the database of text, to serve as the
basis of a query. This is the query text. If desired, special sections (e.g., rifles, headers, tables, captions, tables of
contents, indices, or other sections) may be differentiated from the body of text or incorporated into it.
2. If desired, map prominent query terms or term groups that are not found among the terms or term groups in the
database of models to equivalent terms or term groups that are, in fact, found among the terms or term groups in
the database of models. For example, map "first officer" to "FO"
3. If necessary, match usage of uppercase and lowercase characters in the query text and the text to be queried.
4. Derive a proximity-weighted co-occurrence model of the query text as described in the first section of this
appendix to produce an initial-query model.
5. For each relation in the initial-query model, find any and all instances of the corresponding relation in the database
of models. For a relation A B in the initial-query model, where A is a probe term and B is a term-in-context, the
relation A B or the relation B A in a database model constitutes a corresponding relation. Find the sum of the
relational metric values of all instances of the corresponding relations in the database of models to derive the
database RMV for that relation.
6. Divide the RMV of each initial-query relation by the database RMV of that relation to derive the raw inverse query
RMV.
7. The probe term and term-in-context of the initial-query relation whose value is the raw inverse query RMV is a raw
inverse query relation.
8. The raw inverse query consists of a collection of raw inverse query relations.
9. Multiply the RMV of each relation in the raw inverse query by the fiequency of the relation's probe term in the
query text and the frequency of the relation's term-in-context in tae query text to produce a scaled RMV.
10. If desired, scale all RMVs to convenient magnitudes.
11. If desired, fine-tune the query model by removing relations that are _aot of interest.*
12. Sort the query relations on the scaled RMV, and take some number _,f relations having the largest scaled R.MVs to
serve as the query model.
13. The relation-by-relation product or sum of multiple query models can be used as a query model.*
Compare o_uery model to database models, and rank database models on similarity_
1. Compare the query model to each model in the database of models. ]:or each model in the database of models, do
steps 1.1 through 1.3.
1.1. For each query relation, if both terms are found in a database model :elation, either as probe term or term-in-
context, calculate the product of the RMV of the query relation aad the RMV of the database model relation.
This product is the intersection RMV, the resulting relation is the intersection relation, and the collection of
intersection relations is the intersection model. (Functions mighl usefully modulate the terms and/or product.*)
1.2. Find the sum of the intersection RMVs to produce the raw similarity value associated with the database model and
its corresponding body of text in the database of text.
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1.3.1.
1.3.2.
1.3.3.
1.3.4.
1.3.If thedatabasemodelhasanon-zeroawsimilarityvalue,scaletherawsimilarityvaluetoproducethesimilarity
rankingvalue,usingthescalefactorsin1.3.1through1.3.4.
OnescalefactoriscalculatedbyfindingthesumofthedatabasemodelRMVsofrelationsthatarealsofoundin
thequerymodel,anddividingthisvaluebythesumofallRMVsofthedatabasemodel.Thisfavorsdatabase
modelswhosesharedfeaturesaremorecentraltotheemphasisofthebodyoftextfromwhichthedatabase
modelisderived.Thistendstofavorsmallerbodiesoftext.
A secondscalefactoriscalculatedbycountingthenumberoftermsin thedatabasebodyoftexthatis
representedbythecurrentdatabasemodel,anddividingthisvaluebyanumberaslargeorlargerthanthe
numberoftermsinthelargestbodyoftextinthedatabase.Thisfavorslargerbodiesoftext,counterbalancing
tendenciesofotherscalefactorstofavorsmallerbodiesoftext.(Clampingthisfactormightbeuseful.*)
Anoptionalscalefactor*iscalculatedbyfindingthesumofthequerymodelRMVsofrelationsthatarealso
foundinthedatabasemodel,anddividingthisvaluebythesumofallRMVsofthequerymodel.Thisfavors
databasemodelswhosesharedfeaturesaremorecentraltotheemphasisofthetextonwhichthequerymodelis
based.Thistendstofavorsmallerbodiesoftext.
Anotheroptionalfactor*is thenumberofrelationsthataresharedbythequeryandthecurrentdatabasemodel.
Thisfavorsbodiesoftexthavingagreaternumberofrelationsincommonwiththequerytext.
2. Thebodiesoftexthavingthelargestsimilarityrankingvaluesaremostlikelytobesimilartothequerytext,and
aremostlikelytobeperceivedasbeingrelevanttothequery,sothesimilarityrankingvaluesmaybe
interpretedasrelevancerankingvalues.
3. Sortidentifiersofthebodiesoftextinthedatabaseaccordingtothemagnitudeoftheirrelevancerankingvalues,
withlargervaluestowardtheheadofthelist.
4. Bodiesoftextwhoseidentifiersarenearertheheadofthesortedlistaremorerelevanttothequerytext.
5. Themostrelevantbodiesoftext,asdeterminedbytheirrelevancerankingvaluesand/orotherinterpretation
method(s),mayserveasthebasisofsubsequentquerymodelsand,bycomparingoneormoreofthesubsequent
querymodelstothedatabasemodelsandrankingthedatabasemodelsonsimilarity,evenmorespecifically
relevantbodiesoftextmaybeobtained.*
6. Whenbodiesoftextin thedatabaseoftextareassignedmultiplerelevancerankingvalues(RRVs)withrespectto
multiple,separatequerymodels,theproductofthemultipleRRVscanbeusedtorelevance-rankthetextonthe
logical"and"ofthemultiplequeries.*
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Appendix 2.
Rating materials

INSTRUCTIONS to RATERS
Read each narrative. After reading each narrative, re-read each statement (A-F) below and respond to each statement by
selecting one of the possible responses (1-7). On the response form, circle the response number you selected.
Use a pencil with soft lead. Erase thoroughly if any changes must be made.
After you read each narrative, it is very important that you re-read each statement (A-F) just before responding to it. So,
after reading a narrative, you should re-read statement A, select one response from among the responses numbered 1-7,
and circle that response on your response form. You should then re-read statement B, select among the responses, and
circle that response on your response form. And so on. Be sure to respond to all six statements (A-F) for every narrative.
Respond to each statement on its own merits. Ignore relationships among the statements.
You may re-read all or part of a narrative as often as you wish.
Please write your initials at the bottom of every page of the response form.
;tatements:
A) In some ways, the context of this incident is similar to the context of the Cali accident.
B) Some of the events of this incident are similar to some of the events of the Cali accident.
C) Some of the problems of this incident are similar to some of the problems of the Cali accident.
D) Some of the human factors of this incident are similar to some of the human factors of the Cali accident.
E) Some of the causes of this incident are similar to some of the causes of the Cali accident.
F) In some ways, this incident is relevant to the Cali accident.
For each narrative, select one of these responses for each statement:
1 2 3 4 5
strongly disagree somewhat undecided somewhat
disagree disagree agree
6 7
agree strongly
agree
Appendix 2. Figure 1. Instructions to raters.
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AND HIGH TERRAIN OF EITHER SIDE OF THE STAR ROUTING. WHEN I CHKED THE POINTS ON
THE STAR AGAINST OUR CURRENT DIRECT THE VOR RTE OF FLT IT LOOKED LIKE WE WOULD
BE VERY CLOSE TO THE STAR ROUTING. WHEN YOU ARE 200 MI OUT, A 15 MI DIFFERENCE
IS BARELY NOTICEABLE. FURTHER CHKING OF THE AREA CHART AND OUR DIRECT THE VOR
ROUTING SHOWED TERRAIN AT 14000 FT TO 11000 FT DIRECTLY ALONG OUR PATH. A
SIMILAR ATC CLRNC HAPPENS VERY OFTEN FLYING INTO LIMA, PERU. MANY, MANY, MANY
PLTS ARE NOT AWARE OF JUST HOW CRUCIAL IT IS NOT TO ACCEPT THESE DEADLY CLRNCS.
PLEASE GET THE WORD OUT AGAIN.
310989
ACR X ISSUED CLRNC TO 'FLY HDG 230 DEGS, INTERCEPT THE SAN FRANCISCO 095 DEG
RADIAL, DSND AND MAINTAIN 11000 FT.' I THEN REQUESTED T._IE FMS BRIDGE VISUAL RWY
28R. TRACON CLRED US DIRECT ARCHI. ON ABOUT 9 PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, I HAD ARRIVED
AT ARCHI WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL RTE CLRNC. IT IS NOT CLR THAT THE ORIGINAL
CLRNC TO INTERCEPT THE SFO 095 DEG STILL APPLIES AFTER BEING AMENDED TO FLY
DIRECT ARCHI. IN FACT, ON AT LEAST SOME OF THE PRIOR OCCASIONS, THE FMS WAS
REQUESTED WITH TRACON WITH CHK-IN, AND THEIR ORIGINAL RTE CLRNC WAS SIMPLY TO
FLY DIRECT ARCHI, LEAVING US TO ARRIVE OVER ARCHI WITH NO FURTHER RTE OR APCH
CLRNC. OUR TURNS ON SOME OF THESE PREVIOUS OCCASIONS TO COURSE 275 WERE MADE ON
ASSUMPTION! ON THIS OCCASION, APCHING ARCHI, I QUERIEE 134.5 ABOUT OUR CLRNC
AFTER ARCHI. BAY APCH RESPONDED, 'INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE.' THIS WAS
THE FIRST TIME I HAD HEARD THE TERM 'FINAL APCH COURSE' REFERRING TO THE SFO
095 DEG RADIAL. I INQUIRED AGAIN FOR CLARIFICATION, 'THAT IS NOT CLR TO ME,
SHOULD WE INTERCEPT THE SAN FRANCISCO 095 DEG RADIAL?' THE CTLR INSISTED ON
USING ONLY THE TERMINOLOGY 'FINAL APCH COURSE' AND WOULD NOT RESPOND OTHERWISE
TO MY REPEATED ATrEMPTS TO RECONCILE MY UNCERTAIN'IY ABOUT INTERCEPTING THE SFO
095 DEG OR INTERCEPTING, JUST BEYOND ARCHI, THE RWY 28R LOC OR CTRLINE. AT
ARCHI, WE TURNED TO A COURSE OF 275 ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT WAS OUR 'FINAL
APCH COURSE.' THIS AMBIGUITY WAS PROMPTLY RESOLVED ON THE SUBSEQUENT BAY APCH
FREQ 135.65. THIS TERMINOLOGY DOESN'T MEET THE LOGICAl, DEFINITION OF A 'FINAL'
APCH COURSE. THE FMS BRIDGE VISUAL RWY 28R APCH CHA_N GES COURSE 2 MORE TIMES
BEFORE ARRIVING AT THE RW'Y. NOR DOES IT APPEAR TO MEIIT THE AIM DEFINITION OF
'FINAL APCH COURSE' AS PUBLISHED IN FLT OPS MANUAL. NOR DOES IT SERVE THE
PURPOSE OF CLRLY DISTINGUISHING A CLRNC TO INTERCEPT 1"HE VOR RADIAL OR THE RWY
LOC AND CTRLINE. I SUGGEST 1) BAY APCH PROC BE CHANGK) SO THAT A RTE CLRNC OR
EXPECT FURTHER RTE CLRNC IS ISSUED WITH THE CLRNC TO FLY DIRECT ARCHI, AND 2)
Appendix 2. Figure 2. Example page from the bound collection of 200 narrratives that were read by the analysts.
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198046
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: ! 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
280530
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
198841
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
197507
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
274027
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
217430
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2"3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
315261
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
116871
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
280233
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
301538
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
209811
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
310143
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
370656
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
310989
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
F: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Appendix 2. Figure 3. Example page from booklet of response forms.
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Appendix 3.
Ratings of the 200 incident narratives read by the analysts,
showing the QUORUM-calculated relevance ranking values (RRVs),
QUORUM's ratings derived from the RRVs,
and ratings by each of the analysts

Appendix 3. Table 1. Ratings of the 100 QUORUM-selected incident narratives. The incidents are sorted in order of the
analysts' relevance ratings. The more highly rated incidents appear nearer the head of this list. The ASRS accession
numbers of each incident are shown in column I (accnum). The relevance ranking values (RRVs) in column 2 were
computed by QUORUM, based on the intersection (see example in table 3) between the query model (table 1) and each
narrative model (see example in table 2). The QUORUM ratings in column 3 (labeled Q) are computed from the RRVs,
as described in table 3. Ratings shown for each of the three analysts (A1, A2, A3) are their maximum ratings across the
six assertions of relevance. This indicates whether the analyst saw any relevance in the narrative. For example, a rating
of 7 indicates that the analyst "strongly agreed" with at least one of the six assertions of relevance. The last 16 incidents
on this list, shown in italics, were rated by the analysts no higher than 4 ("undecided"), indicating that they found no
relevance in these incidents. More detail is available elsewhere in this report about the top 11 incidents. The narrative of
incident 310130 is shown in Fig. 2, and all of the analysts' ratings for that incident are shown in Table 4. The narratives
and all of the analysts' ratings for the next 10 incidents, 368360-223467, are shown in Appendix 4, Figures 1-10.
-- accnum RRV Q A1 A2 A3
310130 3052 6 7 7 7 160843 31696 7 5 6 5 342838 4584 6 5 5 3
368360 11483 6 7 7 7 217430 4898 6 5 6 5 358123 6317 6 3 5 5
272508 6158 6 7 6 7 219222 3034 6 5 6 5 84811 5349 6 5 5 3
-- 280233 7214 6 6 7 7 279030 2843 6 5 5 6 115883 2736 6 5 5 2
315261 4012 6 6 7 7 297695 5095 6 5 5 6 354277 6222 6 2 5 5
347848 9726 6 7 6 7 302770 4675 6 5 6 5 307161 10147 6 5 5 1
349669 2869 6 6 7 7 305840 4253 6 6 5 5 303310 2323 6 5 4 3
363536 10542 6 6 7 7 359641 9430 6 6 5 5 264952 6695 6 5 3 3
310143 24955 7 5 7 7 82787 2999 6 5 6 5 279493 6803 6 5 3 3
310228 4735 6 3 7 7 363380 3641 6 5 4 6 350190 3118 6 5 3 3
223467 3974 6 6 6 7 153355 2406 6 6 5 3 355364 2948 6 3 5 3
334866 4001 6 6 6 7 174048 4631 6 3 6 5 242560 2612 6 2 5 3
351150 8316 6 6 7 6 201005 2465 6 3 5 6 249654 4542 6 2 3 5
184380 6426 6 5 7 6 238398 3179 6 3 6 5 309352 3498 6 2 3 5
-- 212324 6327 6 6 5 7 251901 2557 6 3 5 6 282707 3565 6 5 1 3
274820 3713 6 5 6 7 307543 7958 6 3 6 5 99108 3018 6 3 1 5
306151 2633 6 5 6 7 317197 3505 6 5 6 3 260432 9963 6 4 3 1
335098 2661 6 5 7 6 330250 2612 6 3 6 5 280922 9001 6 2 4 2
226114 4086 6 3 7 5 325026 7878 6 5 6 2 325365 4521 6 3 3 3
142553 5395 6 6 6 6 362229 2983 6 2 6 5 308422 4712 6 2 3 3
146645 7106 6 6 6 6 156284 4664 6 2 4 6 228422 3901 6 3 1 3
_ 224363 2574 6 6 6 6 310989 14024 6 4 2 6 355188 2659 6 3 1 3
310373 17066 6 6 6 6 156414 4762 6 5 5 5 313511 5440 6 2 2 3
334006 4234 6 6 6 6 184446 7494 6 5 5 5 112422 2386 6 1 3 2
352618 4305 6 6 6 6 198046 3758 6 5 5 5 281636 3187 6 3 1 2
-- 116871 7215 6 6 6 5 242545 2982 6 5 5 5 370656 6793 6 3 I 2
117306 6867 6 6 6 5 275413 4687 6 5 5 5 332870 2503 6 3 1 1
244767 2684 6 5 6 6 335430 5837 6 5 5 5 148439 2708 6 2 1 2
296506 2735 6 6 6 5 346137 5557 6 5 5 5 342160 3508 6 2 1 2
301760 8371 6 6 6 5 361956 5096 6 5 5 5 325432 10172 6 2 1 1
321136 3124 6 6 5 6 365456 3330 6 5 5 5 340978 2313 6 2 1 1
341815 4676 6 6 6 5 335282 9002 6 5 4 5 360500 3416 6 2 1 1
_ 353338 7910 6 2 6 6 300252 7941 6 3 5 5
140711 3067 6 6 1 6 329185 3011 6 3 5 5
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
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Appendix 3. Table 2. Ratings of the 100 randomly selected incident narrattves. The incidents are sorted in order of the
analysts' relevance ratings. The more highly rated incidents appear nearer" the head of this list. The ASRS accession
numbers of each incident are shown in column I (accnum). The relevance ranking values (RRVs) in column 2 were
computed by QUORUM, based on the intersection (see example in table 3) between the query model (table 1) and each
narrative model (see example in table 2). The QUORUM ratings in column 3 (labeled Q) are computed from the RRVs,
as described in table 3. Ratings shown for each of the three analysts (A1, A2, A3) are their maximum ratings across the
six assertions of relevance. This indicates whether the analyst saw any relevance in the narrative. For example, a rating
of 7 indicates that the analyst "strongly agreed" with at least one of the six assertions of relevance.
accnum RRV Q A1 A2 A3
137942 102 4 5 5 7 329210 0 1 1 5 2 280530 0 1 3 1 1
168420 612 5 6 5 5 352880 0 1 1 5 2 288665 0 1 1 1 3
184917 0 1 5 5 6 374411 0 1 5 1 2 299682 0 1 3 1 1
232995 0 1 5 6 2 98676 0 1 5 1 2 339510 0 1 3 1 1
276144 0 1 2 5 6 217405 19 4 1 1 5 349077 7 3 3 1 1
185995 4 3 2 1 6 289604 0 1 5 1 1 231377 0 1 1 2 2
369400 0 1 1 1 6 326579 14 3 1 5 1 273126 0 1 2 2 1
121942 0 1 5 5 5 334370 1 2 3 4 3 311780 0 1 2 1 2
123523 6 3 5 5 5 269069 0 1 2 4 3 336170 0 1 2 1 2
133697 0 1 5 5 5 224527 0 1 2 4 _" 363445 0 1 2 1 2
137377 2 3 5 5 5 135427 0 1 1 4 1 197399 0 1 1 1 2
299590 32 4 5 5 5 167263 0 1 2 3 3 199234 0 1 2 1 1
317302 2 3 5 5 5 205316 11 3 3 3 2 221398 20 4 2 1 1
120627 6 3 3 5 5 348150 0 1 3 2 3 227582 0 1 2 1 1
124286 0 1 5 5 3 164488 0 1 3 1 3 233097 0 1 2 1 1
294893 0 1 5 5 2 221067 57 4 3 3 1 236441 0 1 2 1 1
301538 0 1 5 2 5 236993 1 2 3 I 3 243432 7 3 2 1 1
80231 0 1 5 5 2 119934 0 1 2 3 2 250185 0 1 2 1 1
163375 0 1 3 4 5 88123 10 3 3 2 2 266321 0 1 2 1 1
226033 0 1 3 4 5 129682 0 1 2 1 3 285669 0 1 2 1 1
92389 0 1 5 4 3 145934 0 1 2 3 1 301427 0 1 2 1 1
197507 48 4 5 4 2 164303 0 1 2 1 3 310662 0 1 2 1 1
296006 0 1 5 4 2 176239 0 1 3 1 2 319332 3 3 2 1 1
93994 0 1 5 4 2 305310 0 1 1 3 '2 345249 0 1 2 1 1
294068 0 1 1 4 5 307714 0 1 2 I 3 358446 0 I 2 1 1
125733 0 1 3 2 5 107473 0 1 3 I t 363100 16 3 2 1 1
184142 0 1 5 3 2 137871 2 3 1 1 3 150685 0 1 1 1 1
357280 60 4 2 5 3 154070 0 1 3 1 t 159808 0 1 1 1 1
119343 76 4 1 5 3 181017 0 1 3 1 E 173602 0 1 1 1 1
236719 0 1 3 5 1 196326 0 1 3 1 i 245613 0 1 1 I 1
274027 58 4 5 3 1 198841 0 1 3 1 l 272741 0 1 1 1 I
297200 12 3 3 5 1 209811 0 1 3 1 t 282765 0 1 1 1 1
324025 0 1 3 5 1 211265 0 1 3 1 [
114244 1 2 5 2 2 249845 0 1 3 1 I
(I: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: s,)mewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
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Appendix 4.
Ten of the incidents rated as
highly relevant to the Cali accident

368360
AFTER DEPARTING FRG ARPT, ENRTE TO OUR FIRST DEP FIX, WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY ATC
TO FLY A HDG OF 360 DEGS BECAUSE OF A LINE OF TSTMS JUST W OF OUR DEP FIX. THE
CTLR TOLD US TO MAINTAIN FL280 AND CONTACT ZNY FOR A RERTE. WE CONTACTED Z/flY,
WHO ISSUED A NEW ROUTING TO US. AS I WAS ENTERING THE DATA IN THE FMS IT BECAME
CLR TO ME THAT THIS ROUTING TO PWK (OUR DEST) WAS INVALID, AS THE FMS WAS NOT
TAKING THE INFO. I ASKED MY FO TO CLARIFY THE ROUTING WITH ATC. HE ATTEMPTED TO
DO SO BUT WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE AT THIS TIME TO ZBW. ON OUR INITIAL CALL
TO ZBW, HE TOLD US TO FLY DIRECT TO ALB VOR, CLB TO FL310 AND WHEN ABLE PROCEED
DIRECT SYR VOR. AT THIS TIME I AGAIN ASKED MY FO TO CLARIFY THE ROUTING AFTER
SYR. WE WERE AGAIN GIVEN INVALID ROUTING (RTE BREAK ON FMS). AT THIS POINT MY
FO BECAME ENGROSSED IN LOOKING ON OUR HIGH AND LOW ALT ENRTE CHARTS TO FIND
WHERE THE PROB WAS. I TRIED AGAIN TO ENTER ROUTING ON THE FMS (THIS TOOK APPROX
2 MINS). I LOOKED UP TO SEE MY FLT INSTS AND AT THIS TIME NOTED THE ALTIMETER
READING FL312 AND CLBING. I IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND ATI'EMPTED
TO DSND TO FL310, BUT OUR 1000 FPM RATE OF CLB CARRIED US TO FL313 BEFORE
CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS INITIATED. APPROX 5 SECONDS LATER ZBW TOLD US TO MAINTAIN
FL3 I0. I LOOKED AT MY TCASII DISPLAY WHICH WAS IN THE 'LOOP UP' MODE BUT SAW NO
CONFLICTING TFC WITHIN A 40 MI RADIUS. ATC FINALLY GAVE US A RTE THAT WAS VALID
AND WE CONTINUED ON TO PWK WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THAT THE
COMPLEXITY OF FMS PROGRAMMING IS NOT ADDRESSED IN INITIAL TRAINING AT SCHOOL
BECAUSE EACH ACFT HAS DIFFERENT EQUIP. HOWEVER, THIS LEAVES THE FLC TO 'LEARN
AS THEY FLY.' THIS EFFECTIVELY TOOK MY FO OUT OF THE LOOP IN THAT IF HE WAS
PROGRAMMING THE FMS, I COULD HAVE CONCENTRATED MORE ON MONITORING THE ACFT. I
SHOULD HAVE LET THE FO FLY THE ACFT WITH THE AUTOPLT RATHER THAN ME DO ALL THE
TASKS. THE ENTIRE CREW WAS DISTR, AND WE BOTH FAILED TO MONITOR THE PERFORMANCE
OF THE ACFT. I SHOULD HAVE JUST PUT MY HSI IN THE VOR MODE RATHER THAN DISPLAY
FMS COURSE INFO. THIS WOULD HAVE ALLOWED US TO FOCUS MORE ON THE ACFT. I
BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT ALL GA PLTS WITH FMS'S ON BOARD ATI'END FMS SPECIFIC
SIMULATOR TRAINING ON THEIR UNITS BEFORE OPERATING AN ACFT WITH THE UNIT
INSTALLED. THERE IS NO REG THAT GOVERNS THIS OTHER THAN FAR PART 91 WHICH
STATES I MUST BE FAMILIAR WITH THE OP OF ALL EQUIP. SO I AM LEFT TO READ A BOOK
ON THE FMS AND THEN GO FLY IT IN REAL LIFE. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context events problems human factors cause_ relevance
368360 analyst 1 7 6 6 6 6 6
analyst 2 2 5 7 6 6 5
analyst 3 6 6 7 6 6 5
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 1. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 368360, one of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Carl accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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272508
I MISSED THE XING RESTRICTION OF 10000 FT AT 'BUMBY' ON THE BATSN.BATSN3 ARR TO
HOU. WE HAD BEEN MANEUVERING AROUND TSTMS AND HAD RECEIVED A FEW ROUTING
CHANGES, THE LATEST OF WHICH WAS 'DIRECT TO DAS THEN TO THE ARPT.' AS WE APCHED
HOU, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO BUMBY AND THE REMAINDER OF THE ARR. I STARTED THE
AIRPLANE DIRECT TO BUMBY WITH THE FMS AND THEN INSERTED THE XING RESTRICTION OF
10000 FT ON THE LEGS PAGE. I THEN SELECTED THE BATSN-3 ARR FOR USE BY THE FMS.
WHAT I FAILED TO NOTICE WAS THAT BY INSERTING THE ARR IN THE FMS, THE COMPUTER
DUMPED THE XING RESTRICTION I HAD INSERTED JUST A FEW MOMENTS EARLIER. AT THIS
POINT, I FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE POS OF 'TOP OF DSCNT' POINT AND PROCEEDED TO
LOAD IN THE APCH TO RWY 4 (ILS), WHICH HAD CHANGED FROM RWY 12R WITH A NEW ATIS
MESSAGE. AT 15 MI PRIOR TO THE DSCNT POINT, I STARTED DOWN AND INTERCEPTED THE
DSCNT PROFILE WELL AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. DURING THE DSCNT I BRIEFED THE APCH AND
SET UP THE NAV FOR THE ILS. THROUGH ABOUT 17500 FT, APCI-[ CTL ASKED IF WE WOULD
MAKE THE BUMBY RESTRICTION (10000 FT) AND IT WAS IMMElhIATELY OBVIOUS THAT WE
WOULD NOT AS THE DSCNT LINE WE WERE ON NO LONG WAS LrSING THE BUMBY RESTRICTION
FOR COMPUTATION. THE CTLR STATED THAT IT WAS NOT A PROB AND THAT WE SHOULD JUST
KEEP OUR SPD UP AND PROCEED ON THE ARR. THE LNDG WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT FURTHER
INCIDENT OR DIFFICULTY. THE CAUSE, I BELIEVE, WAS A COMBINATION OF COCKPIT
MGMNT OVERLOAD DURING THE APCH PHASE COUPLED WITH AN OVERCONFIDENCE IN THE FMS
TO PRESENT VALID DSCNT PROFILE INFO. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO GET TOO BUSY DURING
THE DSCNT TO MAKE ESSENTIAL XCHKS TO CONFIRM THE FMS WAS WORKING AS ADVERTISED.
THE CORRECTION: ALWAYS DOUBLE CHK THE FMS DATA AGAINST OTHER AVAILAABLE NAV
DATA TO INSURE THAT YOUR PROGRAMMING IS CORRECT AND THAT THE ACFT IS FOLLOWING
ACCURATE FMS GUIDANCE. OVERCONFIDENCE IN THE FMS AND INCREASED WORKLOAD IN THE
COCKPIT DURING BAD WX AND APCH PREPARATION IS NO EXCUSE FOR SOUND PILOTAGE AND
THE MAINT OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.
Analysts' ratings qf each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst cqntext events problem_ human factors causes relevance
272508 analyst 1 7 7 7 5 6 6
analyst 2 5 6 5 6 5 5
analyst 3 7 7 6 7 6 7
(I: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: sc_mewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 2. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 272508, ore of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Call accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions 9f relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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280233
APCH CTL CLRED US TO 7200 FT INITIAL APCH ALT FOR RWY 16R AT RNO. BECAUSE OUR
PRESENT ALT WAS HIGHER THAN NORMAL, I CALLED FOR 'GEAR-DOWN' AND EXTENDED SPD
BRAKES TO AID DSCNT. I INTERCEPTED RWY 16R LOC AND TRACKED INBOUND WHILE STILL
DSNDING. SINK RATE ABOUT 3000 FPM. AT 8200 FT THE ALT ALERT SIGNALED AND THE
COPLT AND I EXCHANGED ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. I RAISED THE NOSE TO ARREST SINK RATE
AND DECELERATE AT 7200 FT. APCHING ZERO-FLAP VMA. I APPLIED THRUST AND NOTICED
I WAS USING CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN NORMAL TO MAINTAIN LEVEL FLT. AIRSPD WAS 210
KT AND DECAYING. LNDG WT WAS APPROX 120000 LBS AND VMA ABOUT 180 KTS. AT APPROX
200 KTS, I GOT THE STALL SHAKER WITHOUT ANY UNUSUALLY HIGH NOSE ATTITUDE. I
INSTINCTIVELY LOWERED THE NOSE AND ADDED THRUST. WE WERE NOW DSNDING BELOW 7200
FT AND BELOW GS PRIOR TO THE OM. AT 6500 FT THE GPWS ISSUED A 'TERRAIN'
WARNING. THE FE THEN ALARMED ME THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL EXTENDED. I
IMMEDIATELY RETRACTED THEM, CALLED FOR 'FLAPS-2 DEGS' AND CALLED THE ARPT 'IN-
SIGHT.' WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 16L AND MADE A NORMAL APCH AND
LNDG. ANALYZING THESE EVENTS, I HAD FORGOTTEN THE SPD BRAKES WERE DEPLOYED. THE
LNDG GEAR WAS DOWN TO AID DSCNT BUT WAS NOW A LARGE DRAG DEVICE IN LEVEL FLT.
ADDITIONALLY, I WAS IN A NON-STANDARD APCH PROFILE. GETrING THE STALL SHAKER AT
200 KTS CONFUSED ME AND MY INSTINCT TO LOWER THE NOSE AND ADD THRUST WAS
TRIGGERED ALTHOUGH I WAS STILL LOSING ALT OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. THESE
ACTIONS PREVENTED A STALL BUT ACCELERATED ALT LOSS. THE RNO AREA IS MOUNTAINOUS
AND WE GOT WITHIN GPWS TERRAIN WARNING RANGE AT 6500 FT. FORTUNATELY, MY FE
CALLED MY ATTN TO THE SPD BRAKES. I HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY TRAINED IN TERRAIN
AVOIDANCE MANEUVERS BUT DID NOT EXECUTE THEM SINCE I WAS FOCUSED ON AIRSPD AND
ALT CTL. OUR SCHEDULE WAS MSP TO DFW, DFW TO OAK, OAK TO RNO. WE ALL RECEIVED
15 HRS REST PRIOR TO THESE TRIPS YET ALL OF US FELT EXTREMELY LETHARGIC AND
FATIGUED UPON ARR AT OAK. WORKING 11:28 HRS OF SCHEDULED DUTY AT THIS TIME OF
DAY, I BELIEVE, IS THE MAJOR CAUSE OF THIS FATIGUE FEELING, RESULTING IN A
GROSS IMPAIRMENT OF OUR JUDGEMENT. ADEQUATE CREW REST PRIOR TO THIS TRIP
PAIRING IS NOT AN ANSWER. A SHORTER DUTY PERIOD IS REQUIRED.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context events problems human factors causes relevance
280233 analyst 1 6 6 5 5 4 5
analyst 2 7 6 7 7 6 7
analyst 3 5 6 6 6 7 7
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 3. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 280233, one of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Carl accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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315261
DURING OUR INITIAL APCH INTO ONT WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING CLRNC, PROCEED
DIRECT TO THE PETIS NDB, MAINTAIN 4200 FT TO PETIS, CLRED ILS RWY 26L APCH.
WHILE MY FO WAS READING BACK THE CLRNC I ENTERED DIRECT 'D'F26L' INTO THE FMC
AND PROCEEDED TO FLY INBOUND. A FEW MINS LATER APCH CTL CALLED AND SAID WE WERE
4 NM L OF PETIS AND TO TURN R TO A 320 DEG HDG, MAINTAIN 4200 FT. AT THIS POINT
I REALIZED THAT I HAD BEEN FLYING DIRECT TO THE OM (FOI_q'A) INSTEAD OF PETIS
NDB. WE THEN RECEIVED ANOTHER APCH CLRNC AND CONTINUED UNEVENTFULLY TO THE
ARPT. WE WERE IN VFR CONDITIONS THE ENTIRE TIME AND NEVER HAD ANY TFC OR
TERRAIN CONFLICTS. THE FMS NAV DATA BASE LISTS THE OM (FONTA) AS FF26L INSTEAD
OF JUST FONTA. MOST NDB'S ARE COLLOCATED WITH THE OM. REFERRED TO AS LOM'S.
HUMAN FACTORS BEING WHAT THEY ARE, I SAW D'D'26L AND USED THAT WAYPOINT THINKING
AT THAT MOMENT THEY WERE COLLOCATED AND I WAS FLYING TO PETIS. ACTUALLY THEY
ARE ABOUT 5 NM APART. IF THE FMS HAD SHOWN FONTA AS THE OM WAYPOINT INSTEAD OF
FF26L I THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CLR THAT THEY ARE IN F'ACT 2 DIFFERENT POINTS.
THERE DOESN'T SEEM TO BE ANY CONSISTENCY WITH THE FMS APCH DATA BASE. SOME
APCHS SHOW THE OM NAME AND OTHERS USE THE FF (FINAL FIX) FORMAT. THEY SHOULD
ALL USE THE CORRECT FIX NAMES. ADDING TO THE CONFUSION THE APCH DATABASE SHOWS
PETIS AS SBNB. OUR SOP DICTATES THE PNF MAKE ALL EXECUTABLE ENTRIES TO THE FMS.
THIS KEEPS BOTH PLTS 'IN THE LOOP.' I WAS HAND FLYING AND SINCE WE WERE VERY
BUSY AT THE TIME, I MADE THE ENTRY TO SAVE TIME. FOLLOWING SOP MAY HAVE
PREVENTED THE MIX-UP. FOLLOW SOP AND STAY ALERT, AND PLEASE MAKE THE DATA BASES
MORE USER FRIENDLY!
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context events problems human factors causes relevance
315261 analyst 1 6 6 6 5 5 6
analyst 2 6 6 7 6 6 6
analyst 3 6 5 6 6 7 6
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: s(,mewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 4. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 315261, orpeof the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Call accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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347848
3 MINS PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT, CAPT HAD TO LEAVE FLT DECK TO ATIEND TO
PHYSIOLOGIC NEEDS. FO WAS PF FOR LEG AND HAD CIVET ARR PROGRAMMED IN FMS PRIOR
TO CAPT LEAVING. HE HAD NOT SELECTED THE RWY AT THAT TIME. WHEN CAPT RETURNED,
ACFT WAS PASSING FL280 TO MAKE 140A180B AT CIVET, LNAV/VNAV WAS IN USE. WE WERE
CTRED ON LOC COURSE ON 109.9, BUT FO HAD NOT SELECTED EITHER HSI TO 'ILS' MODE
SO AS TO RECEIVE DME AND NEITHER VOR WAS IN MANUAL -- TOTAL RELIANCE ON THE
'MAGIC.' CAPT BRIEFLY SELECTED ILS AND VERIFIED DME/LOC CTRED AND WAS OCCUPIED
IN COMPLETING APCH SETUP IN FMS, GETTING ATIS, PLANNING DSCNT CHK AND BRIEFING
THE APCH FOR FO. FO WAS BEHIND AND NOT CATCHING UP. SEQUENCE IN FMS PROGRAMMING
WAS SELECTING RWY 25L, LNAV DIRECT DOWNE, THEN BACK TO DEP/ARR PAGE TO RESELECT
RWY 25L, CIVET, ARNES TRANSITION. THIS DROPPED DOWNE AS ACTIVE WAYPOINT, AND
STARTED JET IN TURN BACK TO ARNES. FO DID NOT HAVE LOC SELECTED!? LAX APCH GAVE
A TURN TO 220 DEG TO REJOIN RW'Y 25L LOC. THAT'S WHEN CAPT NOTED FO'S STATE OF
'BEHINDNESS,' AND TALKED HIM THROUGH THE STEPS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE APCH 'RAW
DATA.' AFI_R THAT, THERE WAS BARELY ENOUGH TIME TO COMPLETE THE CHKLISTS, BRIEF
THE APCH, AND GET THE JET ON THE GND. FO HAS ERRONEOUSLY SELECTED APCH PRIOR TO
10 DME, PER NOTAMS WHEN INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN SELECT LOC AND GOT LOW (AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF THAT) BY 200 FT AT HUNDA (1 DOT LOW). CAPT WAS TASK SATURATED AS
WELL, TRYING TO SUPPORT FO AND NOT TAKE THE ACFT OR TAKE US OUT OF SEQUENCE
SINCE MANY PAX HAD TIGHT INTL CONNECTIONS (ALREADY 30 MINS LATE). THAT WAS THE
CAPT'S MISTAKE, ALTHOUGH WE PULLED IT OUT THIS TIME. BUT BOY, IT WAS NOT
PRETTY!! CAPT AND FO WERE BOTH UNDER 100 HRS AND NEW TO JET -- PLAYED SOME PART
IN EVENTS DESCRIBED.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number ansly_t context event_ problems human factors causes relevance
347848 analyst 1 6 7 6 5 6 5
analyst 2 5 5 5 6 6 5
analyst 3 6 6 5 6 6 7
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 5. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 347848, one of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Cali accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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349669
I UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR JURISDICTION MORE THAN LIKEL_t DOES NOT INCLUDE
NICARAGUA, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THIS WAS A CLASSIC SIT OF A FOREIGN ATC LANGUAGE
BARRIER. THE WX AROUND MANAGUA WAS APPROX 1500 FT OVCST AND 10 MI, TSTMS
SURROUNDING THE FIELD AND AT THE FIELD ITSELF. THE RIDE ON THE DSCNT WAS
NOTHING MORE THAN LIGHT TURB WITH VERY OCCASIONAL MODERATE CHOP AND MODERATE
RAIN. I HAD PROGRAMMED THE FMC TO PLAN ON A DSCNT TO ARRIVE 35 NM FROM MANAGUA
AT 10000 FT MSL AND 250 KTS. WE WERE ON FLT PLAN AIRWAY A502 TO MANAGUA. AS THE
FO AND MYSELF LOOKED AT THE APCH PLATE WE NOTICED THAT THERE WERE 1 OF 2 WAYS
TO EXECUTE THE VOR RWY 9 APCH. HE HAD MENTIONED TO ME THAT HE HAD ALWAYS USED
THE PROC OF INTERCEPTING THE PUBLISHED 10 DME ARC AND UTILIZING THAT METHOD TO
RWY 9. AS I HAD NEVER BEEN TO MANAGUA BEFORE AND NOTING THE PRESENCE OF AIRWAY
A502 DEPICTED ON THE CHART AS THE START POINT OF THE 10 DME ARC I AGREED THAT
THIS WAS PROBABLY WHAT WE WOULD GET. LET ME NOTE THAT MANAGUA IS A NON RADAR
APCH CTL ENVIRONMENT. THE CTLR PROCEEDED TO STEP US DOWN FROM 11000 FT MSL TO
5000 FT MSL. PRIOR TO THE TURN OFF OF THE AIRWAY TO INITIATE THE 10 DME ARC SHE
SAID 'RPT 5 DME RWY 9.' THERE WAS NO STATEMENT FROM THE CTLR TO 'EXPECT APCH
CLRNC AT THE VOR,' 'CROSS THE VOR AT 5000 FT, RPT 5 DME,' 'CROSS THE VOR AT
5000 FT, CLRED FOR THE APCH.' ONLY 'RPT 5 DME RWY 9.' WE BOTH ASSUMED WRONGLY
THAT SHE HAD MEANT RPT 5 DME OUT ON FINAL ON THE APCH TO RWY 9. SO WE COMMENCED
FLYING THE ARC, TRANSITIONING FROM THE AIRWAY AND COMPLYING WlTI-I THE CHARTED
STEPDOWN FIXES ASSOCIATED WITH THE VOR 9 APCH. AS WE WERE TURNING FINAL AT
APPROX 9 DME FROM THE RWY THE CTLR ASKED OUR POS AND ALT. WE RESPONDED WITH,
'ON FINAL, 9 DME AT 2700 b"T AS PUBLISHED.' SHE THEN SAID THAT WE WERE TO HAVE
CALLED 5 DME FROM THE VOR AND CROSSED THE VOR AT 5000 FT. THERE WAS NO OTHER
TFC IN THE AREA. WE LANDED wrrHOUT ANY INCIDENT AND THE CTLR NEVER QUESTIONED
FURTHER. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO TWR AND GND CTL AND NOTHING MORE WAS MENTIONED
AT ALL. IN FURTHER CONVERSATION BTWN THE FO AND MYSELF WE BOTH CAME TO THE SAME
CONCLUSION THAT ALL THAT WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN SAID WAS 'CROSS THE VOR AT
5000 FT, RPT 5 DME AND CLRED FOR THE APCH,' OR 'CLRED DIRI_CT TO THE MANAGUA
VOR, MAINTAIN 5000 FT, AND RPT 5 DME.' WE ARE NOT PLACING BLAME ON ANYONE IN
PARTICULAR AS I BELIEVE ALL OF US WERE TO FAULT TO A POINT. JUST SIMPLE MISCOM.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context evcn_ prgl_lcms human fa_) ors causes relevance
349669 analyst 1 6 6 5 5 5 5
analyst 2 7 6 6 6 6 6
analyst 3 5 6 7 5 7 6
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 6. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 349669, one of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Carl accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions c_frelevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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363536
WE WERE ON A VECTOR FOR FINAL APCH COURSE TO ILS 3 AT CPR. DUE TO OUR HIGH ALT
THE CTLR VECTORED US ACROSS FINAL ON A NE HDG. ACF_ ANTI-ICE SYS WERE OPERATIVE
AND SPD BRAKES WERE DEPLOYED TO KEEP AIRSPD BELOW 250 KIAS IN DSCNT. WE WERE
CLRED TO DSND TO 7400 FT MSL. CTLR GAVE US A VECTOR TOWARDS THE S, R TURN IN
ORDER TO MANEUVER US AROUND TO REINTERCEPT FINAL. SHORTLY AFTER THIS THE GPWS
ALERTED US TO TERRAIN, TERRAIN.' AN IMMEDIATE CLB WAS INITIATED AND THE ACFT
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED SAFELY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: I) CTLR VECTORED US AT AN
ALT BELOW MVA. 2) POOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BY FLC. 3) CREW DISTR BY
CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY IN AREA AND ICING. 4) TOO MUCH TRUST PUT IN CTLR BY FLC.
CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CALLED BACK
WITH THE FOLLOWING: THE FLC BRIEFING WAS DONE BUT IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED ALONG
WITH THE DSCNT CHKLIST DURING THE APCH AND VECTOR FROM OVER THE ARPT. THIS ACR
DOES NOT USE ANY TERRAIN AWARENESS IN THEIR APCH BRIEFINGS. RPTR WAS COUNSELED
REGARDING THIS. FO ADMITS TO IT BEING VERY MUCH OF A RUSHED ATMOSPHERE AND
ADMITS TO A LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN EVENT. THE FMS ON THE ACFT WAS NOT
BEING USED. APCH PLATES WERE OUT AND USED. THE RADIO ALTIMETER WAS NOT READ
DURING THE GPWS. ZDV KEPT FLT HIGH AND THAT STARTED THE EVENT WITH A DELAY
VECTOR BEING NEEDED. RPTR REMEMBERS THAT INITIALLY THE CTLR WANTED TO TURN THEM
L WHILE ON THE OVERHEAD -- NE VECTOR PRIOR TO THE TURN TO THE S, BUT THIS WAS
REFUSED ACCOUNT TSTM ACTIVITY TO THE L, N. THE TURN S WAS MADE AT A STANDARD
RATE 25 DEG BANK ANGLE. CREW DID NOT FEEL THAT THEY WANTED TO CALL THE CTLR ON
THE GND WHO, IT WAS THOUGHT, WAS WORKING A SPLIT POS OF APCH, TWR AND GND.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number an_)ly_ context events problems human factors causes relevance
363536 analyst 1 6 6 6 6 5 5
analyst 2 6 6 7 7 6 6
analyst 3 7 7 7 7 7 7
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 7. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 363536, one of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Carl accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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310143
ATC CLRNCS AND HIGH TERRAIN IN SOUTH AMERICA. WE WEILE FLYING INTO CALL COLUMBIA
WHEN ATC CLRED US DIRECT TO THE CALI VOR AND DSND TO 5000 FT. CALI HAS A STAR
AND HIGH TERRAIN OF EITHER SIDE OF THE STAR ROUTING. WHEN I CHKED THE POINTS ON
THE STAR AGAINST OUR CURRENT DIRECT THE VOR RTE OF FLT IT LOOKED LIKE WE WOULD
BE VERY CLOSE TO THE STAR ROUTING. WHEN YOU ARE 200 MI OUT, A 15 MI DIFFERENCE
IS BARELY NOTICEABLE. FURTHER CHKING OF THE AREA CHART AND OUR DIRECT THE VOR
ROUTING SHOWED TERRAIN AT 14000 FT TO 11000 FT DIRECTLY ALONG OUR PATH. A
SIMILAR ATC CLRNC HAPPENS VERY OFTEN FLYING INTO LIMA, PERU. MANY, MANY, MANY
PLTS ARE NOT AWARE OF JUST HOW CRUCIAL IT IS NOT TO ACCEPT THESE DEADLY CLRNCS.
PLEASE GET THE WORD OUT AGAIN.
Note: In the first sentence of the narrative, the words "CALL COLUMBI._" (referring to Cali, Colombia) are shown as
they appear in the ASRS database.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context events problems human factors cause_ relevance
310143 analyst 1 5 3 5 2 3 3
analyst 2 7 7 7 7 7 7
analyst 3 7 7 7 2 7 7
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 8. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 310143, o'Te of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Carl accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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310228
VERY LATE NIGHT APCH TO BOSTON LOGAN. WE DECIDED TO FLY THE APCH TO RWY 33L
USING OUR NEW APCH NAV PROCS. THE ATIS WAS SAYING TO EXPECT THE VOR/DME GPS RWY
33L. WE PULLED UP THIS APCH FROM OUR COMPUTER DATABASE AND INSERTED IT. UPON
CHKING ON WITH BOS APCH WE REQUESTED THE VOR/DME RWY 33L WITH A TURN ON JUST
OUTSIDE YARDD. APCH SAID OK AND GAVE US A HDG. WHEN TURNED ON A BASE APCH, TOLD
US WE WERE 5 MI FROM BEEJE AND CLRED FOR THE VOR/DME GPS RWY 33L. UNBEKNOWNST
TO US THERE ARE 2 APCHS, ONE NAMED THE (GPS) VOR/DME RWY 33L AND THE OTHER
NAMED VOR DME OR GPS A. WE UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC TO BE FOR THE (GPS) VOR DME RWY
33L WHICH HAS AN INBOUND COURSE OF 342 DEGS, WHILE THE APCH CTLR UNDERSTOOD THE
CLRNC TO BE FOR THE VOR DME OR GPS A APCH WHICH HAS AN INBOUND COURSE OF 310
DEGS. SINCE WE WERE LOOKING TO INTERCEPT THE 342 DEG COURSE WE OVERSHOT THE 310
DEG COURSE. TWR TOLD US WE WERE L OF COURSE, AT WHICH TIME WE RPTED FIELD IN
SIGHT AND PROCEEDED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. ONE FURTHER POINT OF CONFUSION: THE
FINAL APCH FIX FOR THE VOR DME OR GPS-A APCH IS BEEJE AND THE FAF FOR THE (GPS)
VOR DME RWY 33L IS MEACH. THESE SOUND VERY SIMILAR AND COMBINED WITH THE ALMOST
IDENTICAL APCH NAMES CREATES A STRONG POTENTIAL FOR CONFUSION. AT LEAST THE
APCHS SHOULD BE RENAMED AND PROBABLY THE FAF'S AS WELL. SUPPLEMENTAL
INFORMATION FROM ACN 310132: I BRIEFED AN 'APCH NAV' (RNAV) VORfDME RWY 33L
APCH AND INSERTED IT INTO THE FMGC. THE FO TOLD APCH THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO
INTERCEPT THE FINAL OUTSIDE 'YARDD' (ON THE VOR/DME APCH TO RWY 33L). APCH CTL
STATED FINE, WHATEVER WE WANTED. THIS WOULD FACILITATE CAPTURING APPR- NAV. WE
WERE ASKED LATER ABOUT THE LENGTH OF FINAL WE DESIRED AND AGAIN REQUESTED
'OUTSIDE OF YARDD.' THIS IS FOUND ONLY ON THE (GPS) VOR/DME RWY 33L APCH PLATE.
APCH TURNED US ONTO A BASE LEG OF 290 DEGS AND SAID '5 MI TO BEEJE CLRED
VOR/DME OR GPS-A 33L APCH.' WE MISSED THE 'ALPHA' AND THE REST OF THE CLRNC
SOUNDED LIKE WHAT WE WERE EXPECTING AND LOADED THE FMGC. YARDD IS NOT ON THE
VOR/DME OR GPS-A APCH AND THE FAF MEACH SOUNDS A LOT LIKE BEEJE. PASSING
THROUGH THE 310 DEG FINAL COURSE FOR THE VOR/DME OR GPS-A APCH TRYING TO
INTERCEPT THE 342 DEG FINAL COURSE FOR THE VOR/DME 33L APCH, TWR TOLD US WE HAD
FLOWN THROUGH FINAL AND SENT US BACK TO APCH. WE SUBSEQUENTLY RPTED THE ARPT
AND RWY IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED A VISUAL APCH. WE LANDED WITHOUT CONFLICT OR
INCIDENT. (TO0 LATE TO RELOAD ANOTHER APCH IN THE FMGC.)
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context events problem_ human factors causes relevance
310228 analyst 1 3 3 3 3 3 2
analyst 2 6 6 6 6 7 6
analyst 3 7 6 6 6 6 6
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 9. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 310228, one of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Carl accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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223467
DEP LGA DEP CTL ALTERED RTE TO DIRECT COL, DIRECT WHYIE AF VICE RV WHITE. FO
ENTERED COL INTO FMS NAV SYS AND BEGAN FOLLOWING CCURSE INFO. COL IN DATA BASE
OF FMS WAS LATER FOUND TO BE COLIMA MEX VOR AND NOT COL COLTS NECK. DEP CTL
QUESTIONED 260 DEG HDG FOR COLTS NECK. FO SELECTED #2 VOR 115.4 AND FOUND VOR
NEEDLE TURNING AND 000 DME AND STARTED TURN 204 DEG TO WHITE. AGAIN DEP CTL
QUESTIONED OUR HDG AND RECLRED US DIRECT COL-WHITE. CAPT SELECTED #1 VOR COL
115.4 AND FOUND IT TO BE 125 DEG TO COL. SO FO USED #1 VOR COL 115.4 AND FOUND
IT TO BE 125 DEG TO COL. SO FO USED VOR #1 AND FLEW DIRECT COL AS FILED.
INVESTIGATION REVEALED FMS DATA BASE COL TO COLIMA MEX VOR. #2 DME INOP WITHOUT
ANY AT FLAG. AFTER WE FOUND FO DME INDICATOR TO READ 000 DME ALL TIMES. ALL VOR
REC AND DME ON CAPT SIDE WORK NORMALLY. UPON ARR FLL ON FLT X, I, THE CAPT,
CALLED CHIEF PLTS OFFICE IN ATLANTA AND ADVISED THEM OF THE BEFORE MENTIONED.
CAPT X OF THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE CALLED ENGINEERING FOR FLT GUIDANCE. ITEM #122
IN OUR DATA BASE WAS COL, COLIM MEX VOR AND NOT COL FOR COLTS NECK, ABOUT 1900
NM AND MANY MANY DEG OFF COURSE. I HAVE NOW FOUND OUT THAT MY COMPANY WILL NOT
AND DOES NOT GUARANTEE ANY INFO IN THE FMS DATA BANK TO BE CORRECT. I MUST
INSURE VIA THE LAT/LONG FROM A COMPANY MAP THAT THEY ARE CORRECT. THIS SYS WILL
NOT AND DOES NOT WITH ENRTE, RTE CHANGES. SO WELCOME TO THE BACK SIDE OF THE
ELECTRONIC WORLD, USE AT YOUR RISK OR LEAVE ALONE. WE HAVE 3 INS AND 1 FMS PER
WDB. ABOUT 880000 DOLLARS PER PLANE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RP'IR REVEALED
THE FOLLOWING INFO. THE RPTING CAPT IN THIS INCIDENT IS RATHER EMBARRASSED
ABOUT THE REACTION THAT HE GOT FROM HIS COMPANY WHEN HE TOLD MGMNT ABOUT HIS
PROBLEM -- THE PROBLEM BEING THAT COL (COLIMA, MEX) COMES UP ON THE FMC WHEN
ONE ASKS FOR COL (COLTS NECK, NJ). BOTH COLS SHOULD COME UP, OFFERING THE PLT A
CHOICE OF MEXICO OR NEW JERSEY OR ANY OTHER COL ON THE PLANET. HIS FLT MGR
TRIED TO GET THE COMPANY ENGINEERING TO CHANGE THE DATA BASE, BUT NOTHING HAS
BEEN DONE IN 3 WKS. NO ALTERING OR WARNING MESSAGE HAS BEEN PUT ON THE FLT
PLANS ABOUT THIS ANOMALY. EACH CREW MUST CHK LAT/LONG AGAINST THE FLT PLAN AND
THE COMMERCIAL CHART BEFORE DEP. THIS IS FINE, BUT WH_" SPEND 1000000
DOLLARS/ACFT, AND THEN HAVE TO DO ALL OF THIS?
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context events problem_ human factors causes relevim_e
223467 analyst 1 6 6 6 6 5 5
analyst 2 2 6 6 4 6 6
analyst 3 5 6 7 6 7 6
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 4. Figure 10. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 223467, one of the narratives rated as highly relevant to
the Carl accident. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the six assertions ,gf relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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Appendix 5.
Examples of incidents about which the analysts disagree

310228
VERY LATE NIGHT APCH TO BOSTON LOGAN. WE DECIDED TO FLY THE APCH TO RWY 33L
USING OUR NEW APCH NAV PROCS. THE ATIS WAS SAYING TO EXPECT THE VOR/DME GPS RWY
33L. WE PULLED UP THIS APCH FROM OUR COMPUTER DATABASE AND INSERTED IT. UPON
CHKING ON WITH BOS APCH WE REQUESTED THE VOR/DME RWY 33L WITH A TURN ON JUST
OUTSIDE YARDD. APCH SAID OK AND GAVE US A HDG. WHEN TURNED ON A BASE APCH, TOLD
US WE WERE 5 MI FROM BEEJE AND CLRED FOR THE VOR/DME GPS RWY 33L. UNBEKNOWNST
TO US THERE ARE 2 APCHS, ONE NAMED THE (GPS) VOR/DME RWY 33L AND THE OTHER
NAMED VOR DME OR GPS A. WE UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC TO BE FOR THE (GPS) VOR DME RWY
33L WHICH HAS AN INBOUND COURSE OF 342 DEGS, WHILE THE APCH CTLR UNDERSTOOD THE
CLRNC TO BE FOR THE VOR DME OR GPS A APCH WHICH HAS AN INBOUND COURSE OF 310
DEGS. SINCE WE WERE LOOKING TO INTERCEPT THE 342 DEG COURSE WE OVERSHOT THE 310
DEG COURSE. TWR TOLD US WE WERE L OF COURSE, AT WHICH TIME WE RFI_D FIELD IN
SIGHT AND PROCEEDED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. ONE FURTHER POINT OF CONFUSION: THE
FINAL APCH FIX FOR THE VOR DME OR GPS-A APCH IS BEEJE AND THE FAF FOR THE (GPS)
VOR DME RWY 33L IS MEACH. THESE SOUND VERY SIMILAR AND COMBINED WITH THE ALMOST
IDENTICAL APCH NAMES CREATES A STRONG POTENTIAL FOR CONFUSION. AT LEAST THE
APCHS SHOULD BE RENAMED AND PROBABLY THE FAFS AS WELL. SUPPLEMENTAL
INFORMATION FROM ACN 310132: I BRIEFED AN 'APCH NAV' (RNAV) VOR/DME RWY 33L
APCH AND INSERTED IT INTO THE FMGC. THE FO TOLD APCH THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO
INTERCEPT THE FINAL OUTSIDE 'YARDD' (ON THE VOR/DME APCH TO RWY 33L). APCH CTL
STATED FINE, WHATEVER WE WANTED. THIS WOULD FACILITATE CAPTURING APPR- NAV. WE
WERE ASKED LATER ABOUT THE LENGTH OF FINAL WE DESIRED AND AGAIN REQUESTED
'OUTSIDE OF YARDD.' THIS IS FOUND ONLY ON THE (GPS) VOR/DME RWY 33L APCH PLATE.
APCH TURNED US ONTO A BASE LEG OF 290 DEGS AND SAID '5 MI TO BEEJE CLRED
VOR/DME OR GPS-A 33L APCH.' WE MISSED THE 'ALPHA' AND THE REST OF THE CLRNC
SOUNDED LIKE WHAT WE WERE EXPECTING AND LOADED THE FMGC. YARDD IS NOT ON THE
VOR/DME OR GPS-A APCH AND THE FAF MEACH SOUNDS A LOT LIKE BEEJE. PASSING
THROUGH THE 310 DEG FINAL COURSE FOR THE VOR/DME OR GPS-A APCH TRYING TO
INTERCEPT THE 342 DEG FINAL COURSE FOR THE VOR/DME 33L APCH, TWR TOLD US WE HAD
FLOWN THROUGH FINAL AND SENT US BACK TO APCH. WE SUBSEQUENTLY RPTED THE ARPT
AND RWY IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED A VISUAL APCH. WE LANDED WITHOUT CONFLICT OR
INCIDENT. (TOO LATE TO RELOAD ANOTHER APCH IN THE FMGC.)
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
numl_er analyst context events problems human factors causes relevance
310228 analyst 1 3 3 3 3 3 2
analyst 2 6 6 6 6 7 6
analyst 3 7 6 6 6 6 6
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 5. Figure 1. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 310228, one of the narratives rated as relevant to the
Carl accident by two of the analysts, but not rated as relevant by the other analyst. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of
the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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140711
AFTER PASSING KILER (N15:00.0 W 76:52.0), BARKANQUILLA CTL CLRED US DIRECT
TULUA VOR. AS WE WERE PASSING ABEAM CARTAGENA VOR, M_I LGT Y CROSSED OUR NOSE
HDG IN A NE DIRECTION. IT WAS EXTREMELY CLOSE AND WE ARE SURE HE WAS AT OUR ALT
BECAUSE WE HIT HIS WAKE TURBULENCE AS WE PASSED BEHIND HIM. BARRANQUILLA CTL
STATED THAT HE WAS CTLING NO OTHER ACFT IN OUR AREA AT FL330. IN THE FUTURE, I
WILL NOT ACCEPT AN OFF AIRWAYS CLRNC WHEN NOT POSITIVE OF BEING IN RADAR
CONTACT. CTLR STATED THAT SOMETIMES ACFT TRANSVERSE HIS AIRSPACE THAT HE WAS
NOT CTLING. ALSO, BARRANQUILLA RADIO VERY WEAK AND UNCLEAR. I NORMALLY FLY WITH
THE RWY TURNOFF LIGHTS ON AT ALL TIMES AND WAS ONCE CRITICIZED BY A COMPANY
CHECK PLT FOR THIS PRACTICE. ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY, MY RIGHT TURNOFF BURNED
OUT AND POPPED ITS CIRCUIT BREAKER. THE CONFLICTING TFC CAME FROM THE DIRECTION
OF THE SETTING SUN SO HIS CHANCES OF SEEING US WAS MUCH GREATER THAN US SEEING
HIM. AFTER I MADE MY NEAR MISS REPORT TO BARRANQUILLA CTL, THERE WAS A LOT OF
JABBERING IN SPANISH BETWEEN BARRANQUILLA AND OTHER ACFT. I BELIEVE SOMEONE IS
COVERING UP A MISTAKE. WE HAD BEEN ASKED TO SQUAWK A XPONDER CODE LONG BEFORE
THE NEAR MISS SO WE ASSUMED WE WERE BEING PROVIDED RADAR SEPARATION. NOW, I'M
NOT SO SURE. MY SUGGESTION TO OTHER PLTS WHO FLY SOB (SOUTH OF THE BORDER) IS
TO USE ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO AVOID A SIMILAR SITUATION. SOME SUGGESTIONS ARE
USE OF EXTERIOR LIGHTS, FLYING 100' ABOVE OR BELOW ASSIGNED FLT LEVEL, NOT
FLYING OFF AIRWAY DIRECT ROUTES, AND OF COURSE EXTREME VIGILANCE. SUPPLEMENTAL
INFORMATION FROM ACN 140497: BAQ CTL HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONFLICTING ACFT,
ONLY REPORTED TFC WAS AT FL310.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analy_ context events problems human factors causes relevance
140711 analyst 1 5 5 6 6 5 5
analyst 2 1 I 1 1 1 1
analyst 3 5 5 6 6 6 6
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 5. Figure 2. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 140711, otpeof the narratives rated as relevant to the
Carl accident by two of the analysts, but not rated as relevant by the other _,_alyst. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of
the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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153355
F/O WAS FLYING THE CHINS ONE ARR INTO SEATAC USING THE FMS FOR PRIMARY NAV. THE
FMS DISPLAY WAS SELECTED AND SHOWED US TO BE ON COURSE. BOTH THE B AUTOPLT WITH
FMS SELECTED IN THE NAV MODE AND AUTOTHROTrLES WERE SELECTED AND ENGAGED.
APPROX 40 NM +/- SE OF SEA VOR, APCH CTL TOLD US THAT HIS RADAR SHOWED US TO BE
+/- 3 MI N OF COURSE. APCH CTL GAVE US A L TURN VECTOR TO RETURN TO COURSE. A
CHK OF THE SEA VOR R SHOWED THAT EVEN THOUGH FMS SHOWED CTRED ON COURSE IT WAS
IN ERROR. APCH CTL DID NOT REQUEST THAT WE INTERCEPT THE ARR AND THE XED
THROUGH THE ARR R (SEA 101 DEG). APCH CTL THEN GAVE US A R TURN VECTOR AND WE
BELIEVED THAT WE WERE THEN NOT ON THE PUBLISHED ARR. IN FACT THE F/O REMARKED
THAT WE MUST BE IN AN APCH CTL VECTOR FOR A W DOWNWIND FOR A S LNDG AT SEATAC.
THEREFORE, WE DID NOT MAKE THE PUBLISHED TURN TO 340 DEG. SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS
FROM APCH SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS NOT UNCOMMON INDICATING PROBS WITH THIS ARR.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context events problems human factors causes relevance
153355 analyst 1 6 5 5 6 5 5
analyst 2 4 5 5 4 5 5
analyst 3 3 3 2 1 2 2
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 5. Figure 3. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 153355, one of the narratives rated as relevant to the
Cali accident by two of the analysts, but not rated as relevant by the other analyst. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of
the six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
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355364
ON DSCNT TO 3200 FT MSL (MVA) AT APPROX 3400 FT, WE RECEIVED A GPWS WARNING
'TOO LOW, TERRAIN.' FLC IMMEDIATELY PERFORMED ESCAPE MANEUVER. AT APPROX 3800-
3900 FT, AND IN VMC, WE STARTED OUR DSCNT BACK DOWN TO 3200 FT AND INFORMED
APCH CTL OF OUR SIT. ACFT RATE OF DSCNT WAS APPROX 700 FPM. WE BELIEVE THAT
EVEN THOUGH WE WERE ABOVE MVA, THE COMBINATION OF RISING TERRAIN AND ACFT DSCNT
RATE MAY HAVE CAUSED THE GPWS TO GIVE ITS WARNING. RADAR ALT WAS 1600-1800 FT
AGL AT TIME OF WARNING.
Analysts' ratings of each assertion of relevance
report A: similar B: similar C: similar D: similar E: similar F: unspecified
number analyst context events pr01_lems human factors causes relevance
355364 analyst 1 3 2 2 3 2 2
analyst 2 3 5 2 3 2 3
analyst 3 3 3 2 1 2 2
(1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: somewhat disagree, 4: undecided, 5: somewhat agree, 6: agree, 7: strongly agree)
Appendix 5. Figure 4. Narrative of ASRS incident report number 355364, o,_eof the narratives rated as irrelevant to the
Carl accident by two of the analysts, but rated as relevant by the other ana!vst. Also shown are the analysts' ratings of the
six assertions of relevance, as they apply to this narrative.
64
Appendix 6.
Excerpts of each of the 84 relevant incidents,
categorized by prominent features they share with the Cali accident

Appendix 6. Excerpts of each of the 84 relevant incidents, categorized by prominent features they share with the Call
accident./n summary, among the 84 incidents rated as relevant by QUORUM and also rated as relevant by one or more of
the analysts: 37 incidents involved over-reliance on automation, and other prob/ems with the use of automation; 29
incidents involved confusion, changes, and problems dunng descent/approach; 19 incidents involved terrain avoidance;
and 6 incidents involved operations in foreign airspace. The number of incidents under each heading appears in
parentheses at the end of each header. The numbers sum to 91 because five of the incidents appear in two different
places, and another one appears in three places. Because of these and other cases of categonca/ overlap, the numbers
in the headings should not be over-interpreted. Clearly, the categories cannot be logically distinct because the use of
automation and the occurrence of incidents dunng descent/approach are pervasive, and other features are also shared.
Accordingly, assignments to categories are based on the more prominent features of the incidents that are shared with
the Carl accident. As used here, the term "automation" refers to the FMS (fright management system) or other
components of the automated flight systems that are used to operate the aircraft.
1. Over-reliance on automation, and other uroblems with use of automation (37)
1.1. Over-reliance on automation (36)
Incidents involving over-reliance on automation typically also involved course or altitude deviations. Such deviations imply a
loss of situational awareness on the part of the crew.
1.1.1. Automation turns aircraft off course (5)
Incidents 223467 and 224363 not only involved automation turning the aircraft off course, but also involved confusion of
identical names in the FMS leading to course deviations.
223467 DEP LGA DEP CTL AL'IERED RTE TO DIRECT COL...FO ENTERED COL INTO FMS NAV SYS AND BEGAN
FOLLOWING COURSE INFO. COL IN DATA BASE OF FMS WAS LATER FOUND TO BE COLIMA MEX [i.e., Mexico] VOR AND
NOT COL COLTS NECK [New Jersey]. DEP CTL QUESTIONED 260 DEG HDG FOR COLTS NECK....I HAVE NOW FOUND OUT
THAT MY COMPANY WILl., NOT AND DOES NOT GUARAN'IEE ANY INFO IN THE FMS DATA BANK TO BE CORREL'q'. I MUST
INSURE VIA THE LAT/LONG FROM A COMPANY MAP THAT THEY ARE CORRECT. [also see 223467 in "1.1.4. Name
confusion using automation"]
224363 UPON DEP, LGA DEP CTL ALTERED RTING TO DIRECT COL...FO EN'IERED COL IDENTIHER INTO FMS NAV SYS
AND BEGAN FOI.J_,OWING COURSE INFO. COL IN DATA BANK OF FMS WAS LATER VERIFIED 1900 MI FROM COL. DEP
CTLR QUF_TIONED 260 DEG HDG FOR COLTS NECK....THIS RPT SEEMS TO BE A MATCH OF A PREVIOUS PROBLEM WITH
COLTS NECK/COLIMA HAVING THE SAME IDF, NTIFIER, COL THE RPTR IN THIS INCIDENT STATES THAT THE ANOMALY IS
STILL IN THE DATA BASE....THIS RPTR STATES THAT THERE ARE OTHER HOLES IN THE DATA BASE, SPECIFICALLY
INCLUDING THE NANCI 4 ARR INTO LGA AND THE DARBS 1 ARR INTO TPA. HE PROMISES TO CONTINUE TO FIGHT TO
IMPROVE THE DATA BASE. [also see 224363 in "1.1.4. Name confusion using automation"]
Incident 146645 not only involved automation turning the aircraft off course, but also involved effects of changes during
descent/approach, confusion regarding charts, and erroneous data entry.
14 6645 I TUNED AND SET THE NAV EQUIP FOR THE ILS TO RWY 32 AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE APCH CHK WAS
COMPLEIE.... HOWEVER, OUR POS AND HDG RELATIVE TO THE 1.£)C WAS LOOKING LIKE AN EXTREMELY TIGHT'I13RN
ON OR AN OVERSHOOT, SO I REQUESTED OUR CURRENT HDG AND ALT ASSIGNMENT FROM APCH. WHAT WE RF_L-EIVED
WAS A TURN AND CLRNC FOR THE NDB APCH RWY 30 CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 32 AT Sq'P AND TO CONTACT ST PAUL
TWR. WHILE HURRYING TO GET THE NAV EQUIP REILrNED AND IDENTED AND RECONFIGURING THE ACFT I WENT
RIGHT BY THE NDB RWY 30 CHART AND TOOK THE DATA FROM THE NDB RWY 3 ST PAUL, MN, LAKE ELMO. AS WE
WENT BY THE NDB AND STARTED TO TURN TO THE INBND HDG, SOME 70 DEG FROM OUR CURRENT HDG, WE KNEW
SOMETHING WAS WRONG. A QUICK CI-IK OF THE CHART CONFIRMED THE ERROR I HAD MADE.... THE TWR CALLED
AND SAID APCH SHOWED US NE OF COURSE.... WE, AS A FLT CREW, SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC FOR
AN APCH TO A RWY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE WE WERE SET UP FOR, UNLESS WE WERE SURE WE HAD TIME TO SET UP
AND CONFIGURE FOR THE APCH TO THE NEW RWY. [also see 146645 in "2.2.2. Confusion regarding charts" and "2.1. Last
minute approach/runway change leads to significant confusion"]
Incident 347848 not only involved automation turning the aircraft off course, but also involved loss of data when other data are
entered.
347848 CAPT ... WAS OCCUPIED IN COMPLETING APCH SETUP IN FMS .... SEQUENCE IN FMS PROGRAMMING WAS
SELECTING RWY 25L, LNAV DIRECT DOWNE, THEN BACK TO DEP/ARR PAGE TO RESELECT RWY 25L, CIVET, ARNES
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TRANSITION.THISDROPPED DOWNE AS ACTIVE WAYPOINT, AND STARTI-I) JET IN TURN BACK TO ARNES. [also see
347848 in "1.1.2. Loss of data when other data are entered "]
353338 THE CAFr HAD BRIEFED A VISUAL AtK]-I TORWY 36L WITH AN ILWAV RWY 36L APCH BACKUP. HEHAD
ENTERED THE RNAV APCH INTO OUR FMS AND COUPLED THE FMS TO THE AUTOPLT WHICH WAS FLYING THE ACFT.
WHEN WE CROSSED THE 1 .i_-_E FIX THE ALrrOPLT TURNED R AND HEADh-'I) FOR THE 'CAMBE' INTXN WHICH WAS THE
INITIAL APCH FIX FOR THE RNAV RW'Y 36I., APCH.... THE FMS, COUPLED TO THE AUTOPLT IN THE NAV MODE, WAS
DOING EXACTLY AS THE CAPT HAD PROGRAMMED IT, SO HE DID NOT SUSPECT A PROB .... CTLR ASKED WHERE DID
YOU GET THAT HI)G? ... THE CTLR HAD EXPECTED THEM TO CONTINUE ON TO THE VOR AS SHOWN ON THE ARR CHART.
1.1.2. Loss of data when other data are entered (5)
272508 WHAT I FAR.,ED TO NOTICE WAS THAT BY INSERTING THE ARR IN THE FMS, THE COMPUTER DUMPED THE
XING RESTRICTION I HAD INSERTED JUST A FEW MOMENTS EARLIER.... THE CAUSE, I BELIEVE, WAS A COMBINATION
OF COCKP1T MGMNT OVER.I.L3AD DURING THE APCH PHASE COUPLED WITH AN OVERCONFIDENCE IN THE FMS TO
PRESENT VALID DSCNT PROFR.E INFO. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO GET TOO BUSY DURING THE DSCNT TO MAKE
ESSENTIAL XCHKS TO CONFIRM TIIE F'MS WAS WORKING AS ADVERTISED.
2 7 90 30 IN ENIERING THE [ILS approach] DATA INTO THE DATABASE, WE WERE UNAWARE THAT THE 15000 FT
CONSTRAINT AT MUMSY WAS DELETED. THEREFORE, THE ACFT HAD REVERTED TO A 1000 FPM RATE OF DSCNT. WE
REALIZED THE ERROR AS WE WERE XING OVER MUMSY AT ABOUT 18000 FT.
361956 DURING DSCNT TO BRONC INTXN...I ENTERED THE LNDG RWY 33L INTO THE FMS. THIS CAUSED THE RESTR
AT BRONC (280 KTS/11000 FT) TO DELETE ITSELF. I HAD THE ACFT SF_,LF_L-'IEDTO MANAGED FLT AND DID NOT
OBSERVE THAT IT CHANGED TO VERT SPD AND THE RESTR DELETED. CTR REALIZED THAT WE PROBABLY WOULD NOT
MAKE THE RF_,KrR AND GAVE US A VECTOR. ... THIS WOULD NOT OCCUR IF ONCE A RESTR WAS PLT ENTERED INTO THE
FMS IT WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY DELEIE ITSELF WHEN A DEST RWY IS ENTERED.
Incident 275413 also involved problems due to changes late in descent/approach.
275413 AT THIS POINT, TO COMPLY wrrH THE 210 KIAS SPD REQUEST BY ATC, THE FO SEI.,F,CI'ED THE 'VERT SPD'
FUNCTION ON THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE PANEL, SEITING 600 FPM DSCNT RATE AND CHANGING THE 'SPD SELECT
WINDOW TO SHOW 210 KTS. BECAUSE OF A FLAW IN THE MD-88'S DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE PROGRAM, LAST SECOND
CHANGES IN ANY OF THE VERT CIL FUNCTIONS WILL REMOVE THE ALT LS'VEL OFF COMMAND PREVIOUSLY
SELECTED. THE ALT WARNING SIGNAL AND A TCASII "rA' GOING OFF SIMULTANEOUSLY AT 7700 MSL BROUGHT OUR
ATTN TO THE DEV. [also see 275413 in "2.4. Other problems with changes late in descent/approach"]
Incident 347848 also involved automation turning the aircraft off course.
347848 CAPT ... WAS OCCUPIED IN COMPLETING AI_H S_ IN FMS .... SEQUENCE IN FMS PROGRAMMING WAS
SELEC'q_G RWY 25L, LNAV DIRECT DOWNE, THEN BACK TO DEP/ARR PAGE TO RESELECT RWY 25L, CIVET, ARNES
TRANSITION. THIS DROPPED DOWNE AS ACTIVE WAY'I_INT, AND STARTED JET IN TURN BACK TO AR_NES. [also see
347848 in "!.1.1. Automation turns aircraft off course"]
1.1.3. Distracted by automation (7)
Incident 368360 is one of the two incidents rated by all three analysts as highl} relevant to the Cali accident. The other is
310130 in section 2.1. See appendix 3, table 1 for the list of incidents sorted on their relevance ratings.
36 83 60 WE WERE AGAIN GIVEN INVALID ROUTING (RTE BREAK ON FMS) AT TI-I]S POINT MY FO BECAME ENGROSSED
IN LOOKING ON OUR HIGH AND LOW ALT ENRTE CHARTS TO FIND WHERE THE PROB WAS. I TRIED AGAIN TO ENTER
ROUTING ON THE FMS frl-IIS TOOK APPROX 2 MINS). I LOOKED UP TO SEE }.fY FLT INSTS AND AT THIS TIME NOTED THE
ALTIMETER READING FL312 AND CLBING. I IMMEDIA'[ELY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT... APPROX 5 SECONDS
LATER ZBW TOLD US TO MAINTAIN FL310.... I BELIEVE THAT THE COMPL=_XrI'Y OF FMS PROGRAMMING IS NOT
ADDRESSED IN INITIAL TRAINING AT SCHOOL BECAUSE EACH ACFT HAS DIFFERENT EQUIP. HOWEVER, Tiffs LEAVES
THE FLC TO 'LEARN AS THEY FLY.' THIS EFFFCTIVELY TOOK MY FO OUT O= THE LOOP IN THAT IF HE WAS
PROGRAMMING THE FMS, I COULD HAVE CONCENTRATED MORE ON MONITORING THE ACFT... THE ENTIRE CREW WAS
DISTR, AND WE BOTH FAKED TO MONITOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE AC'FT.
359641 WE WERE NAVING USING FMS. WORKLOAD WAS HIGH FOR BOTE PLTS, AND THE F'MS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE
INTERCEPTING THE COURSE. NErFHER PLT NOTICED THE ALT PASSING 5(g)0 FT. AT 5300 FT, THE ALT ALERTER
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SOUNDED...THEMAJORCAUSEOF THIS DEV WAS WHEN BOTH PLTS WERE DISTRACTED BY A MINOR FMS PROB
DURING A BUSY DEP. THE PF SHOULD HAVE IGNORED THE FMS AND SWITCHED TO RAW DATA NAV.
160843 I CALLED THE APCH UP ON THE FMS AND REALIZED THAT THE APCH IN THE FMS DATA BASE DID NOT GIVE
ANY PRECISE GUIDANCE TO THE APCH END OF THE RWY. I STARTED TO BUILD THE APCH... THE PRF_.£_CUPATION OF
BOTH CREW MEMBERS CAUSED A DELAY IN COMPLETION OF THE DSNT CHKLIST (USUALLY DONE PASSING THROUGH
18000') UNTIL JUST AP"IER LEVEL OFF AT 11000'. WE RESET THE ALTIMETERS TO 30.22 AND REALIZED WE HAD
LEVELED OFF AT 11300'.
2192 22 THE FO DID THE REQUIRED FMS ENTRIES. ENCOUN'IERING DIFFICULTY WITH THE FORMAT FOR ENTRY MY
ATTN WAS DIVERTED TO EXPLAIN THE FORMAT FOR FMS TO TIlE FO. UI:K)N COMP_ON OF THE ENTRY THE DSCNT
INFO WAS SLOW BEING DISPLAYED (AN UNFOR'I'UNATE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WDB ACTT FMS). MEANWHILE,
MENTAL CALCULATIONS INDICATED THE XING RESTR/CIION COULD NOT BE MADE... MY OWN INEXPERIENCE WITH
THIS ACP'T SIMPLY DID NOT ALERT ME TO THE DIFFICULTY IN COMPLYING WITH THE CLRNC WHEN FIRST ISSUED AND
THE FMS FORMAT PROBLEM ENCOUN'IERED BY THE FO ARE ALL TOO COMMON ON THIS AC-'FT....
18 4380 I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED MORE CLOSELY ON HOW THE CAlWl" HAD LOADED THE FMS ON ARR. AFIER I
FOUND THE DISCREPANCIES I BECAME OVERLOADED ON KEEPING UP ON WHAT THE CAI_ WAS DOING AND WHAT WAS
NEEDED TO CORREL-qLY PLY THE APCH AND DO ALL THE CHKLIST ITEMS.
296506 WELANDED ON RWY 9R.... WE HAD NOTRECF2VED LNDG CLRNC FROM ATLANTA TWR. THIS EVENT COULD
HAVE POSSIBLY BEEN AVOIDED IF THE CAPT HAD NOT BEEN PROGRAMMING THE FMS DURING THE _.
350190 AUTOPLT ENGAGED, THE ACFT ENTERED A POCKET OF SEVERE TURB .... FO APPROPRIATELY DISCONNECTED
AND MADE PROPER INPUTS MANUALLY .... ONCE WE STABILIZED AT 16000 FT, I WAS THEN REQUIRED TO MAKE
AMENDMENTS TO THE FMS FOR THE APCH AND BRIEF THE APCH. DUE TO THESE DESCRIBED FACTORS, I FORGOT TO
RPT THE TURB.
1.1.4. Name confusion using automation (4)
(Also see section "2.2.1. Name confusion" in section "2.2. Other confusion during descent/approach.")
The Cali accident involved two distinct instances of name confusion. First, the arrival was named ROZO 1, instead of TULUA 1,
which appeared to confuse the captain. According to the NTSB report (NTSB, 1996c), "CVR (cockpit voice recorder) evidence
reveals that the crew may have expected the standard STAR naming convention to be used with respect to the ROZO 1 Arrival and
may have incorrectly believed that ROZO was located at the beginning of the route." The second instance of name confusion
involved crew confusion of the identifier R for ROZO, which the automated system interpreted to mean ROMEO.
Incidents 223467 and 224363 both involved confusion of identical names in the FMS leading to course deviations.
223467 DEP LGA DEP CTL AL'IERED RTE TO DIREL_ COL...FO ENTERED COL INTO FMS NAV SYS AND BEGAN
FOLLOWING COURSE INFO. COL IN DATA BASE OF FMS WAS LATER FOUND TO BE COLIMA MEX [i.e., Mexico] VOR AND
NOT COL COLTS NECK [New Jersey]. DEP CTL QUESTIONED 260 DEG HDG FOR COLTS NECK....I HAVE NOW FOUND OUT
THAT MY COMPANY WILL NOT AND DOES NOT GUARANTEE ANY IN IN THE P-'MS DATA BANK TO BE CORRECT. I MUST
INSURE VIA THE LAT/LONG FROM A COMPANY MAP THAT THEY ARE CORRECT. [also see 223467 in "1.1.1. Automation
turns aircraft off course"]
2243 63 UPON DEP, LGA DEP CTL ALT£RED RTING TO DIRECF COL...FO ENTERED COL IDENTIHER INTO FMS NAV SYS
AND BEGAN FOLLOWING COURSE INFO. COL IN DATA BANK OF FMS WAS LATER VERIFIED 1900 MI FROM COL. DEP
CTLR QUESTIONED 260 DEG HDG FOR COLTS NECK....THIS RPT SEEMS TO BE A MATCH OF A PREVIOUS PROBLEM WITH
COLTS NECK/COLIMA HAVING THE SAME IDENTIFIER, COL THE RPTR IN THIS INCIDENT STATES THAT THE ANOMALY IS
STILL IN THE DATA BASE....THIS RFrR STATES THAT THERE ARE OTHER HOLES IN THE DATA BASE, SPECIFICALLY
INCLUDING THE NANCI 4 ARR INTO LGA AND THE DARBS 1 ARR INTO TPA. HE PROMISES TO CONTINUE TO FIGHT TO
IMPROVE THE DATA BASE. [also see 224363 in "1.1.1. Automation turns aircraft off course"]
315 261 AT THIS POINT I REALIZED THAT I HAD BEEN FLYING DIRECT TO THE OM (FONTA) INS'IEAD OF PETIS NDB ....
THE FMS NAV DATA BASE LISTS THE OM (FONTA) AS FF26L INSTEAD OF JUST FONTA. MOST NDB'S ARE COLLOCATED
WITH THE OM, REFERRED TO AS LOM'S. HUMAN FACTORS BEING WHAT THEY ARE, I SAW FF26L AND USED THAT
WAYPOINT "IMINK]NG AT THAT MOMENT'H-tEY WERE COLLOCATED AND I WAS FLYING TO PETIS. ACTUALLY THEY ARE
ABOUT 5 NM APART. IF THE FMS HAD SHOWN FONTA AS THE OM WAYPOINT INSTEAD OF FF26L I THINK IT WOULD
HAVE BEEN CLR THAT THEY ARE IN FACT 2 DIFFERENT POINTS. THERE DOESNT SEEM TO BE ANY CONSISTENCY WITH
THE FMS APCH DATA BASE. SOME APCHS SHOW THE OM NAME AND OTHERS USE THE FF (FINAL FIX) FORMAT. THEY
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SHOULDALLUSETHECORRECrFIXNAMES.ADDING TO THE CONFUSION THE APCH DATABASE SHOWS PETIS AS
SBNB.
301760 I DISCOVERED THAT MRLIN WAS NOW ABOUT 5 Nil N OF ITS PREVIOUS I.£_ATION AND TRITN WAS WHERE
MRLIN USED TO BE. OUR PROB ACI_ALLY OCCURRE, D BECAUSE WE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE AC/TCE DATA
BASE IN OUR F'MS WAS NOT THE CURRENT DATA BASE DURING THE FMS PREFLT. PERHAPS WHEN THEY ARE
CONSIDERING MOVING THE LOCATION OF A FIX THEY SHOULD CONSIDER CHANGING THE NAME AS WELL.
I.I.5. Automation data entry error or data error (6)
321136 AFTER THE FMS RAN OUT ALL THE LEGS, AND WE WERE NOT WlTHIN RANGE OF LAND, IDF, O.AREDANEMER
DUE TO OUR INABILITY TO DETERMINE OUR POS .... FO SAYS LAST MINUTE CONFUSION WHEN DEPARTING RJNN
CONTRIBUTED TO THE CAPT INFHAL/ZING PRESENT POS INCORRECILY. INSERTED WRONG LONGITUDE.... THE
LONGITUDE WAS E AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN W.... FUEL WAS DANGEROUSLY LOW, THE FLC HAD NO NAV TO THE
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS AND DECLARED AN EMER. COMMERCIAL RADIO RECOMMENDF.D A HDG CHANGE AND WHEN
FINALLY _G AN ADF SIGNAL, IT TOOK A 90 DEG TURN TO THE R. THEY HAD BEEN PARALLELING THE CORRECT
COURSE, BUT 350 MI OFF.
307543 ACFT WAS ON AUI'OPLT USING FMS NAV IN MD-11 ACFT. APCH (._L DIRECTED ACFT ON A I-IDG TO INIERCEPT
THE RWY 5L LOC AT RCPT .... APCH ALERTED CREW TO BEING SE OF COURSE.... L£X: NEEDLE SHOWED CTRED BUT
LOC FREQ HAD AUTO-TUNED TO ICKS, TIlE LOC FREQ FOR ILS-DME RWY 6, WITHOUT THE PITS KNOWLEEX3E NOR
THROUGH EITHER PITS ACTIONS. RECEIVED VECIOR TO INTERCEPT RWY 51, LOC ... HE DOES NOT KNOW IF THE CAPT
RErUNED THE R,S MANUALLY, AND PUT IN THE WRONG R.S, OR WHE'rHER THE FMS JUMPED TO THE WRONG R.S BY
ITSELF.... THE RtrlING FO KNOWS THAT HE DID NOT AURALLY CHK THE ILS IDENTIFIER AND HE BEL/EVF.S THAT THE
CAPT PROBABLY DID NOT ErrHER.
342838 DEP CTL SHOWED US OFF COURSE FROM THE SEA 158 DEG RAD1M,. I STATED THAT WE WERE CLRED VIA THE
FMS DEP AND WERE FOLLOWING TIIE COURSE IN FMS LNAV AND VNAV. CTL,R THEN CANCELED OUR FMS DEP AND
ISSUED RADAR VECIORS TO INTERCEPT THE AIRWAY. CTLR THEN STATED, T)ONT USE THAT FMS DEP, IF WE WERE ON
N DEPS YOU COULD GET _ DOING THAT.'... THE RPTR STATED THAI' PRIOR TO DEP HE DID NOT NOTICE IF THE IRS
WAS ALIGNED.
358123 THE HDG BUG IMMEDIATELY SLEWED TO A COURSE OTHER THAN THE INBOUND COURSE AND THE COMMAND
BARS WERE COMMANDING "IURN TO THE HIX3 BUG. THE CAPT CLICKED OFF THE AUTOFLT SYS AND FLEW AN
UNEVENTFUL MANUAL RAW-DATA A.PCH .... WHILE BRIEFING, THE CAPT'S BRIEF WAS INTERRUVrED SEVERAL TIMES
WITH ATC ALT CHANGES, TFC CALLS AND A FREQ CHANGE. THE INTERRUIrI'IONS PROBABLY CAUSED US TO NOT
PROPERLY VERIFY THE COURSE IN THE ILS CTL PANEL.
302770 Tiffs WAS A CASE OF THE FMS PROVIDING FAULTY DSCNT DATb TO THE FLC AND THE FLC FAILING TO BACK
UP THE DATA. RELYING ON THE FMS TO SHOW THE DSCNT CAUSED US TO BE TOO I-IIGH TO CROSS A PUBLISHED RESTR.
156414 WE WERE NAVIGATING USING THE FMS... ATC CAI2.ED...BECAU SE HE SHOWED US ABOUT 8 NM N OF COURSE.
...EVIDENTLY FMS SYS WAS WORKING WITH ERRONEOUS XWIND OF 35(¢101. _ WE SELECTED "PROGRESS PAGE"
OF FMS IT SHOWED NO NAVAIDS IN USE, THE SYS WAS "LOST". WE RESET OUR PRESENT FOS (USING NAVAID AND
DME) ON FMS POS PAGE....IT CAUGHT US OFF OUR GUARD.
1.1.6. Other problems getting automation to work as desired (4)
341815 I INFORMED THE CREW TO RPT A DUAL IRS NAV FAILURE AS THEY DID NOT AGREE WITH THE CTLR... AT OUR
DEST, THE FO DISCOVERED THE PROB. THE VERY DANGEROUS ERROR AND HIDDEN HONEYWELL "]RAP.' WE ENTERED
AGNEZ MANUALLY AS IT WAS NOT DEFINED IN THE DATABASE. IN SO DOING, THE FO GAVE ME THE WRONG DISTANCE
FOR PLACE, BEARING-DISTANCE... I WAS UNABLE TO CORRECT THE ERROR TO MY AMAZEMENT GETI'ING ERRORS TIX
USED BY ACTIVE FLT PATH.['] NOT TO WORRY, I DEI.ETED THE FIX FROM UHE ACTIVE FLT PATH AND REENTERED IT,
ONLY 1 FOUND I WAS UNABLE TO NOW DELETE AND CORRECT IT FOR REMSONS UNDEIER_MINF_... THE FLT WAS
COMPLETED... [On a subsequent flight,] THE INCORRECT FIX WITH CORRECI" PLACE-BEARING AND WRONG DISTANCE
WAS STILL IN THE DATABASE. ... THE HONEYWELL TRAP!!! THERE IS NO WAY HONEYWELL MAKES THE PLT AWARE
THAT THE FIX HE CHOSE WAS MANMADE AND NOT FROM THE DATABASE!
117306 WE GLANCED AT OUR CHARTS, _TED POPPS ON THEM, AND THE CAPT TRIED TO ENTER 1T AS A WAYPOINT
IN THE FMS. THE FMS REJEL-'IED IT AS "NOT IN DATA BASE".... AT THAT F_)INT, THE CTLR ASKED IF WE KNEW WE
WERE "5 MILES" PAST POPPS .... OUR FMS DATA BASE SHOULD INCLUDE MOST, IF NOT ALL, POTENTIAL HOLDING
FIXES NEAR ARPTS.
7O
116871CAPTATI'EMP'IED TO PROGRAM THE FMS TO COMPLY WITH RESTRIC-q'ION BUT DUETO HIS INF-,XPERIENCE
WITH THE ACFT FMS (2 MONTHS TOTAL ON ACTT) AND THE FAC'r THAT THE ACFT WAS ON A VF,CIDR THAT HAD TAKEN
IT OFF THE FMS LNAV COURSE [,] THE CAPT COULD NOT PROPERLY PROGRAM THE FMS TO CAUSE THE ACFT TO LEAVE
ALT.
249 65 4 THE LGT FMS HAS A NAV PROB ENRTE THAT HAS BEEN RPTED THROUGH MY COMPANY BUT N_G HAS
BEEN DONE ABOUT IT. WITH THE FMS PROPERLY PROGRAMMED 1T DOES NOT ALWAYS MAKE TURNS ENRTE WHICH
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIRED ACCURACY AND TECHNIQUE TO SATISFY ATC, EVEN THOUGH THIS FMC AND ACFT ARE
FAA CERTIFIED. IT HAPPENS AT MANY DIFFERENT PLACES BUT THE LAS DIRECT GFS DIRECT HEC RTE SEEMS TO BE
ONE OFTHE WORST.
1.1.7. Miscellaneous over-reliance on automation (5)
303310 A DIFFERENT APCH AND LNDG RWY WAS ASSIGNED. WHILE BRIEFING THE NEW _ WE BECAME
DISTRA_... WE ASSUMED THE FMS WOULD START THE DSCNT FOR US WHILE BRIEFING THE APCH. LOST
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MOMENTARILY AND SUBSEQUENTLY FAKED TO MEET OUR RF_STR.
198046 THEFOF'LEW ACCORDING TO WHAT THE INSTS WERE TELL/NG HIM TO DO THINK]NG THE COMPUTER MUST
KNOW MORE ABOUT THE WIND THAN WE DO.... I THINK THE BIGGEST PROBLEM WAS MY RFAAANCE ON THE FLT
DIRECTOR V BARS WHICH CAUSED ME TO DEVIATE SO FAR FROM THE DESIRED COURSE.
251901 UNEXPLAINED AND UNEXPF_L-'TED FMS FAILURE.... ONE CREW MEMBER NOT MANUALLY TUNING OF ABB
VOR AS A BACKUP.... TOO MUCH TRUST IN THE AUTOMATION.
33 025 0 AS THE FMS WAS BEING PROGRAMMED FOR THE INTERCEPT BOTH PLTS NOTICED THE ACF-T DSNDING
THROUGH 10700 FT. A CLB WAS INrrlATED AT 10600 FT AND THE AcFr ONCE AGAIN LEVELED OFF AT 11000 FT.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS - THE CREW WAS RECEIVING NUMEROUS UPDATED CLRNCS FOR THE
DSCNT, THEN A TURN AT LEVEL OFF WHICH REQUIRED ADDITIONAL PROGRAMMING OFTHE FMS.
1533 55 THE FMS DISPLAY WAS SELECI'ED AND SHOWED US TO BE ON COURSE.... APCH CTL TOLD US THAT HIS
RADAR SHOWED US TO BE +/- 3 MI N OF COURSE. APCH C'I'L GAVE US A L TURN VEL-'IDR TO RETURN TO COURSE ....
APCH CTL TI-IEN GAVE US A RTURN VECTOR AND WE BELIEVED THAT WE WERE THEN NOT ON THE PUBLISHED ARR. IN
FACI" THE F/O REMARKED THAT WE MUST BE IN AN APCH CTL VF_L-'rOR FOR A W DOWNWIND FOR A S LNDG AT
SEATAC. THEREFORE, WE DID NOT MAKE THE PUBLISHED TURN TO 340 DEG.
1.2. Other automation-related problems (1)
(Also see automation-related problems in "2. Confusion, changes, and other problems during descent/approach".)
Incident 238398 involved misuse of automation and problems with crew coordination.
23 83 98 CAPT INSISTED FMS NOT BE PROGRAMMED FOR ANTICIPATED CI./LNCS AND NAVAIDS NOT BE TUNED IN
ADVANCE. "THIS IS TO PREVENT THE FMS FROM FLYING A RTE NOT YET CLRED FOR.' HE SAID THE CIVET 3 PROFILE
DSCNT WAS NOT IN THE DATABASE. (I CHKED AHEAD OF TIME -- IT WAS.) ... I SET THE FIRST 'AT OR ABOVE' OF 14000
FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FLT CTL PANEL. THE CAPT RESET 10000 FT AND SAID SOMETHING TO ME ABOUT,
q'RUSTING THE FMS TO FLY THE PROFILE ACCURATELY.'...I LOOKED UP TO SEE THE AC'FF PASSING THROUGH 12000 FT
PRIOR TO THE 'AT OR ABOVE' RESTRIC"rION... APCH CANCELLED OUR APCH CLRNC AND ASKED US OUR SPD .... SHORT
OF 'OVERRIDING' THE CAPT AND TAKING PHYSICAL CIL OF THE AcFr, I'M NOT SURE I COULD HAVE DONE ANY'IMING
DIFFERENTLY ....
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2. Confusion. chan2es, and other uroblems during descent/aunroach (29)
2.1. Last minute approach/runway change leads to significant confusion (3)
The Cali accident involved additional workload imposed on the crew by their ac ::eptance of a runway change during the
automation-aided approach. This change created time pressure on the execution ;)f procedures and led to significant crew
confusion.
Incident 310130 is one of the two incidents rated by all three analysts as highly relevant to the Cali accident. The other is
368360 in section 1.1.3. See appendix 3, table 1 for the list of incidents sorted on their relevance ratings. Incident 310130
involved not only a last minute approach/runway change, but also confusion during descent/approach, problems with crew
decision making, confusion regarding charts, and problems with crew coordination.
310130 AT THE LA,VF MIN, AFTER WE WERE VECIORED DIRECT TOWARD THE OUTER LOCATOR 'OC, WE WERE CLRED
FOR A 'STRAIGHT IN LNDG ON RWY 1 !' AND TOLD TO RPT OVER 'OC.' ... THE IK) INITIALLY SET UP HIS RADIO ON THE
LOC 110.1, BUT THERE WAS NO I.DC OR ANYTHING ON qMAT FREQ.... WE -tAD BRIEFED BOTH THE ILS TO RWY 35 WITH
A CIRCLE TO LAND AND THE LOC-VOR-DME RWY 11 APCH, BUT NOT A STILMGHT IN APCH. THE ONLY STRAIGHT IN
At_H WAS AN ADF LOCATOR APCH, WITH DME.... MEANWHILE I WAS TRYING TO bIND AN APPROPRIATE APCH PAGE.
WE SETTLED ON 11-2 CHART SINCE THE CI'LR HAD CALLED THE APCH A STRAIGHT-IN APCH.' ... I SAID I AM
CONFUSED.' I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY WE WERE DSNDING AND THE FO HAD ALL HAGS WITH HIS RADIO ON THE ILS
FREQ .... I COULDN'T FIGURE OUT WHICH APCH HE WAS USING, AND I HAD TROUBLE READING HIS CHART FROM
ACROSS THE C(_KPIT. THEN THE SO MENTIONED THAT WE HAD A 3000 FT MSA. WE WERE AT 2650 FT... THE APCH WE
WERE FINALLY GIVEN, OR bLEW ANYWAY, DID NOT CONFORM TO ANY OFTHE PLATES .... I ACCEFIED THE CLRNC
FOR A STRAIGHT-IN At_H, NOT KNOWING WHICH AI:_H.
Incident 146645 involved not only the effect of changes late in descent/approach, but also confusion regarding charts,
erroneous data entry, and automation turning the aircraft off course.
14 6645 I TUNED AND SET THE NAV EQUIP FOR THE ILS TO RWY 32 AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE APCH CHK WAS
COMPI.EIE.... HOWEVER, OUR POS AND I-IDG RELATIVE TO THE LOC WAS I,OOKING LIKE AN EXTREMELY TIGHT TURN
ON OR AN OVERSHOOT, SO I REQUESTED OUR CURRENT HDG AND ALT ASSIGNMENT FROM APCH. WHAT WE RECEIVED
WAS A TURN AND CLRNC FOR THE NDB APCH RWY 30 CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 32 AT STP AND TO CONTACt ST PAUL
TWR. WHILE HURRYING TO GETTHE NAV EQUIP REFUNED AND IDENTED AND _NFIGURING THE ACFr I WENT
RIGHT BY THE NDB RWY 30 CHART AND TOOK THE DATA PROM THE NDB'RWY 3 ST PAUL, MN, LAKE ELMO. AS WE
WENT BY THE NDB AND STARTED TO TURN TO THE INBND HDG, SOME 70 DEG FROM OUR _ HI3G, WE KNEW
SOMETHING WAS WRONG. A QUICK CHK OF THE CHART CONFIRMED THE ERROR I HAD MADE.... THE TWR CAI.J.,F_
AND SAID APCH SHOWED US NE OF COURSE. ... WE, AS A FLT CREW, SHOLLD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC FOR
AN APCH TO A RWY DIPFERENT FROM THE ONE WE WERE SET UP FOR, UNLESS WE WERE SURE WE HAD TIME TO SET UP
AND CONFIGURE FOR THE APCH TO THE NEW RWY. [also see 146645 in "1.1.1. Automation turns aircraft off course" and
"2.2.2. Confusion regarding charts"]
Incident 306151 involved not only the effect of changes late in descent/approach, but also confusion, crew coordination
problems, and loss of situational awareness.
306151 APCH CTL ASSIGNED US THE ILS FOR RWY 7 .... THEN AI_H CTL ASSIGNED US THE KS FOR RWY 8.... JUST
OUTSIDE THE OM WE SWITCHED TO TWR. TWR ASKED IF WE COULD ACO_I" LNDG ON RWY 17R. THE CAFr ACCEFIED.
I IMMEDIATELY ASKED WHERE RWY 17R WAS. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION .... ON THE MISSED APCH l
HAD TO CALL 3 TIMES FOR THE CAPT TO SET MAX PWR AND FLA__ TKOF ... HE SAID HEWAS STILL THINKING ABOUT
WHAT HAPPENED BACK THERE. I SAID, 'YOU NEED TO BE THINKING ABOUT THIS APCH NOW. FLY Tiffs AtKS-I NOW.' ...
THE FACT IS, NEITHER OF US KNEW WHERE RWY 17R WAS IN RELATION "_"ORWY 8.... THE CAPT ACC-'EFIED A CLRNC
WHEN HE SHOULD NOT HAVE.... I DID NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO STOP A SIT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH.
2.2. Other confusion during descent/approach (11)
2.2.1. Name confusion (5)
(Also see section "1.1.4. Name confusion using automation" in section "1.1. Over-reliance on automation.")
The Cali accident involved two distinct instances of name confusion. First, the arrival was named ROZO 1, instead of TULUA 1,
which appeared to confuse the captain. According to the NTSB report (NTSB, 1996), "CVR (cockpit voice recorder) evidence
reveals that the crew may have expected the standard STAR naming convention :o be used with respect to the ROZO 1 Arrival and
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mayhaveincorrectlybelievedthatROZOwaslocatedatthebeginningoftheroute."Thesecondinstanceofnameconfusion
involvedcrewconfusionftheidentifierRforROZO,whichtheautomatedsysteminterpretedtomeanROMEO.
Amongthefollowingincidentsinvolvingnameconfusion,severalsoinvolvedmiscommunicationbetweenthecrewand
controller.
Inadditiontonameconfusion,i cidents310228and274820involvedproblemswithsituationalwareness.
310228UNBEKNOWNSTTOUSTHEREARE2APCHS,ONENAMEDTHE(GPS)VOR/DMERWY33LANDTHEOTHER
NAMEDVORDMEORGPSA.WEUNDERSTOODTHECLRNCTOBEFORTHE (GPS) VOR DME RWY 33L WHICH HAS AN
INBOUND COURSE OF 342 DEGS, WHILE THE APCH _ UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC TO BE FOR THE VOR DME OR GPS A
APCH WHICH HAS AN INBOUND COURSE OF 310 DEGS. SINCE WE WERE LOOKING TO INTERCEPT THE 342 DEG COURSE
WE OVERSHOT THE 310 DEG COURSE. TWR TOLD US WE WERE L OF COURSE.... ONE FURTHER POINT OF CONFUSION:
THE FINAL APCH FIX FOR THE VOR DME OR GPS-A APCH IS BEEJE AND THE FAF FOR THE (GPS) VOR DME RWY 33L IS
MEACH. THESE SOUND VERY SIMILAR AND COMBINED WITH THE ALMOST IDENTICAL APCH NAMES CREATES A
STRONG POTENTIAL FOR CONFUSION.
274820 I ANTICIPATED VFR CONDITIONS...I WAS NOT AS MENTALLY PREPARED FOR THE UPCOMING INST APCH AS I
WOULD HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE. WE DECIDF__2) THE VOR DME C _ WOULD BE BEST... HOWEVER, AFTER
INTERCEPTING THE FINAL APCH COURSE MCGRATH RADIO BEGAN TO QUESTION OUR LOCATION AND WE SOON
LEARNED THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE VOR D/VIE 16 APCH INSTEAD OF THE VOR DME C APCH.
142553 THE WORD "VIS" IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THE NAME OF IFR/VFR APCH. BOTH PLTS HEARD "VIS APCH" NOT
"QUIET BRIDGE VIS APCH!". PLTS ARE TRAINED TO KEY ON THE PHRASE "CLRED FOR VIS AI:_H" AND CAN BE MISLED
IF SUCH WORDING IS CONTAINED IN AN APCH WHICH IS NOT A PURE VIS.
310989 I HAD ARRIVED AT ARCHI WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL RTE CLRNC. IT IS NOT CLR THAT THE ORIGINAL CLRNC
TO INTERCEPT THE SFO 095 DEG STILL APPLIES AFTER BEING AMENDED TO FLY DIRECT ARCHI .... I QUERIED 134.5
ABOUT OUR CLRNC AFTER ARCHI. BAY APCH RESPONDED, 'INTERCEPT THE FINAL AI:_H COURSE.' THIS WAS THE
FIRST TIME I HAD HEARD THE TERM _r-'INAL APCH COURSE' REFERRING TO THE SFO 095 DEG RADIAL. I INQUIRED
AGAIN FOR CLARIFICATION, ql-IAT IS NOT CLR TO ME, SHOULD WE INTERCEPT THE SAN FRANCISCO 095 DEG RADIAL?'
... THE CTLR INSISTED ON USING ONLY THE TERMINOLOGY _-INAL APCH COURSE' AND WOULD NOT RESPOND
OTHERWISE TO MY REPEATED ATIEMPTS TO RECONCILE MY UNCERTAINTY...
33543 0 WE THOUGHT AT THIS TIME THAT THE VOR 17 APCH WAS IN USE. MANCHESTER HAS 2 VOR APCHS TO RWY 17
(VOR 17, CHART 13-2) WHICH UTILIZES THE MHT VOR AND THE VOR DME 17 WHICH USES THE CONCORD VOR (APCH
CHART 13-3) .... AS WE INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH HE ADVISED US THAT WE WERE 1/4 MI R OF COURSE AND THAT
THE APCH USED THE CONCORD VOR.
2.2.2. Confusion regarding charts (4)
Incident 352618 not only involved confusion regarding charts, but also involved confusion regarding the detailed
representation of terrain on charts. It also involved complacency in the presence of terrain. See the excerpt in section 3.1.1.
352618 WE FELT THAT THERE WAS SOME AMBIGUITY ABOUT TERRAIN CONTOURS DEPICI'ED ON THAT CHART AS
COMPARED TO THE AREA CHART FOR LAS VEGAS. THE APCH CHART SHOWS A CONTOUR INTERVAL MARKED 3000 P-T,
AND THE SAME INTERVAL IS MARKED 4000 FT ON THE AREA CHART....I SAW THE NUMBER 3000 FT AND FORGOT
THAT IT WAS A CONTOUR INTERVAL EXTENDING FROM 3000 FT TO 4000 FT IN THE AREA WE WERE IN. [also see 352618
in "3.1.1. Complacency, loss of situational awareness, slow reaction"]
Narrative 226114 is one of those rare ASRS reports that describes a situation that seems unsafe to the reporter, as opposed to a
particular incident. This situation, in Juneau, Alaska, is of such importance that special procedures are being developed for it
(Steenblik, 1998).
226114 TI-I]S IS THE 3RD MAJOR ACCIDENT ON THE APCH FOR JNU CLDA 1 RWY 8). ALL 3 AC'FT (ACR-LGT, ACR-LTT,
MIL-MLT) HIT WITHIN 1/2 MI OF EACH SEPARATE ACCIDENT SITE. ALL 3 CREWS APPARENTLY MISIDENTED BARLO,
THE FINAL APCH FIX. I KNOW FROM MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, THAT THE APCH PLATE TAKES A LOT OF STUDYING
BECAUSE OF ALL THE POSSIBLE TRANSITIONS .... I THINK HAVING LESS CLLrITER ON THE PLATE WOULD BE A BIG
HELP....CHART IS CONFUSING.
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In addition to confusion regarding charts, incident 146645 also involved automation turning the aircraft off course (see further
excerpt in section 1.1.1.) and a last minute approach/runway change leading to significant confusion (see further excerpt in
section 2.1.).
146645 WHILE HURRYING TO GETr THE NAV EQUIP _ AND IDENH_ AND REL-ONTIGURING THE AC'FT I _
RIGHT BY THE NDB RW'Y 30 CHART AND TOOK THE DATA FROM THE NDB RWY 3 ST PAUL, MN, LAKE ELMO. AS WE
WENT BY THE NDB AND STARTED TO TURN TO THE INBND HDG, SOME 70 DEG FROM OUR CURRENT HDG, WE KNEW
SOMETHING WAS WRONG. [also see 146645 in "1.1.1. Automation turns aircraft off course" and "2.1. Last minute
approach/runway change leads to significant confusion"]
3 654 56 THE EASTSIDE ONE ARR IS THE ONLY F'MS ARR KNOWN TO THIS AVIATOR TO RETAIN DSCNT CLRNC AFTER
BEING CLRED FOR F-MS APCH. CERTAINLY, A SIT FOR CONFUSION WHEN COMPARED TO MOST, IF NOT ALL OTHER FMS
APCHS I'M FAMILIAR WITH .... UPON REVIEWING TIlE F'MS STAR CHART, HE SAW THE NOTE ABOUT MAINTAINING THE
LAST ASSIGNED ALT UNTIL PASSING KAYOH, HOWEVER, HE STILL THINK,C; THAT THE STAR IS MISLEADING AND ITS
FORMAT CONFUSING.
2.2.3. Confusion due to use of wrong data (2)
335098 I WAS SURPRISED TO FIND MY DME INDICATING 13.5, OR 1.5 MI PAST FERNS. I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED
DSCNT TOWARD 1200 FT, OUR NEXT STEP-DOWN ALT. SHORTLY, THE FO _"NDICATED SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT .... I
THEN DISCOVERED MY DME HOLD FEATURE WAS ENGAGED AND IMMEDIATELY SELECIED 1T OFF. MY DME THEN
READ APPROX 10.5 AND I REALIZED WE HAD NOT YET REACHED FERNS.... WE HAD DSNDED SEVERAL HUNDRED FT
BELOW THE MINIMUM ALT OF 2000 FT.
Incident 212324 involved data entry error and use of the wrong navigational beacon.
212324 I HAD ABE IN VOR AND WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED THE I.DC BACK COURSE APCH TO RWY 24. I FAILED
TO TUNE IN ETX VOR FOR D/VIE INFO. CAPT WAS FLYING AND NOTICED DME WAS ABOUT 10 DME. liE BEGAN DSCNT
DOWN TO THE MDA OF 760 FT MSL. AT ABOUT I000 FT MSL (600 FT AGL) TWR CALLED AND SAID WE WERE WELL
BELOW THE PROPER ALT FOR THE APCH AND WE SHOULD CLB BACK IMMEDIATELY.
2.3. Forgot speed brakes (2)
The Cali accident involved execution of a terrain escape maneuver without retra;.'tion of the speed brakes. Two of the incidents
relevant to the Cali accident involved forgetting to retract the speed brakes.
334866 I AM NEW ON THE B757...WE HAD TO USE SPD BRAKES BTWN ARCH] AND GAROW INrXNS TO GET DOWN TO
PROFILE....AIRPLANE DIDN'T STOP AT THE PROFILE, IT KEPT DSNDING AND BUSTED TIlE 4000 FT RESTR AT GAROW
INTXN BY 400 FT. IT TOOK ME A FEW SEC'ONDS TO REALIZE WHY - AS THE ACFT APCHED THE PROFILE, I HAD NOT
REIRACTED THE SPD BRAKES SINCE I WAS DISTRACrED AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF SPD BRAKE
DEPLOYMENT TO REMIND YOU.
Incident 280233 not only involved forgetting the speed brakes, but also involved a GPWS warning.
28 0233 I CALLED FOR 'GEAR-DOWN v AND EXTENDED SPD BRAKES TO AID DSCNT.... AT 8200 FT... I RAISED THE NOSE
TO ARREST SINK RATE AND DECELERATE AT 7200 FT.... I APPLIED TI-IRUSI" AND NOTICED I WAS USING
CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN NORMAL TO MAINTAIN LEVEL FLT.... AT A3:_PROX 200 KTS, I GOT THE STALL SHAKER... I
INSTINCHVELY LOWERED THE NOSE AND ADDED THRUST. AT 6500 FT THE GPWS ISSUED A TERRAIN' WARNING. THE
FE THEN ALARMED ME THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL EXTENDED.
2.4. Other problems with changes late in descent/approach (4_
Incident 275413 involved not only the effect of changes late in descent/approac a, but also loss of data when other data are
entered into the automated system.
275413 AT THIS POINT, TO COMPLY WITH THE 210 KIAS SPD REQUEST BY Arc, THE FO SELECTED THE WERT SPD'
FUNCTION ON THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE PANEL, SETIING 600 FPM DSC'qT RATE AND CHANGING THE 'SPD SELECT
WINDOW TO SHOW 210 KTS. BECAUSE OF A FLAW IN THE MD-88'S DIGITA_ FLT GUIDANCE PROGRAM, LAST SECOND
CHANGES IN ANY OF THE VERT CTL FUNCTIONS WILL REMOVE THE ALT LEVEL OFF COMMAND PREVIOUSLY
SELECTED. THE ALT WARNING SIGNAL AND A TCASII TA' GOING OFF SIMILTANEDUSLY AT 7700 MSL BROUGHT OUR
A'I-I'N TO THE DEV. [also see 275413 in "I .1.2. Loss of data when other data at.- entered"]
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310373WEWEREBEING VECTORED FOR THE 'CANARSIE APCH' (VOR RWY 13L/R) AT JFK.... THE CRI VOR WAS AT 12
O'CIADCK (STRAIGHT AHEAD), ABOUT 5 M]. THE PNF INDICATED TO ME SHORTLY THEREAFTER THAT THE USUAL
VISUAL REF PoINrS JUST BELOW US WERE NOT WHAT THEY SHOULD BE. I CI-IKED MY RMI NEEDLES (WE BOTH HAD
THE CRI VOR TUNED AND IDENTED) AND SAW THEM SWINGING OFF TO THE R, ABOUT 2.5 DME. I RECHKED MY 'NAV'
(FMS) DISPLAY, AND IT WAS NO LONGER AT 12 O'CI.XDCK, BUT NOW WAS OFF TO THE R (SEE NOTE). IT HAD BEEN AT 12
O'CIXDCK, 5 MI, ONLY 4-5 SECONDS PRIOR TO THAT. WE INITIATED A R TURN AND I IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED TO _,AW
DATA' TO COMPLE2_ THE _.... WHEN VECTORS ARE CHANGED CLOSE TO THE FAF, MORE THAN THE NORMAL
XCHK MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE PLT WHO HAS TO QUICKLY GO FROM FMS INFO TO RAW DATA INTO,
DECIPHER, SWITCH DISPLAYS, FLAG THE APCH, CONFIGURE, DSND TO MDA, ETC.
21743 0 RWY 36R ILS WAS BRIEFED. AT GILMORE, WE WERE CLRED DIREL-"F TO AULON FOR THE ILS RWY 9. I TOLD
THE FO TO BRIEF ME ON THE AI:M°H WHILE I ACTrVATED THE SECONDARY FLT PLAN IN THE FMS. WE WERE CLRED TO
DSND TO 3000 AND I BEGAN A RAPID DSCNT TO THAT ALT AS THE ARPT WAS NOW VERY CLOSE.... I GLANCED
QUICKLY AT THE APCH PLATE FOR IL,S RWY 9 AND SAW 1500 AS THE INTERMEDIATE APCH ALT.... WE WERE ASKED
OUR ALT BY APCH AND WE RPTED 1500 FT. THEY ADVISED THEY WERE RECEIVING A LOW ALT ALERT.
335 282 WHILE TURNING ONTO THE FINAL APCH PATH, _ IN CONTINUOUS MODERATE TURB AND MODERATE
RAIN SHOWERS, THE _ CTLR INFORMED US THAT A PRECEDING FLT MISSED THE _ AND INFORMED US THAT
WE MIGHT HAVE BETTER LUCK WITH THE ROSSLYN LDA RWY 18. THE C-'II.R THEN CLRED US FOR THE ROSSLYN LDA
RWY 18 At_H. SINCE THIS WAS THE FIRST WE HEARD THAT THE ROSSLYN LDA WAS IN USE, WE WERE VERY RUSHED
PREPARING FOR THE APCH .... [Part of the problem is] THE LACK OF STORED AI_H INFO FOR THE AI_HS TO RWY 18 ....
THE FLC EITHER HAS TO FLY THE APCH USING THE APCH PLATE ONLY OR TAKE'ITqE TIME (WHICH WAS NOT
AVAILABLE) AND ENTER EACH WAYPOINT INTO THE FMC. THE APCH PLATE ITSELF MUST BE BRIEFED AND THESE LAST
MIN CHANGES CREATE A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD, HIGH STRESS, ENVIRONMENT IN THE COCKPIT.
2.5. Miscellaneous problems during descent/approach (9)
28 27 07 HAD DSCNT CONTINUED THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A COLLISION.... ONE BECOMES CONFIDENT AND
TRUSTING WHEN BEING CTLED INTO AN ARPT OF THE SIZE OF SFO. WE RELY ON TFC SEPARATION. rT IS ALSO A TIME
THAT IS VERY BUSY FOR FI.,C - SETTING UP FMS, FINAL APCH BRIEFINGS, CHKLISTS, MONITORING AI:_H FREQS TO
HEAR WHAT OTHER ACFT ARE DOING. THANKS TO A DILIGENT AND OBSERVANT FO AND TCASII, THIS POTENTIAL
COLLISION WAS AVOIDED.
279493 FLYING UP HUDSON RIVER... WE WERE THEN CLRED TO FLY THIS APCH. OUR At_H PLATE SPEL--qFIF_
'REMAIN ABOVE 2000 FT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE' BUT NO OTHER ALT RESTRS .... CTR TOLD US WE WERE NOT CLRED
FOR LOWER AND TO CLB BACK TO 3500 FT .... QUALITY ASSURANCE SPECIALIST STATED THE _ IS CORRECT. HE
CAN DSND TO 2000 FT.
309352 THE AI:_H PLATE SPECIFIES FOR US TO REMAIN 'AT OR ABOVE 2000 FT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.'... APPROX
ABEAM THE WORLD TRADE CTR, THE APCH CTLR ... ASKED WHAT OUR ALT WAS AND I REPLIED WE WERE PASSING
2500 b-T GOING DOWN TO 2000 FT. HE RESPONDED THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT MSL UNTIL
ABEAM CE_ PARK.
3633 80 ACFT WAS AT 2800 FT DSNDING .... REMEMBERED ALT ASSIGNED AND A CLB STARTED BACK TO 3000 FT ....
IN FUTURE, RECOMMEND THE PF USE AUTOPLT TILL ESTABLISHED ON FINAL AI_H COURSE IN ORDER TO FREE UP
MENTAL WORKLOAD TO BETIER IMPROVE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.
99108 WE WERE ADVISED BY COAST APCH THAT THE RWY LIGHTS ON AI--I RWYS WERE NOT TURNING ON .... HE
THEN ASKED APCH WHAT TIME SUNSET WAS, AND THEY INFORMED HIM 3 MINS AGO.... WE COULD STILL SEE THE
ARPT, AND IT WAS STILL LIGHT OUT, SO THE CAPT TOLD APCH WE WOULD CONTINUE.
242545 I WAS TOLD THAT OUR CLRNC WAS TO THE HUSON FIX, VIA THE 13 DME ARC, MAINTAIN 13000 FT, EXPECT
NO DELAYS FOR THE VOR DME-A APCH. THIS IS THE CLRNC THAT MY FO RF__L-'EIVEDWHILE I WAS OFF THE AIR. HE
STATES THAT HE MISTOOK THIS FOR AN APCH CLRNC.
8481 1 I EXPLAINED ABOUT BEING ON A VISUAL APCH AND HE SAID I SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED THE XING
RESTRICTION. I CONFERRED WITH MY FIRST OFFICER AND WE BOTH AGREED THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED THE
RESTRICTION.
115 883 MOUNT VERNON VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36 WASHINGTON NATL. WASHINGTON APCH FAILED TO CHANGE FLT
OVER TO TWR. FLT CREW DID NOT REALIZE THAT RADIO WAS TUNED TO At_H AND FAILED TO REQUEST LNDG CLRNC
FROM TWR.
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307161WHILEBE_G VECTORED FOR AN NDB APCH AND WHB._ ON DOWNWIND, THE CREW WAS TOLD BY ATC,
TINITED STATES CUSTOMS REQUIRES NXXXXX TO BE DIVERTED TO FT PIERCE SO AS TO CLR CUSTOMS AND THAT
LNDG CLRNC TO MELBOURNE IS DENIED.' ATC WAS ADVISED BY THE CREW THAT THE AIRPLANE HAD NOT LANDED IN
A FOREIGN COUNTRY AND THAT 4 FAA INS_RS WERE ONBOARD THE. ACFT.
3. Terrain avoidance t19)
3.1. GPWS alarms (15)
The many GPWS alarms in the ASRS database illustrate the kinds of experiences flight crews have with this terrain
avoidance system. Previous experience with false GPWS alarms can be a factor in accidents involving controlled flight
into terrain (Majikas, 1995).
3.1.1. Complacency, loss of situational awareness, slow reaction (5)
351150 APPROX 30 Nil S OF LAS, RECEIVED CLRNC FOR VISUAL APCH RWY 1R, VASI OTS. DISCUSSED WITH FO
IMPLICATIONS OF DSNDING VISUALLY IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN OFF P3BLISHED RTE, PLUS NO GS INFO. WE WERE
LULLED INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY BY FAME/ARYrY OF AREA, CKJOD VISIBB.,ITY, AND TERRAIN BEING WELL
LIT BY FULL MOON. APPROX 10 MI S OF LAS ON THE 180 DEG RADIAL, CTI.R ISSUED A _BELL)W MVA' ALERT. WE WERE
AT 4100 Fr MSL. SECONDS LATER, A GPWS WARNING TERRAIN, TERRA//q ONLY SOUNDED WITH TEILRAIN IN SIGHT.
AN IMMEDIATE CLB WAS INITIATED...
Incident 352618 also involved confusion regarding charts. See the excerpt in section 2.2.2.
352618 THE CAtrr STATED THAT WE WERE GOOD TO DSND NOW TO 4100 FT. I COMMEN'I-r_,D THAT THE AIRSPACE THAT
PROTECTED US AT 4100 FT WAS ONLY VALID ONCE WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON FINAL AND OVER THE FIX INBOUND. HE
SAID HE WAS SURE IT WAS SAFE... THE CAPT SEEMED VERY CONFIDENT AND NOTHING IN HIS MANNER SIGNALED
THAT I SHOULD BE AT ALL CONCERNED ABOUT HIS JUDGEMENT. I REMEMBERED THINKING EARLIER THAT HE SEEMED
LIKE A REALLY GREAT GUY TO FLY wrI'H: VERY PROFESSIONAL AND SELF-ASSURED, WITH VERY GOOD PEOPLE
SKILLS TOO.... ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE CAPT SAID SOMETHING ABOI.rr A MOUNTAIN BEING VISIBLE OUTSIDE THE
WINDOW. I LOOKED OUT AND OUR LNDG LIGHTS WERE CLEARLY ILLUMINATING A LARGE PEAK BELOW OUR NOSE.
THE CAPT SAID, THE RADIO ALT IS SHOWING 1000 FT, LETS GET OUT OF Va_a,.E!' I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND
INITIATED A CLB AT TOGA THRUST BACK LIP TO 6000 FT, SHORTLY AFrER I STARTED THE CLB, THE GPWS CALLED
q'ERRAIN, TERRAIN!' [also see 352618 in "2.2.2. Confusion regarding charts _]
363536 CTLR GAVE US A VECTOR... SHORTLY AFTER THIS THE GPWS ALERTED US TO TERRAIN, TERRAIN.' AN
IMMEDIATE CLB WAS INITLATED AND THE AC"FT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED SAFELY.... THIS ACR DOES NOT USE
ANY TERRAIN AWARENESS IN TI-IEIR APCH BRIEFINGS .... FO ADMITS TO tl" BEING VERY MUCH OF A RUSHED
ATMOSPHERE AND ADMITS TO A LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN EVENT.
Incident 82787 also involved lack of detailed terrain information on approach ::harts.
82787 I YEI.2.ED, "CLB NOW," VERY FORCEFULL,Y. WHEN THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, I HIT AUTOPLT
DISCONNECT AND PULLED UP.... TI-IIS HAS HAPPENED BEFORE IN THIS IXICATION. A FOREIGN CARR/ER HAS
CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE RESEARCH. THERE IS A 5637' HILL IN THE AREA,';"HAT SHOWS ON THE DEP CHART, BUT IT IS
NOT DEPICTED ON THE APCH CHART. THE CHART PUBLISHER HAS BEEN CONTACIED AND THEY SAID THEY WOULD
INCLUDE THIS HILL ON FURTHER APCH CHARTS. RPTR WAS PARTICULARLY DISTURBED BY THE FACT THAT HIS
SKK,I.ED AND CO_ F/O FROZE IN THE MACHINE MODE AND TRIED TO COMPLY WITH THE GPWS INSTRUCTIONS
WITH THE AUTOPLT CTLS RATHER THAN EXECUTING AN IMMEDIATE PULl.UP MANUALLY.
346137 AFrER LEVELING AT 4600 FT MSL FOR 15-20 SECONDS THE GPWS (MODE 2) "TERRAIN, TERRAIN' ALERTED,
BOTH PLTS WERE SURPRISF_,D AS WE HAD ASSUMED THAT 4600 FT WAS MINIMUM VECTOR FOR THAT AREA. AS GPWS
ALERTED SECOND TIME, PLTS INITIATED ESCAPE MANEUVER WITH GAR 71-1RUST FOR MAX CLB ANGLE.
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3.1.2. Miscellaneous GPWS alarms (10)
325026 PASSING THROUGH 3000 FT MSL, WE RECEIVED A GPWS ALERT WARNING OF TERRAIN, TERRAIN.' I
IMMEDIATELY INrFIATED THE PRESCRIBED PROC OF FIREWALL PWR AND PITCH TO 20 DEGS NOSE UP. THE WARNING
CONTINUED FOR ABOUT 10-15 SECONDS.... THE ACFT HAD TO HAVE THE ENGS INSPECIED AS THE PF HAD
'FIREW_' THE ENGS IN THE CI.B MANEUVER, OVERTEMPING THEM IN THE PROCF_S. THE ACFr WAS FERRIED
BACK TO ATL THE NEXT DAY.... THE ACFT HAD ITS SPOILER-SPD BRAKES DEPLOYED. THE CREW, IN COGNIZANCE OF
THE LATEST ACCIDENT IN S AMERICA, DID NOT FAIL TO RF__aMEMBERTHE ACF'TS CONFIGN AND RETRA_ THE
SPOILERS... THE AREA SE OF HUNTSVILLE ARtrl" HAD A HISTORY OF ERRONEOUS GPWS WARNINGS.
174048 AFIER DSNDING TO 3800' MSL THE GPWS ISSUED A CONTINUOUS AURAL AND VIS 'TERRAIN" ALERT. SINCE
WE COULD NOT IMMEDIATELY DEIERMINE VISUALLY THAT WE HAD ADEQUATE TERRAIN CLRNC AND THE RADAR
ALTIMEIER INDICATED DECREASING GND CLRNC, WE INITIATED A CLB ... ROA HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE FAA AS
A SPECIAL _ DUE TO MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN AND HIGH OBSTRUCTIONS IN THE AREA. BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL
NATURE OF THIS ARPT, COMPANY HAS 9 PAGES OF INSTRUCTIONS TO AID FLT CREWS IN ARR, APCH AND DEP PROCS.
201005 WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CLB TO 8000 FT, AND TURNTO A HDGOF 180. AFTER WE WERE LEVEL AT 8000FT,
AND ON THE 180 HDG FOR SOME TIME, WE RF_./ZEIVED A CONTINUOUS TERRAIN WARNING FROM THE GPWS. THIS WAS
OVER A COMPLEFH_Y DARK AREA ... I INITIATED A CLB AND THE FO ADVISED APCH CTL ... THE APCH CTLR STATED
THAT HE WAS PROVIDING TERRAIN CLRNC FOR US AND FOR US TO MAINTAIN 8000 FT... BUT DID GIVE US A TURN
TOWARD THE CTR OF THE VALLEY. WE q_.JRNED, BUT IGNORED THE ALT INSTRUCTION AND CONTINUED THE CLB
ENOUGH TO SILENCE THE GPWS WARNING. A CILR'S EX POST FACTO STATEMENT THAT HE IS PROVIDING OBSTACLE
CLRNC IS SMALL COMPORT WHEN "vVI-IOOP,WHOOP, PULL UP' IS RINGING IN ONE'S EAR.
317197 OVER THE RIDGE OF HI/A_S WE WERE STARTI.ED TO HEAR OUR GPWS ANNOUNCE qERRAIN, TERRA/N' THIS
STARTLED US SINCE AS I MENTIONED EARLIER WE WERE AT AN ATC CLRED ALT AND HDG AND COULD VISUALLY SEE
THAT WE WERE IN NO DANGER OF BEING NEAR TERRAIN. OF COURSE THE CAPT REACIED TO THE WARNING
IMMEDIATELY...
362229 INBOUND TO LAS...WE RECEIVED A GPWS TERRAIN WARNING. IN COMPLIANCE WITH OUR COMPANY PROCS,
I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO INCREASE PWR AND CLB....SINCE WE WERE AT THE MVA OF 6100 FT MSL, I FEEL THAT WE
WERE GIVEN AN INCORRECT TERRAIN WARNING.
300252 AS THE C'ILR GAVE US THE HDG TO INTERCEtrI" THE LOC COURSE, HE ADVISE D THAT THE HDG AND ALT MIGHT
CAUSE A GPWS WARNING THAT HE CHARACrERIZED AS SPURIOUS, BUT THAT WE WOULD CLR THE TERRAIN .... I HAD
BRIEFED THAT WE WOULD RESPECT ALL GPWS WARNINGS DURING OUR OPS AT RNO.
329185 DURING APCH PHASE OF ARR INTO RNO WE EXPERIENCED A GPWS WARNING OF TERRAIN' FOLLOWED BY
q_ULL UP.'... THE CAI:rl" WAS TOLD BY A SUPVR THAT THIS HAPPENS ALL THE TIME OVER HAZEN MOUNTAIN. THE
MOUNTAIN IS ABOUT 7800 FT HIGH WITH A TWR ON IT SO THE GPWS GOES OFF.
354277 WHILE ON ARR INTO SLC, WE WERE CLRED TO DSCNT TO 9000 FT. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 9500 FT IN IMC
OUR GPWS TERRAIN WARNING BEGAN SOUNDING CONTINUOUSLY SO WE INrlTATED A CLB AND INFORMED APCH WE
WERE CLBING TO 11000 FT. THE CTLR RESPONDED THAT 9000 F'T WAS ABOVE MVA AND STARTED TO GIVE US AN 8000
FT XING RESTR FOR OUR INST APCH TO RWY 34L .... I DONT THINK THAT THIS PARTICULAR CTLR FULLY
APPRECIATES THE EFFECT THAT THE TERRAIN WARNING HAS ON A FLC ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT, UNDER INST
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITION, AND IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN.
355364 WE RECEIVED A GPWS WARNING TOO LOW, TERRAIN.' FLC IMMEDIATELY PERFORMED ESCAPE MANEUVER.
... WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN THOUGH WE WERE ABOVE MVA, THE COMBINATION OF RISING TERRAIN AND ACFT DSCNT
RATE MAY HAVE CAUSED THE GPWS TO GIVE ITS WARNING.
242560 JUST AS WE CROSSED OVER THE PEAK OF THE MOUNTAINS BELOW US WE RECEIVED A GPWS "TERRAIN'
WARNING.... THE UNDERLYING TERRAIN WAS CLRLY IN SIGHT AT ALL TIMES AND AN EVASIVE CLB MANEUVER WAS
NOT NECESSARY. I HAVE RECEIVED MANY UNNECESSARY GPWS WARNINGS IN THE TRI AREA, ALL OF WHICH HAVE
OCCURRED WHILE UNDER RADAR VECYORS FOR A VISUAL OR INST APCH. THE MINIMUM VECTORING ALI'S IN THE
AREA ARE OBVIOUSLY TOO LOW AND SHOULD BE RAISED IMMEDIATELY. I DO NOT CONSIDER THESE TO BE _AI_E'
GPWS TERRAIN WARNINGS BECAUSE THE SYS APPEARS TO BE FUNCrlONING AS INTENDED. THE ATC VECTORING ALTS
SIMPLY BRING THE ACFT TOO CLOSE TO RAPIDLY CHANGING TERRAIN. EVERY TIME A PLT RECEIVES AN
UNNECESSARY GPWS WARNING HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE SYS IS UNDERMINED, MAKING HIM LESS LIKELY TO
RESPOND PROMPTLY AND PROPERLY IN THE CASE OF A VALID WARNING. WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE CFIT
ACCIDENTS UNTIL UNNECESSARY GPWS WARNINGS ARE ELIMINATED...
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3.2. Other terrain-related incidents (4)
Incident 156284 involved confusion regarding charts in context of terrain.
156284 WHILE CLBING THROUGH 12500' MSO APCH ASKED US TO CROSS 8 NE ON V187 AT 11000'. I RESPONDED THAT
IT WOULD BE NO PROB, WE WERE ALREADY ABOVE 11000'. THE C-"II,R STATED THAT WE WERE TO MAINTAIN 11000'
TILL THE MSO AND NOW TO MAINTAIN 11000' TILL 8 NE OF MSO VOR ON V187. BOTH THE F/O AND MYSELF WERE
S_SED BECAUSE OF THE CHARTS AND TERRAIN IMPLIED THAT 1T WAS AN AT/OR ABOVE CLRNC.
Incident 297695 involved problems with crew coordination.
297695 I MISREAD THE DEP TO MAKE A LTURN AT 9000 FT WHEN I SHOULD HAVE MADE A R TURN. WAS CLR WX AND
IN A MOUNTAINOUS AREA WHERE I WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE TRYING TO AVOID ANY TERRAIN OR OTHER ACFT AND
SIMPLY MADE THE WRONG TURN .... I BELIEVE 1T COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY BET/ER CREW COORD PRIOR TO
DEP... BOTH PLTS WERE THE CAPTS ... THE BRIEFING BY THE CAPT FLYINC; MAY HAVE BEEN MORE THOROUGH IF HE
WERE FLYING WITH A COPLT,
Incident 184446 involved procedures not followed and lack of detailed obstack information on approach charts.
184446 THE FI_,C DID NOT REVIEW OR HAVE THE SAT RADAR- 1 APCH PLATE DISPLAYED .... l'l'he continuer] SAID TO
DSND TO OUR MDA OF 1200 FT, AND KEPT TELLING US TO CORRF.L_ HDGS TOTHER AS WE WERE L OF CENTERLINE ....
WE STARTED PICKING LIP THE GND AND THEN SAW A 'VERY TALL TWR' AT 1459 FT AT OUR 20'CIADCK POS WHICH WAS
APPROX 1/2-1MI AWAY (rile TOP OF THE TWR BEING MUCH HIGHER THAN OUR ALT). JUSTTHEN THE CII.R GAVE US
ANOTHER I-IDG CORRECI]ON TO THE R TO CENqER/JNE. WE TOLD HER THAT WE COUI.,D NOT A_ THIS HDG
BECAUSE IT WOULD TAKE US INTO A TWR. SHE SAID CHK YOUR MDA ALT OF 1200 FT. SHE APPARENTLY DID NOT
KNOW ABOIYF THE 1459 FTTWR .... I CALLED SAT APCH ON ARR SAT AND SPOKE WITH A SUPVR. HE APPARENTLY WAS
NOT AWARE OF A PROBLEM NOR OF THE RADIO TWR ON THE RWY 21 APCH.
Incident 264952 involved terrain-related data.
264952 IBECAMEEX'/REMELY AJ.A,RMEDWHENII.,E, ARNED THAT HIS C/_LL-'ULATIONS WERE BASED ON THE USE OF
MINIMUM SAFE ALT DATA AS DEPICTED ON COMMERCIAL APCH PLATES _MqD NOT ON TOPOGRAPHICAL CHARTS OR
COMPLETELY ON MEA INFO FROM ENRTE CHARTS.... THE COMPANY RE(T=NTLY FIRED 2 CREWMEMBERS FOR
_SING TO TAKE A DRIFIDOWN DEPENDENT FLT THROUGH THE ROCKIES. THEY ASSERT THEY WERE NOT GIVEN
ENOUGH TIME OR INFO TO COMPUTE THE ACFT PERFORMANCE FOR THE TRIP, AND HENCE REFUSED IT. TiffS IS THE
CLIMATE OF THE PLACE WHERE I WORK: EXTREME DURE, SS AND CONST.a.NT FEAR OF LIVELIHOOD LDSS .... 1130 NOT
BELIEVE THAT THIS DATA HAS BEEN EVEN SUBMrlqED TO THE FAA, LET _J..ONE SCRI.YI'INIZED BY AN ENGINEERING
TEAM.
4. Problems with Qperations in forei2n airspace (6)
4.1. Problems with operations in Latin America (4)
Incidents 310143 and 140711 involved operations in the vicinity of Cali, Colombia, near the site of the crash of Flight 965.
310143 ATC CLRED US DIRECT TO THE CALl VOR AND DSND TO 5000 FT.... FURTHER CHKING...SHOWED TERRAIN AT
14000 FT TO 11000 FT DIRECTLY ALONG OUR PATH. A SIMILAR ATC CLRNC HAPPENS VERY OFTEN FLYING INTO LIMA,
PERU. MANY, MANY, MANY PLTS ARE NOT AWARE OF JUST HOW CRUCIA]_ IT IS NOT TO ACCEPT THESE DEADLY
CLRNCS. PLEASE GET THE WORD OUT AGAIN.
140711 BARRANQUILI._ CTL CI.,RED US DIRECT TULUA VOR. AS WE WERE PASSING ABEAM CARTAGENA VOR, AN LGT
Y CROSSED OUR NOSE HDG IN A NE DIRECrlON. 1T WAS EXIREMELY CLO._E AND WE ARE SURE HE WAS AT OUR ALT
BECAUSE WE HIT HIS WAKE TURBULENCE AS WE PASSED BEHIND HIM .... BARRANQUII.LA CrL STATED THAT HE WAS
CTLING NO OTHER ACFT IN OUR AREA AT FL330. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT ACX2EPT AN OFF AIRWAYS CLRNC WHEN
NOT POSITIVE OF BEING IN RADAR CONTACT. CTLR STATED THAT SOMEq IMES ACFT TRANSVERSE HIS AIRSPACE THAT
HE WAS NOT C'ILING.
349669 I BELIEVE THIS WAS A CLASSIC SIT OF A FOREIGN ATC LANGUAGE BARRIER....I HAD NEVER BEEN TO
MANAGUA BEFORE... SHE SAID 'RPT 5 DME RWY 9.'... WE BOTH ASSUMED WRONGLY THAT SHE HAD MEANT RPT 5
DME OUT ON FINAL ON THE APCH TO RWY 9 .... AS WE WERE TURNING FINAL AT APPROX 9 DME FROM THE RWY THE
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CTLRASKEDOURPOSANDALT.WERESPONDEDWITH,'ONFINAL,9DMEAT2700FTASPUBLISHED.'SHETHENSAID
THATWEWERETOHAVECALLED5DMEFROMTHEVORANDCROSSED THE VOR AT 5000 FT.
334006 TCASH SCREEN SHOWED TFC 12 O'CLOCK, 800 FT BELOW US AND CLBING! ... I TURNED THE ACFT R AT THE
LAST MOMENT BECAUSE WE FINALLY SAW NAV LIGHTS OF THE OTHER ACFT AT OUR 11:30 POS .... I HAVE BEEN
FLYING THIS AIRSPACE FOR OVER 5 YRS NOW AND WITH THE HORRENDOUS ATC (AND/OR UNSCRUPULOUS LATIN
AMERICAN OPERATORS FLYING ANY ALTS THEY WANT) THERE WILL BE A MIDAIR COLLISION BEFORE TOO LONG ...
WE NEED, AND THE TRAVELING PUBLIC SHOULD DEMAND, SATCOM AND BETTER Arc THAN THIS ARCHAIC LATIN
AMERICAN SYS, NOTE ALL THE IATA AIRWAYS ON MAPS WHERE 'ATC IS OF DUBIOUS QUALITY'...
4.2. Problems with operations in other foreign locations (2)
Incident 244767 is reminiscent of the August 1997 crash of Korean Air Flight 801 on Guam (McKenna, 1998b).
244767 SCHEDULED PART 121 FLT FROM SPN (SAIPAN) TO MANILA, PI (MNL). WX AT THE TIME WAS RPTED 1 KM TO 1
1/9.2KM IN HVY RAINS...COMS DIFFICULT AT BE, ST DUE TO POOR EQUIP AND CTLR'S HVY ACCENT .... ATIS INFO NEVER
SPECIFIED APCH IN USE OR IF ANY PART OF ANY APCH SYS WAS NOT IN SVC. APCH CTLR STATED 'APCH TO RWY 24 IN
USE.' WE (ALl., 3 PLTS) BRIEFED THE ILS 24 APCH ... I STATED SEVERAL TIMES THE ILS FREQ IS NOT IDENTING. THIS,
SAD TO SAY, IS NOT UNUSUAL IN MANILA DUE TO VERY POOR GND EQUIP. CTLR VECTORED US ON THE INTERCEPT
HDG AND THEN CLRED US FOR THE 'RWY 24 AI_H.' THE CAtrF (PF) CAI:rrURED THE LOC AND GS AND BEGAN TO LET
DOWN. AT MINIMUMS, ARPT WAS NOT IN SIGHT SO A MISSED APCH WAS EXECUTED. TO OUR DISMAY, THE OMEGA
READ 7 MI FROM THE ARPT. WE WERE 7 MINE OF THE ARPT AT 400 FT!
305840 AI:_H CTL VF_,CI_RED US W THROUGH FINAL AND THEN BACK. THE APCH WAS NOT IN THE FMS DATABASE
AND BOTH PLTS WERE USING RAW DATA. AS WE SAW THE DEW BAR BEGIN TO CTR, THE CAFrI" (WHO WAS HAND
FLYING) CALLED 'ARPr IN SIGHT.' IT WAS APPARENT THAT WE WERE TOO HIGH AND A FEW SECONDS (5-10) LATER THE
FO AND I REALIZED THIS WAS NOT THE NAGOYA ARPT. THE VISUAL APPEARANCE WAS SIMILAR, BUT RWY HDG WAS
30 DEGS OFF AND NOW WE WERE E OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE, AND STILL APPROX 9 MI NNE OF NGO.... LANGUAGE
AND PHRASEOLOGY WERE DEFINrIELY A FACTOR. IT WAS NOT QUITE CLR, AF'IER SEVERAL QUERIES, IF WE WERE
CLRED FOR THE APCH OR WERE STILL ON VECTORS. A 'HEADS UP CA[J., THAT ONE MIGHT EXPECT IN CONTINENTAL
UNITED STATES SUCH AS 'ARPT AT 2 O'CLOCK, 9 MI,' IS NOT USED IN JAPAN OR OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES THAT I'M
AWARE OF. THE CAPT WAS NEW TO INTL FLYING AND TO THE ACTT (4 MONTHS APPROX) AND SAW WHAT HE
EXPECTED TO SEE AND MADE A QUICK DECISION BASED ON LIMITED INFO.
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Appendix 7.
Excerpts of each of the 16 incidents
that were rated relevant by QUORUM but not by the analysts

Appendix 7. Excerpts of each of the sixteen incidents that were rated relevant by QUORUM but not by the analysts. The
16 incidents fall into 9 categories. The first two incidents involve GPWS alarms, and are clearly relevant. The incident
involving an escape maneuver is also relevant. The incident describing problems and confusion with terminal area charts
seems somewhat relevant, as does the incident involving speed brakes. The six incidents involving FMS and approach,
or approach/descent, are only vaguely relevant. Three incidents involving ACCIDENT are not relevant, nor are the two
incidents involving CIVIL or FAA/SAFETY. So, of the 16 incidents rated as irrelevant by the analysts but rated as relevant
by QUORUM, 5 are clearly irrelevant, 6 are vaguely relevant, and 5 are relevant.
1. GPWS alarms
Since this incident involved an event that also occurred in the Cali accident, a GPWS alarm, this incident is relevant. Further, it
illustrates crew reluctance to respond to the GPWS when it is perceived to be giving a false alarm. This issue is clearly relevant
to CFIT accidents. Still, one analyst strongly disagreed that incident 228422 has any relevance or similarity to the Cali
accident.
228422 THE GPWS GAVE REPEA'IED TERRAIN, TERRAIN, WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP' WARNINGS. SINCE WE WERE IN
DAY VMC FLT CONDITIONS AND COULD CLRLY SEE THAT WE WERE NOT IN DANGER OF A GND COLLISION, WE DID NOT
PULL UP. AFIER REPEATED WARNINGS, WE SELEL-qED THE GPWS OVERRIDE TO SILENCE THE AURAL WARNING ....
THIS SAME TYPE OF INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED WHILE FLYING THE LOC/DME BACK COURSE RWY 8 APCH AT
MARTINSBURG, WV, AND WHILE BEING VECrORED AT ROANOKE, VA.... TO BE REQUIRED TO EXECU'I_ AN ABRUPT
PULL UP WHILE FLYING A PUBLISHED PROC DOES NOT ENHANCE SAFETY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RECORD WILL
SHOW THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED BECAUSE P'IA2S ELECTED TO IGNORE THE
GPWS AND CONSEQUENTLY COLLIDED WITH THE GND. THE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THE GPWS AND THE TERMINAL
INSTS PROCS SHOULD BE CORRELATED TO PREVENT THESE FALSE WARNINGS.
Incident 280922 involved an event that also occurred in the Cali accident, a GPWS alarm, so this incident is relevant.
280922 BELOW 1000 PT WE GOT A GPWS _ LOW TERRAIN' AND TOO LOW GEAR' WARNING AT THE SAME TIME THE
TCASII WAS TELLING US TO DSND.... DEP CIL _ CAI.LEJ) TO INQUIRE ABOUT OUR CI.,B OR LACK OF CLB AT ABOUT
THE SAME TIME THE GPWS BURPED TOO LOW TERRAIN' OR "rERRAIN, TERRAIN.' THE CONFUSION AND TENSION IN
THE COCKPIT WAS QUITE HIGH ... THE CAPT AND I AGREED THAT UNDER D_ CIRCUMSTANCES, SAY A LOW
VISIBILITY TKOF OR AN ENG FAILURE AFTER TKOF, THAT THE CONFLICTING COMMANDS ('DSND, DSND'/'TERRAIN,
TERRAIN') COULD EASILY CAUSE AN ACCIDENT.
2. Escape maneuver
Since incident 313511 involved an event that also occurred in the Cali accident, an escape maneuver, albeit in response to a
windshear alarm, this incident is relevant. In fact, the Colombian report on the Cali accident stressed the relationship between
windshear training and GPWS training:
"Simulator training is the best method for pilots to extract maximum performance from large
airplanes during a CFIT escape maneuver. Therefore, Aeronautica Civil urges the FAA to require a CFIT
training program that includes realistic simulator exercises comparable to the successful windshear
and rejected takeoff training programs."
The NTSB agreed:
"Develop a controlled flight into terrain training program that includes realistic simulator exercises
comparable to the successful windshear and rejected takeoff training programs and make training in
such a program mandatory for all pilots operating under 14 CFR Part 121.(Class II, Priority Action)
(A-96-95)"
Thus, incident 313511 is particularly relevant to the Cali accident.
313511 WrlTIOUT ANY NORMAL WARNINGS (AIRSPD LOSS OR GAIN, SINK RATE CHANGE, E'I'C) WE WERE SUDDENLY
GIVEN AN ON-BOARD "_riNDSHEAR' ALERT (AURAL AND RED LIGHT). I IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED AN ESCAPE
MANEUVER (MAX FIREWALL PWR, 20 DEGS NOSE UP) AS ACFI" BEGAN DSNDING .... I AM ONLY GLAD THAT I JUST
COMPLETED ANNUAL RECURRENT TRAINING IN WHICH WlNDSHEAR TRAINING WAS AN EMPHASIS ITEM. I DID NOT
HESITATE TO INITIATE THE ESCAPE MANEUVER, BUT rM NOT CERTAIN THAT I WOULD HAVE DONE SO IMMEDIATELY IF
I HADN'I" JUST HAD THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE AND DECISIVE' RESPONSE EMPHASIZED IN THAT TRAINING!!
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3. Chartsand confusion in the terminal area
Incident 112422 raises questions about the clarity and adequacy of some terminal area charts. The themes of confusion in the
terminal area and confusion regarding charts also appear in the Cali accident. Thus, this incident is relevant. Perhaps the fact
that this incident involved a general aviation pilot convinced the analysts that it was not relevant.
112422 I WAS INBND TO SAN DIF_C_.K)'SMONTGOMERY FIELD FROM SANTA BARBARA VIA VAN NUYS, POMONA, AND
OCEANSIDE VORS .... I ASKED THE CFI.,R TO VERIFY THAT I HAD CLRNC INTO THE TCA. THE RESPONSE WAS "YOU'VE
BEEN IN THE TCA FOR SEVERAL MINUTES"... SINCE THE SAN DIEGO TCA CONS'ITIL'TF_ THE MOST CONFUSING MAZE
OF AIRSPACE I HAVE TO DATE ENCOUNTERED, I HAD CONDUCI'ED VERY C.,M_I.JL FLT PI.,ANNING TO AVOID LAX TCA
AND TO PLAN FLT INTO MONTGOMERY ON ROUIF__ AND ALTS AVOIDING THE SAN TCA. IN THE COURSE OFTHAT FLT
PLANNING I OBSERVED SEVERAL CRITICAL OMISSIONS ON THE SAN VFR qERMINAL AREA CHART. THE QUEST FOR
"ALL AVAILABLE INFO" REQUIRED BY FAR 91.5 SHOULD BE AIDED, NOT HINDERED, BY THE CHART-MAKERS, AS
FOLLOWS: ...
4. Speed brakes
Incident 340978 centers on a problem with speed brakes that began during descent. Speed brakes also played a central role in the
Cali accident. On that basis, this incident is relevant. It is reasonable to suggest that an accident investigator might want to
explore speed brake incidents to see if there are any operational difficulties that might be related to the Cali accident. As
indicated by incidents 334866 and 280233 in appendix 6, section 2.3, "Forgot speed brakes," the use of speed brakes is a
topic worthy of investigation. Thus, reports of problems with speed brake have some relevance.
340978 ON DSCNT INTO SFO I "IR/ED TO ARM THE SPD BRAKES BUT COULD NOT GET A GREEN SPD BRAKE AR.MED
LIGHT, JUST THE SPD BRAKE DO NOT ARM LIGHT. SO I STOWED THE SPD BRAKE LEVER IN TIlE DOWN DETENT POS (NO
LIGHTS). WE USED FLAPS 40 DEGS POR THE FLAP SETTING. I PLANNED A LONG ROLLOUT (ANTI-SKID INOP, MANUALLY
SPD BRAKE, REDUCED BRAKING) .... WHEN I TRIED TO USE THE REVERSER THEY WOULD NOT DEPLOY, IT TOOK A
COUPLE OF TRIES. THEN WHEN THEY DID DEPLOY I NOTED THAT'II-IE SPD BRAKE HANDLE MOVED TO THE UP POS BY
ITSELF AND AT THAT POINT IN TIME WHAT SEEMED TO ME AS BRAKING OR STRONG DECELERATION, ALL THIS WITH
VIOLE, NT SHAKING. BRAKES WERE NOT BEING USED BY ME OR THE FO.
5. Use of automation on descent/approach
Incident 308422, like the Cali accident, involves letting automation fly the aircraft in a demanding environment during
descent/approach. While the turn in this incident was intended, both the incident and the accident involved safety concerns
associated with turns initiated by automation. This incident is vaguely relevant to the Cali accident.
308422 I WAS LETTING THE FMS AND AUTOPLT FLY THE ARR.... THE FM,'; STARTED THE TURN FROM DARTS TO FINAL
APCH APPROX 2 MI PRIOR TO DARTS. THE FMS IS DESIGNED TO DO THIS SC)THAT THE ACFT WILL NOT OVERSHOOT THE
NEW COURSE .... SOCAL APCH [said] THAT WE HAD INTRUDED INTO ANOT-IER CI1R'S AIRSPACE BY STARTING THE
TURN EARLY AND ADVISED THAT WE NOT lET THE FMS FLY THE AIRPLANE IN LOS ANGELES BASIN.
6. On approach
These incidents are, at best, only vaguely relevant to the Cali accident. They in'_olve some sort of problem while on approach,
but have little else in common with the accident.
Incidents 370656 and 332870 describe parallel approaches to SFO. QUORUM picked up that there was a problem on approach,
but misinterpreted the contextual association of "FMS" (flight management system) and "APCH" (approach) in the narrative.
370656 WHILE SHOOTING THE FMS BRIDGE VISUAL RWY 28R APCH TO SFO, APCH CTL CALLED OUR TFC AT 10
O'CLOCK HIGH AND THAT IT WOULD BE GOING TO RWY 28L .... WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE _ AND CON]'INUED ON THE
FMS APCH PASSING THE GAROW FIX (15 DME AT OR ABOVE 4000 FT) AS PI',ESCRIBED....WE THOUGHT IT ODD THAT HE
WAS CRUISING RIGHT BY US, BUT FIGURED WE WOULD HAVE THE REQUIR.ED I/8 MI STAGGER PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN.
332870 SFO APCH CLRED US THE FMS RWY 28R AI:L"H ... THEY THEN AD_¢ ISED US A B737 WOULD BE MAKING AN
APCH TO RWY 28L. WE KEPT THE B737 AHEAD OF US BUT BARELY. THE RtASON FOR THIS RPT IS THE APCH UPSET
SEVERAL PAX ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT. THEY THOUGHT WE WERE WAY TOO CLOSE. I KNOW THIS INCREASES ARR
RATES, BUT IT CAN BE UPSETTING TO PAX.
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Incident281636happenedduringapproach,buthaslittleelseincommonwiththeCaliaccidento herthanthecrewhavinga
problematicinteractionwiththecontroller.QUORUMover-interpretedth presenceoftheterm"FLC"(flightcrew)inthe
contextof "APCH"(approach).
281636ONTHEQUIETBRIDGEVISUALTOSFORWY28RAPCHCTLCALLEDOUTANACFFAHEAD.... CTLR THEN
CLRED OUR ACFI' TO MAINTAIN 2500 FT AND 250 KTS. OUR ACP-'T WAS NOW APPROX 7 DME FROM RWY 28R. WE
QUERIED THE Cq'LR ABOUT THE AIRSPD HE WANTED US TO MAINTAIN AND HE REPLIED HIS INTENTIONS WERE TO HAVE
US OVERTAKE THE AC-'P-TTHAT WAS AHEAD, BELOW AND TO OUR L... AT APPROX 6.5 DME WE TOLD THE _ THAT
UNLESS WE COULD REDUCE OUR AIRSPD WE COULD NOT LAND. CTLR REPLIED BY HAVING US DISCONTINUE THE
APCH. WE INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE NOW HAD THE COMMU'IER AC'TT IN SIGHT AND THAT IT WAS ABOVE US AND
BEHIND US. CTLR RESPONDED ROGER, MAINTAIN VISUAL WITH THE COMMUTER ACb-T AND SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. WE
SWITCHED OVER TO SFO TWR CTL AND INIK)RMED THE CTLR THAT WE COULD NOT MAINTAIN VISUAL wrrH AN ACFT
THAT WAS ABOVE AND BEHIND US .... APCH CTLS DIRECTION TO HAVE A FLC MAINTAIN VISUAL WITH AN ACTT THAT
IS ABOVE AND BEHIND THEM WHILE ON FINAL APCH IS NOT ONLY IMPRACHCAL, BUT IMPOSSIBLE AND DANGEROUS
IF ATTEMPTED.
Incident 325365 happened during approach, but has little else in common with the Cali accident other than the crew
misunderstanding the controller. QUORUM over-interpreted the presence of the term "FLC" (flight crew) in the context of
"APCH" (approach).
3 253 65 WE HAD ... BEEN GIVEN A NORTHERLY VECTOR FOR A VISUAL _ TO LOS ANGELES INTL ARFI'S S
COMPLEX .... A JEILINER, ALSO FOR THE S COMPLEX, WAS APCHING LAX FROM THE E .... THE CTLR ISSUED A VISUAL
APCH CLRNC INTENDING FOR US TO MANEUVER OVER AND BEHIND HIS PATH FOR RWY 25R WHILE HE PROCEEDED TO
RWY 25L.... WE MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY ANTICIPATED THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS AND PREPROGRAMMED
OURSELVES TO HEAR AND BELIEVE THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE RWY 25L VISUAL APCH.... HE BELIEVES THEY
WERE NEVER CLOSER THAN 1/4 M] FROM THE B767. HE TALKED TO SOCAL APCH CTLR WHO INDICATED THE ACR FLC
WAS UPSET BUT SOCAL INDICATED THEY WERE ON A VISUAL APCH AND SOCAL WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR
SEPARATION.
In the narrative describing incident 260432, the reporter provides a lengthy description of the details of a normal approach as a
set-up for the sudden, abnormal, and violent roll excursions. QUORUM misinterpreted the detailed set-up as central to the
incident. Mention of the flight data recorder also appeared to QUORUM to signify relevance.
260432 WE INTERCEVrED FINAL ABOUT 5/vii OLrI_IDE THE FINAL At_H FIX AND PROCEEDED TO FLY A NORMAL APCH
USING THE FMS/ILS AND STANDARD ACR PROCS. AN APCH CHK WAS RE-ACCOMPLISHED TO IDENT THE RWY 36R LOC
AND CONFIRM THE NEW MINIMUMS FOR THAT APCH .... AT ABOUT 500 FT AGL, THE COPLT DISCONNF_.L-"IED THE
AUTOPLT, AND BEGAN TO HAND-FLY THE ACFT, WITH THE AUTOTHROTTLES STILL CONNECTED.... LATER ANALYSIS
OF THE FLT DATA RF_L-'ORDER DID NOT SHOW ANY DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCE BTWN THE AUTOPLT AND COPLT FLYING.
... AS THE RWY THRESHOLD LIGHTS WERE PASSING UNDER THE NOSE, THE AC'FT ENTERED INTO A SF_,RIF_ OF ABRUPT
AND VIOLENT ROLL EXCURSIONS WHICH I ESTIMATE TO BE IN THE RANGE OF 15-20 DEGS OF BANIC THERE WERE 3 OR
4 OF THESE ROLL REVERSALS, WHICH ENDED AS ABRUPTLY AS THEY BEGAN. AT THIS POINT, I WOULD ESTIMATE THE
ACFT ALT AT ABOUT 15 FT...
7. "ACCIDENT" in the context of "PLTS" or "TRAINING"
The words "ACCIDENT" and "PLTS" are rare in the ASRS database, but are much more common in the Cali documents. Once
QUORUM had already identified the more obviously relevant reports, it over-interpreted the relevance of those, like incidents
342160 and 360500, having words such as "ACCIDENT" in the context of "PLTS" (pilots).
342160 WE DO AERIAL FIRE-FIGHTING - OUR MISSION IS LOW LEVEL AND VERY INTENSE FLYING. I AM CONCERNED
NOT ONLY FOR OUR AGENCY PLTS, BUT ALSO FOR THE CONTRACT AIR TANKER PLTS. IF YOU CHK OUR ACCIDENT
RECORD, YOUTL SEE WHY I'M CONCERNED. WE ARE REQUIRED TO WORK EITHER 12 DAYS ON AND 2 DAYS OFF OR 6
DAYS ON AND 1 DAY OFF -- OUR DUTY DAYS AVERAGE 10-12 HRS.
360500 LCL PLTS PERSISTENTLY TAXI ON RWY 04/22 AT THE INTXN OF TXWY A WHEN INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY
29. TRANSIENT PLTS WILL REMAIN CLR OR HOLD SHORT OF RWY 04/22 UNLESS AUTH BY ATC. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT
WAITING TO HAPPEN AT THIS FACILITY BECAUSE THE ONLY PLTS THAT ACCESS RWY 04/22 WHEN INSTRUCIED TO
TAXI TO RWY 29 ARE LCL PLTS ...
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Incident325432lookedrelevanttoQUORUMprimarily because of the proximity of "ACCIDENT" and "TRAINING." This
pairing is rare in the ASRS database and more common in the Cali documents.
325432 IDEPARTEDFROMFTLAUDERDAI.EEXECLrHVEARPTWrrHMRX, ANFAAS_INSPF.L-TOR/PLTON A
PART 141 TRAINING FLT.... THIS TRAINING PERIOD WAS TO INCLUDE TOUCHIX)WN ALrI'OROTATIONS .... THE FAA HAS
MADE THIS MANEUVER A REQUIRED rlEM IN THEIR CONTRACr DEMANDS FOR OUT OF AGENCY RECURRENCY
"IR.MNING. ACCORDING TO PRELIMINARY ACCIDENT RPTS AS COLLF_,crED AND CIRCULATED TO THE HELl INDUSTRY,
THE MOST COMMON TRAINING ACCIDENT INVOLVES THE PRACTICING OF TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATIONS.
8. A "CIVIL" incident
Incident 148439 looked relevant to QUORUM primarily because of the presence of the word "CIVIL" in numerous QUORUM
relations. The word "CIVIL" is rare in the ASRS database and common in the Cali document (due to references to the Colombian
agency investigating the accident, Aeronautica Civil, and the International Civil Aviation Organization).
148439 SEVERAL CALLS WERE MADE TO THE TANKER REQUESTING A RFT OF HIS IMIENTIONS, BUT IT SEEMED THAT
THE TANKER WAS NOT ON FREQ. LATER I WAS ABLE TO CONTACT THE TANKER PLT BY PHONE AND LEARNED FROM
HIM, TOMY GREAT SURPRISE, THAT HIS AC'Fr IN NOT EVEN EQUIPPED wr'FH THE VHF RADIOS NF.CF._SARY TO
COMMUNICATE WITH CIVIL AIR TFC! ... THE MIL WOULD LOOK ESPECIALl ,Y BAD IF INVESTIGATORS DISCOVERED
THAT THE CIVIL ACFT HAD BEEN IN COMPLIANCE wrrH FAA RFZX)MMENI }ED RADIO PROCS AND THE MIL ACFT HAD
NOT, BECAUSE OF HIS LACK OF BASIC RADIO EQLrIP.
9. "FAA" and "SAFETY"
In the ASRS database, the words "FAA" and "SAFETY" usually do not describe operational details of incidents, but are
occasionally found in general opinions that some reporters add to their narratives. In the context of accident investigations,
however, these words are much more common, as in the Cali documents. QUORUM misinterpreted the prominence of relations
containing "FAA" and/or "SAFETY" as an indication that incident 355188 is re levant to the Cali accident.
355188 WE WERE ON FAA PROVING RUNS ENRTE FROM IAH TO MCO.... I.INFORTUNATELY, OUR FAA AVIATION
SAFETY INSPECTOR HAD S_CALLY REQUESTED THAT WE DO NOT ADVISE ATC OF THEIR 'SIMULATED EMER,' BUT
THAT WE WERE TO IMPROVISE PROCS TO 'EXPEDITE' A LNDG. IN AN ACTUAL EMER SIT SUCH AS THIS, ATC IS OUR
PRIMARY AND MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE, A RESOURCE DENIED TO US BY OUR AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR ....
DURING THIS DSCNT, I BR/EFED THE CREW FOR A L,NDG AT DOWNTOWN/d_,.PT, WITH THE FAA AVIATION SAFEI'Y
INSPECTOR OBSERVING THE BRIEFING.
86

Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMSNo.o7o4.o18o
Public reportingburden for this collectionof information is estimatedto average 1 hour per response, includingt "e time for reviewing instructions,searchingexisting data sources,
gatheringand maintainingthe data needed, and completingand reviewing the collectionof information. Send c( "nmentsregarding this burdenestimateor anyother aspect of this
collection of information,includingsuggestionsfor reducing this burden,to WashingtonHeadquarters Services, 3irectorate for information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington,VA22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget,PaperworkReductionPro ect (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leaveb/ank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
September 1998 Technical Memorandum
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Rating the Relevance of QUORUM-Selected ASRS Incident Narrat:,ves
to a "Controlled Flight Into Terrain" Accident
6. AUTHOR(S)
Michael W. McGreevy and Irving C. Statler
7. PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
548-71-12
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
A-9812680
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
NASA/TM-1998-208749
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Point of Contact: Michael W. McGreevy, Ames Research Center, MS 262-4
(650)604-5784
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified -- Unlimited
Subject Category 03 Distribution: Standard
Availability: NASA CASI (301) 621-0390
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
An exploratory study was conducted to identify commercial aviation incidents that are relevant to a
"controlled flight into terrain" (CFIT) accident using a NASA-developed text processing method. The
QUORUM method was used to rate 67820 incident narratives, virtually all of the narratives in the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database, according to their relevance to two official reports on the crash of
American Airlines Flight 965 near Call, Colombia in December 19!)5. For comparison with QUORUM's
ratings, three experienced ASRS analysts read the reports of the crash and independently rated the relevance
of the 100 narratives that were most highly rated by QUORUM, as well as 100 narratives randomly selected
from the database. Eighty-four of 100 QUORUM-selected narratiw_s were rated as relevant to the Call
accident by one or more of the analysts. The relevant incidents involved a variety of factors, including over-
reliance on automation, confusion and changes during descent/appi3ach, terrain avoidance, and operations in
foreign airspace. In addition, the QUORUM collection of incidents was found to be significantly more
relevant than the random collection.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Controlled flight into terrain, CFIT, ASRS incident reports, Relevance ranking
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT
Unclassified
NSN 7540-01-280-5500
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
19. SECURI1Y CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
83
16. PRICE CODE
A05
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
298-102
